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Introduction 
This dissertation addresses age discrimination of older workers in the labour market in Italy. 
It consists of three papers: one theoretical, which provides the state-of-the-art in this domain, and 
two empirical, with the first examining the role of policy in dealing with age discrimination and the 
second considering age discrimination experimentally through a laboratory experiment. 
This is not the first study on discrimination. Indeed, various types and forms of 
discrimination (i.e., gender, ethnic or age) have been subject to serious scrutiny since the 1930s and 
1950s in various disciplines, from psychology to sociology and economics to legal studies (e.g., 
Robinson, 1934; Ross, 1948; Allport, 1954 (1979); Becker, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973, etc.). 
However, although it is persistent in many social and economic domains and in various cultures and 
has been intensively studied, discrimination escapes from clear-cut definitions and semantic 
boundaries. Not only disentangling discriminatory practices from non-discriminatory attitudes and 
behaviour is difficult; it also is hard to measure any possible empirical instance of these and 
considering only one particular theoretical or methodological approach is not sufficient to account 
for the subtle nuances of the phenomenon, which can even be context-specific.  
The first chapter has tried to reconstruct these definitional problems. On the one hand, 
discrimination consists of any attitude, behavior or practice that implies to deny a person equal 
treatment due to the fact that he/she belongs to a certain group, without any reference to his/her own 
objective characteristics. Simple at a first glance, this definition gradually becomes more and more 
complicated the longer we consider it and try to apply it heuristically to understand the empirical 
reality. For instance, separating objective aspects (i.e., a given characteristic or quality of a person) 
from subjective motivations (i.e., based on stereotypical and/or prejudiced beliefs about a person as 
a member of a particular group) is very hard. Often, subjective motivations are difficult to 
reconstruct, while identifying the boundaries between penalties determined by social or economic 
inequality from ‘real’ discrimination leads to either overestimating or underestimating 
discrimination (Lucas, 2008, 2013).  
There is also another, specifically, age-related factor that complicates the study of age 
discrimination specifically. While gender and race discrimination has been addressed by legislators 
and scholars since at least the past century, age discrimination has mostly received attention only 
after the retirement age has been increasing in most European countries and the USA, i.e., in the 
past three-four decades. Although some pioneering studies have been published already at the end 
of the 1970s (e.g., Haefner, 1977; Connor et al., 1978), this domain of research is relatively new. 
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Moreover, age is considered an exceptional case even according to the Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 (Employment Equality Framework Directive), which was 
introduced by the European Parliament, where age discrimination, among other forms of 
discrimination in employment, is sanctioned. However, the law itself does not set strict boundaries 
on what is age discrimination and what is not. The clause 25 states:  
 
“The prohibition of age discrimination is an essential part of meeting the aims set out in the Employment 
Guidelines and encouraging diversity in the workforce. However, differences in treatment in connection with 
age may be justified under certain circumstances and therefore require specific provisions which may vary in 
accordance with the situation in Member States. It is therefore essential to distinguish between differences in 
treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational 
training objectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited”.  
 
It is worth noting that the list of possible justifications is vague. For example, age, seniority 
and professional experience are considered similar when allowing for minimum required age, while 
fixing maximum age is allowed if it is based on some training requirements or “the need for a 
reasonable period of employment before retirement”. Additionally, the differences in treatment are 
allowed if they serve to protect workers of certain ages.  
Therefore, the law implies that if there is a legitimate, reasonable reason for unequal 
treatment of people of different ages, this treatment is not discriminatory. In principle, this makes 
sense as differences in ages mostly mean differences in experience, education, physical abilities and 
health status. However, it must be noted that “objectivity” here relates more preferably to younger 
ages. Indeed, it is literally impossible to have 20 years of experience at 25, but it is possible to be 
physically fit at 50 even if age increases the probability of having some diseases, provided that a 
person leads a healthy life. Furthermore, considering younger people, research often attributes 
unequal treatment to different economic cycles or the education-job market mismatch without any 
discriminatory reasons (e.g. Barbulescu, 2012; Refrigeri, Aleandri, 2013; Gontkovičová, 
Mihalčová, Pružinský, 2015).  
However, understanding the mechanisms behind stereotypes that prevent employers to 
evaluate older people objectively is more difficult. Considering older workers less motivated, less 
healthy, less prompt to learn new methods and dealing with new technologies is typical (e.g., Riach 
& Rich, 2007). All these stereotypes result in discrimination as a person’s characteristic is simply 
transposed from the simple fact that he/she is considered as a group member, merely due to 
categorization rather than concrete individual characteristics.  
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Therefore, the reasons behind younger people’s high risks of unemployment are more often 
than not connected to the reasons not related to discrimination.  
On the other hand, the situation of older people is less clear, with subjective and objective 
dimensions often conflated to the detriment of understanding (Wood et al., 2008). This makes 
almost impossible to distinguish between discrimination and justified unequal treatment, especially 
because research about older people’s abilities and their link to productivity did not produce 
consensual findings (e.g., Fyock, 1991; Warr, 1994; Chaparro et al, 1999; Kang, Yoon, 2008; 
Zancada-Menendez et al, 2015, etc.). 
However, this is one of the most important aspects when studying potentially discriminative 
outcomes, actions and settings. Finding out the grounds for unequal treatment is key to understand 
discrimination. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.  
In the first chapter, we provided an overview on discrimination in general and age 
discrimination specifically, delving into the history of this research and its current state. We also 
considered methodological issues and approaches which could enlarge and enrich research in this 
domain.  
Among other things, in the first chapter, we have provided an overview of the literature 
about possible theories behind older workers being discriminated in the labour market. After 
analyzing them we infer that there are two main reasons behind specifically discriminatory 
decisions against older workers made by employers (Wood et al., 2008). First, these are cultural 
norms that favour “young” over “old” which can be considered as instances of the tastes-based 
discrimination defined by Becker (Becker, 1971). Secondly, labour market is conditioned by 
imperfect information, which leads employers to rely on stereotypes about older workers. This is 
what economists would define as “statistical discrimination” (e.g., Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973).  
Beside these two theories, Wood and colleagues (2008) examine various others that could 
stand behind unfavourable treatment of older workers compared to younger ones such as older 
workers intentionally not undergoing necessary additional training or firms in the periods of crisis 
letting go workers who are closer to retirement. However, most of those theories, that are addressed 
in chapter one in detail, depend a lot on the circumstances behind the actions. It is almost 
impossible to understand whether the actions were discriminatory without digging into the 
reasoning the preceded the actions, be they objective or subjective. The workers could have decided 
themselves that they hold no interest in undergoing training that would allow them to gain up-to-
date knowledge in their field or they could have been denied access to training by their employers 
due to their beliefs that workers will not be able to keep up with new methods because they are too 
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old. In the period of crisis employer could have made an older worker redundant because he/she 
assumed that an older worker is less motivated than a younger worker and will retire anyway in a 
couple of years or he/she could have made that decision because an older worker was less 
productive than a younger worker. The reasoning here decides everything.  
Therefore, examining discrimination without considering reasoning and motivations often 
has little sense. Absence of an up-to-date training and health problems have constructive 
implications while stereotypes, cultural norms and beliefs a lot less so. The mechanisms 
determining unequal treatment are also key, as they are instrumental for policies. Employment 
problems of older workers that are linked to their health issues and/or lower competency levels 
require different policy measures compared to the employment problems that arise from simple 
discriminative behaviour from the side of employers.  
Another important point that we raised in the first chapter is methodological. There is a 
limited number of approaches towards discrimination in the labour market: analysis of the 
outcomes, surveys of the employers and workers, field and laboratory experiments (Keuschnigg and 
Wolbring, 2015) that, obviously, have their strengths and weaknesses and, ideally, all of them 
should be used to get a full picture about discrimination, as separately they do not represent it. 
Thus, in our research, we made an attempt to look at the discrimination issue from different angles.  
In the second chapter, we analyzed the role and effect of policies in fighting discrimination, 
with a particular interest in the introduction of the Employment Equality Framework Directive in 
Italy. Although previous research suggested that policies are not sufficient to eradicate 
discrimination, analyzing these aspects is instrumental to understand how the concept is socially 
constructed (Krings, Sczesny, Kluge, 2011). Even though research about age discrimination in the 
labour market in Italy is scarce, there is certain evidence about discrimination of older workers 
(Segalla, Jacobs-Belschak, Muller, 2001; Rymkevitch, Villosio, 2007; Lazazzara, Bombelli, 2011). 
According to some researchers, this problem is currently being solved only by the increase in 
retirement age, which is what many governments are doing, and which is not necessarily the best 
decision (Guaglianone, Ravelli, 2017). Indeed, retirement age increase does not automatically lead 
to an increase of older people’s employment. It may also lead to an increase of unemployment 
among older groups if other anti-discriminatory measures are not undertaken at the same time. 
Therefore, in the chapter two, we analyzed the influence of the introduction of the anti-
discriminatory legislation in 2003 on the employment rate of the older cohort (55-59 y.o.) compared 
to a control group of younger workers (35-39 y.o.) by using the difference-in-difference method of 
analysis on the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) data.  
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In the third chapter, we presented a laboratory experiment on labour market discrimination. 
We concentrated on the actual existence of age discrimination in hiring towards older workers by 
presenting various vacancies and CVs to participants (students) and asking them to choose between 
older and younger candidates, who also varied in terms of gender, experience and additional 
training. Our design was intended to help us disentangling objective (experience, training) and 
subjective factors (stereotypes, social influence), while considering also certain recruiters’ personal 
characteristics (i.e., gender, age, family situation). Our ambition was to distinguish between 
objective, rational, non-discriminatory decisions; pure discriminatory decisions (“tastes-based”) and 
statistical discrimination. This is why we asked participants additional questions about their 
attitudes towards older workers and older people in general. Here, the laboratory experimental 
setting was instrumental to obtain objective information about the current situation, while 
permitting us to remove additional unobservable factors as our best.  
In the conclusion of this dissertation, we summarized our results, discussed changing trends 
in discrimination and certain factors influencing it. We considered mechanisms behind 
discriminatory actions, the best fitting theories and possible measures that could lead to the decrease 
of discrimination. We addressed the benefits and limitations of this research, and, finally, ways in 
which it could be further developed and enriched. 
 
Chapter 1. Literature review1 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the concept of discrimination. Attention will be paid 
to reconstructing the most relevant approaches in order to provide the state-of-the-art in this 
domain, with a special emphasis on age discrimination in the labour market. We will start with 
discussion of concepts and types of discrimination in general to turn then to a more specific type 
of discrimination — age discrimination. It is important to note that this type of discrimination 
has attracted a lot of attention considering the current trends in ageing population in all 
contemporary societies, with dramatic socio-economic implications. However, the amount of 
literature compared to literature on other forms of discrimination is relatively scarce.  
1. The concept and definition of discrimination 
Everyone knows what discrimination is from his or her personal experience. The notion 
may seem obvious and self-explanatory without further ado. Even if we do not feel victims of 
discrimination and/or do not consider ourselves capable of discriminating other people, we 
usually read newspapers and journals or see social media campaigns which show public 
movements or civil protests aimed to provide equal rights to certain groups, who are deprived of 
these by someone else. Everything seems clear and obvious. We may agree or disagree about the 
existence and extent of discrimination, but, probably, we will have no doubt saying that we are 
very well aware of the existence of this phenomenon and of what it means.  
However, it had not always been the case.  
Social stratification that exists to a certain extent in all societies is the division of the 
society in groups that differ by wealth, social status and power (e.g., Parsons, 1940; Davis, 
1942). Social inequality comes as a result of this division. Division in groups, per se, can be 
considered normal and natural for a society (Davis, Moore, 1944). Certain level of inequality is 
even looked at as a positive thing by some researchers as it may stimulate people to invest in 
themselves and work harder to improve their position on the social ladder (Grusky, Manwai, 
2008). 
However, this division in groups is not always just and, thus, social inequality is also not 
necessarily just. It can, obviously, arise from individuals’ personal qualities and abilities 
(Durkheim, 1892; Davis, Moore, 1944) but no less often from other factors that do not depend 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Prof. Marco Castellani (University of Brescia), Prof. Flaminio Squazzoni 
(University of Brescia), Prof. Cinzia Meraviglia (University of Milan), Prof. Károly Takács (RECENS) and Prof. 
Marco Novarese (University of Eastern Piedmont) for their useful comments.  
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on any individual characteristics, including discrimination based on persons’ belonging to 
specific groups (Lucas, 2008).  
This attitude towards certain group characteristics is a societal thing, historically 
developed. These characteristics, be it gender or skin colour, are only important to the extent that 
society considers them important (Grusky, Manwai, 2008). The more important they are, the 
higher is the level of discrimination. In the past, this group approach was considered completely 
natural, societies were based on them. Nowadays, we are trying to move away from them, 
knowing that, according to recent studies higher levels of equality are better for economic 
growth and for the societies as a whole (Grusky, Manwai, 2008). Higher levels of equality, lower 
levels of discrimination benefit not only unfavoured groups but also those who do not belong to 
them (Lucas, 2008).  
However, inequality that arises from objective individual factors and inequality that 
comes from discrimination are two different things that are not always easy to disentangle.  
In order to understand the phenomenon of discrimination better, we will first look at its 
concept and origins in more detail.  
We can start by giving the term a rather broad, general, dictionary definition, just to set 
certain wide boundaries for this review. Thus, according to Cambridge dictionary, discrimination 
means,  
 
“treating a person or particular group of people differently, especially in a worse way from the way in 
which you treat other people, because of their skin colour, sex, sexuality, etc.”.  
 
Oxford dictionary says that it is  
 
“the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, age, 
or sex”.  
 
We will, through the course of this chapter, address other earlier and later definitions and 
related concepts. However, we believe that these definitions allow us to understand that if a 
person is denied equal treatment with other people only because he/she belongs to a certain 
group or groups and not because of objective facts regarding this person specifically, well, in 
these cases, we can surely say he/she is being discriminated. 
Nowadays, in most places and societies the existence of discrimination is considered 
common knowledge. Most people, in theory at least, have been exposed either directly or 
indirectly to certain discriminative actions and know that this leads the victims to negative 
consequences, which is something incorrect and unjust. The existence of various anti-
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discriminatory laws, regular publications and discussions in blogs and on social media, social 
advertising and social experiments does not permit people to forget or ignore it and helps 
everyone to remember.  
Nevertheless, evidence indicates that discrimination is still persistent (see in detail 
below). This is because distinguishing discrimination from other actions based on well-founded, 
valid, objective reasons as well as understanding the subjective reasoning of discriminators 
behind their actions is considerably more complicated (Kalisch, Williams, 1983).  
Probably, this is also because discrimination on closer inspection remains a relatively 
young field of research. On the one hand, evidence suggests that it has existed since long ago. In 
history, signs of discriminatory behavior can be found as early as the fifth century B.C. (Isaac, 
2006, p.2) among ancient Greeks and Romans. They were proponents of environmental theory 
which assumed that physical environment influenced and even determined group characteristics. 
Moreover, they believed that these characteristics were passed on to the next generations and 
stayed unchanged over time. While these theories cannot be viewed as contemporary racism is 
viewed (indeed, Isaac himself talks about proto-racism and ethnic prejudice), they served to 
justify categorization of people into inferior, equal and superior, and the roots of contemporary 
racial and ethnic discrimination come from those, very early, periods (Isaac, 2006, p. 1; p. 55-
56). Similarly, we can talk about Christians being oppressed in the third century, i.e. 
discriminated if put in today’s words, and with scales shifting in the next century in their favour 
and against the pagans (Arjava, 1996, p. 3). Women in the Late antiquity in Roman society had 
considerably fewer rights and free will than men, be it marriage decisions or property rights. 
Moreover, even though Roman laws in general were gender neutral and, as Arjava states, 
women’s position in the Roman society was rather strong in comparison with other historical 
societies, their role was limited to the family and they did not seem to have any independent role 
outside of it (Arjava, 1996, Chapter 7). Finally, while old age was often favoured in antiquity, 
even regarding this group there can be found signs of prejudice and discrimination as there were 
two extreme attitudes:  
 
“that old people have a definite role to play and contribution to make; and that old people are an 
unwelcome burden and at best must be tolerated” (Johnson, Thane, 1998, p. 34).  
 
Therefore, we can see that unequal and unjust treatment of certain groups is a very old 
phenomenon.  
On the other hand, the first official definition of discrimination is attributed by Oxford 
dictionaries only to the early 17th century (English Oxford living dictionaries, 2018). Certain 
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laws and acts aiming at providing some sort of equal treatment and equal rights to different 
groups of society can be found in earlier periods in history (e.g., Statute of Kalisz, 1264; Edict of 
Nantes, 1598). However, first systematic analyses are found not earlier than in the 1920s and 
1930s and they mostly concerned market power side, i.e., strictly economics-based side of 
discrimination (Robinson, 1934; Ross, 1948; Kessel, 1958), and prejudice/stereotypes 
(Schneider, 2005, pp. 8-9). Later on, research explored various angles, with a particular attention 
to racial discrimination since the 1950s and especially the 1970s (Becker, 1971; Phelps, 1972; 
Arrow, 1973; Aigner, Cain, 1977; Allport, 1954 (1979).  
However, it is relatively clear that discrimination as a recognized issue is only about a 
century old. Certain theoretical and methodological approaches trace back to about 50-70 years 
old. This can explain why research did not yet clearly distinguish discrimination from inequality, 
for instance, or did not develop robust methods to measure it. 
2. The origins, process, types and consequences of 
discrimination 
2.1 Stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination 
Discrimination has negative economic, social and psychological consequences either 
individually or collectively. It penalizes certain individuals to benefit other ones either 
objectively or subjectively. When a person discriminates another one due to his/her age, 
ethnicity or gender, not only is he/she reducing the likelihood that this person accesses relevant 
material or symbolic resources (money, a job, respect and self-esteem); he/she also can benefit 
from keeping these resources for him/herself or for a member of his/her group. These advantages 
and the competitive power related to them can explain why discrimination did not cease to exist. 
For a long time, stereotypes, both arising from subjective and objective thinking, have been 
considered a reason behind prejudice and, thus, behind discriminatory behavior.  
According to Schneider (2005),  
 
“stereotypes are qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people” 
(Schneider, 2005, p. 24). 
 
Stereotypes follow people’s natural tendency of categorizing what they see, do, know and 
experience. Hence, dividing everything into groups and categories, including themselves and 
people around them, is natural. Note that many categorizations and even stereotypes arising are a 
necessity for humans. They make life easier, help avoid uncertainty and use experience to 
personal advantage. Therefore, stereotypes are not a bad thing per se. They are bad when 
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negative, far from the truth and hurting vulnerable people either directly or indirectly (Schneider, 
2005, Chapter 15).  
Furthermore, the relationship between stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination is not 
exactly straightforward. Many of the first studies in psychology and social psychology 
considered discrimination as a form of prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954 (1979), Frederickson, 
Knobel, 1980, etc.). This is followed even by recent authors (Fishbein, 2002, who covers most of 
the publication on prejudice written before him; Nelson, 2009, Brown, 2010; etc.).  
In his seminal work Allport wrote that prejudice is  
 
“an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that 
group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group” (Allport, 1979, 
p.7).  
 
He also argued that  
 
“the net effect of prejudice (…) is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his 
own misconduct” (Allport, 1979, p.9).  
 
In this respect, Fishbein provided another definition:  
 
"Prejudice is an unreasonable negative attitude toward others because of their membership in a particular 
group" (Fishbein, 2002, pp. 4-5).  
 
It can be noted that these definitions have in common the idea that prejudice is 
unreasonable and not based on any objective facts. However, Brown (2010) disagreed with the 
part of definition about prejudice being regarded only as unreasonable, as  
 
“a ‘false’ or ‘irrational’ set of beliefs, a ‘faulty’ generalization, or as an ‘unwarranted’ disposition to behave 
negatively towards another group” (Brown, 2010, p. 5). 
 
Firstly, according to Brown, such an approach means that there is a way to prove 
incorrectness of prejudiced ideas which is not necessarily the case. He presented an example of 
landlords’ prejudice against black tenants who are “likely to create problems”. Brown claimed 
that even if it was possible to devise some normative standard of “peacefulness” and compare 
people to it, there would still be many possible explanations for this predisposition to blacks 
“creating problems” (provocations by white people, reaction to unfair social deprivation, etc.) 
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that are not connected to black people’s nature. Thus, as Brown stated, even if the landlords’ 
beliefs did have some alleged proof from reality, it would make their attitudes no less prejudiced.  
Prejudice may have warranty, especially in the eyes of those who are prejudiced, and, in 
this sense, will be reasonable from their point of view.  
Prejudice typically exists towards members belonging to specific groups and usually has 
a negative flavour, although some researchers mentioned even cases of positive prejudice 
(Brown, 2010, p. 4-5; Allport, 1979, p. 6). For instance, Allport suggested that prejudice can also 
be positive in situations when people are  
 
“prejudiced in favor of others; they may think well of them without sufficient warrant” (Allport, 1979, p. 
6).  
 
However, in general, researchers are concerned with the negative side of prejudice that is 
usually studied as this side of the phenomenon has serious and negative consequences for the 
society, and this prejudice often arises from negative stereotypes.  
Nevertheless, it is not as obvious. For example, as Brown (2010) stated, presenting 
himself as an example, he is very favourable towards everything Italian (food, cinema, language, 
etc.) but that this kind of preference is highly unlikely to create any serious social problems. 
Nevertheless, there are instances in which positive bias towards certain groups can lead to these 
groups staying in subordinate position. Brown cited examples from previous research. In North 
America, people tended to have more positive stereotypes about women than about men  
 
(“men are incomplete without women’; ‘women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral 
sensibility’; or ‘a good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man” (Brown, 2010, p.6))  
 
but these stereotypes exactly served to defining women as dependent on men and people 
with such views were also more prone to defending sexist notions. Thus, even positive prejudice 
could (indirectly) result in societal problems and create social inequality.  
 
Therefore, agreeing with Brown, to our opinion, a more complete definition of prejudice 
would be: 
 
“any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, which directly or indirectly implies some 
negativity or antipathy towards that group” (Brown, 2010, p.7). 
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Considering the place of discrimination here, we can state that this should be an action 
resulting from prejudiced attitudes. As Allport (1979) indicated, prejudice does not necessarily 
equal discrimination. It only turns into discrimination when people start acting in accordance 
with their personal misconceptions about certain groups. In his theory, discrimination is formed 
in five steps. The first step is people talking about their prejudices (antilocution). A lot of people 
do not go beyond it. The second step takes place when people start to avoid those who they are 
prejudiced against (avoidance). At this stage they do not do any direct harm themselves. The 
third step he named is, actually, discrimination. This is when active steps are being taken to 
remove, exclude, members of certain groups, for example, from employment, education or social 
privileges. Next stage is physical violence against members of this groups. The final step is 
extermination — the highest degree of expressing prejudice.  
To summarize Allport’s attitude towards discrimination we can cite his words: 
 
“Discrimination comes about only when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment 
which they may wish.” (Allport, 1979, p. 51). 
 
This would suggest that while prejudice is more or less a feeling, an opinion, an attitude, 
discrimination is an action following such feelings, opinions and attitudes and being the 
consequence of them.  
 
According, for example, to Frederickson and Knobel: 
 
 “Discrimination may appear to be simply acting out of prior prejudice, but there is evidence to 
suggest that prejudice becomes fully developed and formally sanctioned only after the process of 
differential treatment is well under way. Attitude and action tend to feed on each other, creating a 
vicious circle that works to enhance the power and prestige of one group at the expense of the other” 
(Frederickson, Knobel, 1980, p. 31).  
 
Additionally, as Allport correctly argued,  
 
“few people keep their antipathies entirely to themselves” (Allport, 1979, p. 14).  
 
Therefore, prejudiced people very often discriminate in one way or another against 
groups of people they dislike. Consequently, prejudice becomes stronger and the same happens 
to discrimination.  
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It should also be mentioned that prejudice and stereotypes are not fixed. They change 
with environment, time and circumstances. And it is hard to predict how the stereotype (and 
prejudiced attitudes with it) would evolve if one person belonged to two different groups against 
which another person had contradicting stereotypes (i.e., he/she is negatively prejudiced against 
one group and positively prejudiced against another group) (Schneider, 2005, p. 269). 
Furthermore, recent research suggests that certain negative stereotypes can lead to positive 
consequences and absence of discrimination, such as gay black men not being discriminated 
contrary to black men in general because in this case the stereotypes of gays being effeminate 
would override the stereotypes of black people being aggressive and dangerous and play in favor 
of the applicant in the labour market (Pedulla, 2014, p. 75). Still, these are very specific cases 
that do not overturn the whole story about the destructive role of prejudice and stereotypes in 
people’s lives.  
Lucas (2008) when addressing the phenomenon of discrimination, adopted an approach 
that differed slightly from the ones that we have presented above. He claimed that the third step 
that Allport named discrimination is not actually discrimination but one part of it — exclusion. 
He also claimed that Allport himself defined discrimination as an action but that, in this sense, 
antilocution (the first step) is not just an attitude but an action in itself. Thus, he argued that the 
whole five-step-process presented by Allport (from feeling and voicing prejudice to 
extermination) described different forms and stages of discrimination.  
Following Lucas’ reasoning, here we will adopt his definition of discrimination which is 
very close to the one given by Allport: 
 
“discrimination entails distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation 
either to individual capacities or merits, or to the concrete behavior of the individual person, but is, instead, 
based in a limiting view of some types of persons” (Lucas, 2008, p.179). 
 
Here, we should also address the fact that stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination rarely 
happen on individual level only (although this is the level at which they are usually studied, and 
we will look at this this further in the text). In general, it is a group phenomenon. According to 
Allport’s (1979) theory of in-groups and out-groups, people get used to belong to homogeneous 
groups, to their own kind and often do not feel the need to communicate with other groups, 
outside the circle of people that they are used to. They do face people from the out-groups in 
occupational situation but often do not go in the communication beyond the work environment. 
This concerns both minority and majority groups, and the minorities do not always remain 
separate due to the action of the majority groups. It is not a rare case when the minority groups 
choose to remain among their kind. This, obviously, creates the environment for the members of 
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one group not to have enough information about the members of other groups. They may 
overestimate the level of differences between them and other groups and form understanding of 
other groups based on this limited information. This, in turn, leads to the creation of stereotypes.  
Moreover, as we have already briefly mentioned above, categorizations and 
generalizations follow people through all their lives. 
People are taught generalizations in schools and by their parents (and for the good cause 
as well), they learn from their culture, they consider themselves to belong to certain groups 
themselves (by birth and/or by personal choices). And this brings us to the issue of identification 
and even self-identification. Each and every person grows up in some kind of a culture starting 
from the cultural norms inside his/her family and finishing with the cultural and legal norms of 
the country he/she grew up in. Every person learns to identify himself/herself with those norms, 
what is right or wrong, good or bad, legal or illegal. And he/she, definitely, adds personal 
experience to it forming generalizations of their own (Schneider, 2005, Chapter 1). Which kind 
of influence is stronger will depend on the circumstances.  
In any case, it could be said that due to the circumstances of his/her upbringing and/or 
due to personal experience a person decides to consider himself/herself belonging to one or 
several groups and often tends to be at least cautious around those who he/she thinks to belong to 
other groups. His/her caution may be the result of previous experience or of ignorance, either 
way he/she is sure that another person is somehow different — and in a negative way. The 
“type” of this difference varies with time and circumstances. In the distant past discrimination 
was often based on religion (Allport, 1979, p. xvii); in the twentieth century, we would have 
probably named race and gender as the main reasons for discrimination — or, at least, as the 
most obvious ones; today, we can expect all these kinds of discrimination together with the new 
ones, such as discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identification.  
To summarize all that was discussed above, we can say that discrimination originates 
from the people’s tendency to categorize everything and everyone around them. While it makes 
life simpler and less uncertain, it also leads to people being cautious towards things and people 
that they consider different from themselves. Those categorizations may be based on cultural 
norms and/or personal experiences. Either way it is easy to put a person in a specific category 
based on his/her race, gender, age, etc. and assume that all member belonging to this group have 
certain traits. When negative traits are assumed, it is the first step towards discrimination as a 
stereotypes and prejudice are being formed. Then, depending on the severity of negative attitude 
discriminatory behavior may vary from simple avoidance to exclusion and even to 
extermination. As a consequence, discriminated groups face various issues including 
psychological problems, lower grades at school, worse career and life opportunities in general, 
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face higher unemployment risks and issues. All this, in turn leads to lower quality of life than 
that of people who do not belong to discriminated groups that we will discuss in more detail 
further on.  
2.2 Types of discrimination 
When trying to distinguish between different types of discrimination, research tends to 
highlight two main ones.  
The first type is the one on which Becker has built his theory of discrimination, saying 
that  
 
“if someone has a taste for discrimination, he must act as if he were willing to forfeit income to avoid 
certain transactions” (Becker, 1971, p. 14)  
 
and that in the foundation of this approach lie ignorance and prejudice. This type of 
discrimination is usually called tastes-based or prejudice-based discrimination.  
The advocates of the opposite theory (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner, Cain, 1977) 
took a different approach. According to them, it is not about likes and dislikes based on 
prejudiced perceptions, but rather about not tastes-related decisions based on different logic of 
thinking. They claimed that the employers who could not observe the real abilities of their 
potential employees would use ethnic, age or other characteristic as proxies for these abilities. 
They will take average productivity of the group to make decisions. Sometimes real statistics, 
sometimes stereotypical views based on personal experiences and experiences of other people 
will be used. In both cases, the person who does not fit the average or the stereotype (and a lot of 
people would not) would be the victim of discrimination.  
In case of the first theory the person is ready to accept a decreased income just to avoid 
coming in contact with someone who he/she does not like (e.g., not hire an objectively good 
candidate just because it is a woman instead of a man, or a black person instead of a white one; 
deny a person booking of a hotel room based only on his or her nationality-specific surname 
even though there are rooms available just because of a specific dislike of people of this specific 
nation, etc.). In case of a second one, the person does the opposite: for example, he does not 
make a woman a job offer not because he/she does not like women but because he/she knows for 
a fact that women take more leaves of absence to stay with sick children than men and that her 
frequent absences will disrupt his/her business and lead to income loss. True, this person cannot 
know how this specific woman will act but he/she does not hire her just in case.  
However, in retrospective both tastes-based and statistical discrimination are a result of 
stereotypical beliefs and prejudice which role we have discussed in the previous section of this 
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chapter. It is just that in the first case the person who discriminates is prepared to lose something 
while in the second one this person expects to gain something or, at least, to avoid objective 
losses. Still, in both cases we have some kind of a stereotype about a group to which the 
discriminated person belongs and a prejudiced attitude against him/her based on this stereotype.  
Apart from the main, underlying, types of discrimination, there were other attempts to 
distinguish among such types as market power discrimination; discrimination coming from 
institutional, social or legal constraints (both specified in Feltovich, Papageorgiou, 2004); 
intentional, explicit discrimination (verbal antagonism, avoidance, segregation, physical attacks 
and extermination); subtle, unconscious, automatic discrimination; discrimination resulting from 
organizational processes (rules of providing loans and mortgages; selling and renting houses; 
employing new employees, while not discriminating anyone formally, still result in some groups 
being put at a disadvantage) (all presented in Blank, Dabady, Citro, 2004).  
Lucas (2008) discussed the criticism of the two main approaches to classify 
discrimination.  
According to him, Becker’s theory is hard to generalize to other spheres aside from the 
economic one. It also fails to distinguish between positive and negative discrimination, i.e. 
Becker in his theory assumes that the wage gaps between discriminated and non-discriminated 
groups are due to the employer willing to compensate for his/her displeasure of hiring workers 
who he/she dislikes. However, this could also work the other way around: the wage of someone 
may be higher because the employer likes him/her more than he/she likes other workers. 
Similarly, Becker’s theory in unable to distinguish between discrimination and differences that 
arise from other reasons. As Lucas put it, with Becker’s theory it is impossible to see the 
difference between marriage and employment discrimination. When marrying someone, the 
person makes a choice based on tastes, they may be forfeiting some income (e.g., if they are 
choosing a less wealthy person) and they may be decreasing the quality of life of the person they 
are not choosing. The same thing happens in employment discrimination situation.  
Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, according to Lucas, also has problems. He 
claimed that, if employers hold incorrect information about the abilities of workers, then these 
attitudes should be corrected over time when the employer gets to observe real abilities. If this 
does not happen, it means that other factors influence the position of discriminated groups that 
the theory does not consider. If this is not the case, it may mean that incorrect attitudes of 
employers come as a result of the limits of information that they have access to. However, in this 
case, Lucas says, it means that employers are prepared to accept the unreliable sources of 
information or unreliable indicators of the productivity of discriminated groups. This would 
mean that they have some views about these groups that allow them to keep these unreliable 
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indicators. This, in turn, would mean that issues are more complicated than notions of statistical 
discrimination assume. Finally, the decisions made under the concept of statistical discrimination 
could happen due to employers being risk-averse. In this case, Lucas claimed, these are not 
discriminatory issues. This, last, point, to our opinion, is debatable. While an employer may 
decide not to hire a person whose abilities he/she cannot evaluate on the spot in an attempt to 
avoid risks, this will still, de facto, be a discriminative action. This decision will be made 
because the employer will hold a stereotype about the group to which this potential employee 
belongs. This discrimination just will not be a conscious, planned discrimination based on a 
personal dislike or preference.  
Proponents of both theories in their research concentrated mainly on the labour market 
and other economic situations which are, obviously, not the only domains where discrimination 
can be found (see below). We have also established that adapting them (especially Becker’s 
theory) to other domains may be hard. However, as this research concentrates on discrimination 
in the labour market, this cannot be the reason for us not to base our research on these types of 
discrimination. 
We also agree with most of other critics addressing these two types of discrimination. 
Nevertheless, to our view, they represent two different, practically opposite, attitudes through 
which a person as an individual and/or a person as part of a group can be discriminative against a 
person belonging to another group. Becker’s tastes-based discrimination addresses more 
conscious side of discrimination. Statistical discrimination, being based on statistical 
information, and, thus, even considered by Lucas as not-discrimination, to our view remains 
discrimination as members of those groups who do not hold qualities attributed to them will still 
suffer from unfair treatment. To make our reasoning clearer: only women can get pregnant and 
give birth. However, basing employment decisions on this notion and assuming that this 
particular woman of fertile age will make a choice to have a baby and leave employment soon 
would be discriminative. Moreover, physical abilities and health do tend to deteriorate with age. 
However, using age as an only factor to determine whether a potential employee will be able to 
perform tasks that require certain level of physical fitness will be discriminatory as from age 
alone it is impossible to say whether the persons keeps himself/herself in good shape. To our 
opinion, both these examples fall in line with statistical discrimination.  
Thus, although understanding that these two definitions have their limits and are unable 
to provide for all details behind discriminatory action, we, however, will be using them as a 
means of distinguishing between baseline motives that could lie at the heart of discrimination. 
We will address the importance of these motivations further in the text.  
 21 
We understand that it is difficult to distinguish between different types of discrimination, 
mainly, because the subtle differences in reasoning that separates one from the other are often 
difficult to “catch”, especially with the existing methods of research that we analyze in the next 
sections of this chapter and with the current attitude in the world towards discrimination from the 
legal point of view.  
Even with a simple personal dislike of a certain group of people a person can find an 
objective explanation for his/her discriminatory decisions, especially as today mostly everyone 
knows that, in general, being an openly discriminating person is bad for reputation and — due to 
the existence of anti-discriminatory laws — bad for business. Consequently, those people, even 
if they do discriminate on the basis of tastes, would look for valid, socially acceptable 
explanations of their actions. Probably, it is not surprising that most papers do not go into 
distinguishing between tastes-based and statistical discrimination, as it is so difficult to do 
exactly that — find out what lies behind discriminatory actions and why.  
Still, in the end, all forms of discrimination arise from prejudice, stereotypes, statistics or 
previous experience (which, in turn, also come to stereotypes) — or at least to market research 
that allows for generalizations leading in return, for example, to price discrimination in the 
market. In the end, all these types of discrimination are linked to either statistical or tastes-based 
discrimination. For example, rules on loans of mortgages are based on the average statistical 
information about certain groups of people and market power discrimination on the average type 
of consumer, even if it is apparent that some individuals act differently.  
Thus, we have two focal types of discrimination both closely linked to stereotypes and 
prejudice. We will now move to the next section to discuss the levels at which discrimination 
can take place: micro and macro.  
2.3 Two levels of discrimination 
There are two main levels at which discrimination may take place: micro and macro. 
Mainly the researchers take the micro-level approach, i.e. studying individual’s actions towards 
other individuals, even if those individuals consider themselves and their counterparts to belong 
to certain groups. Almost every research approach to discrimination (surveys, experiments, 
secondary data analysis (Keuschnigg and Wolbring (2015))) is a micro-level one. And it is true 
that discrimination is often understood as a micro level phenomenon. It even comes from its 
definition about a person being denied equality because of belonging to a certain group.  
However, macro-level of discrimination which happens on the level of the society as a 
whole, the level on which legislations and policies that influence the level of discrimination are 
introduced, the level at which norms and beliefs are often engrained is no less important. 
Consequences of discrimination, even if these are individuals who perform discriminatory 
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actions, have an encompassing effect on everyone in the society. This is a large-scale approach 
that looks not at individuals or small groups but at big groups, countries, states or societies as a 
whole, on an aggregate level. This approach, however, is not very popular in the studies of 
discrimination. For example, research that concerns laws focuses on the contents of laws and 
analyzes the content of those laws or specific cases rather than the quantitative data and a more 
in-depth analysis of the direct connection of changes to the introduction of new anti-
discriminatory laws (e.g., Sargeant, 2004; McColgan, 2005; Fredman, 2011; Ellis, Watson, 
2012; Sargeant, 2013; Corbin, Duvall, 2015; Khaitan; 2015).  
The proof of discrimination’s all-encompassing role in the society is that its existence is 
found almost everywhere. Let us present some example about different discriminatory settings 
and different discriminated groups. 
In USA, research shows high levels of perceived discrimination in educational settings 
due to racial bias both in academic sense and in peer activities (Fisher, Wallace, Fenton, 2000; 
Benner, Graham, 2013; Benner, Wang, 2017). In developing countries, such as Pakistan (Ara, 
Malik, 2012), India (Nagaraja, Reddy, Shankar, 2013), Bangladesh or Malawi (Khan et al., 
2016), females face more obstacles than males in getting access to education.  
In health care in USA, patients from racial and ethnic minorities suffer both from 
statistical discrimination (they tend to get worse treatment compared to white patients due to 
communication problems with physicians who, as a result, understand the health status of these 
patients worse and are likely to mismatch them with the treatments (Balsa, McCuire, 2001)) and 
perceived discrimination (Hausmann et al., 2008). Patients with mental illness often fall victims 
of negative attitude from medical staff and “diagnostic overshadowing”, i.e. when their physical 
symptoms are wrongly attributed to their mental illness problems (Thornicroft, Rose, Kassam, 
2007). Kydd and Fleming (2015) present an in-depth analysis on age discrimination and ageism 
against older adults aged between 50 and 85.  
In the USA, disabled people, in particular, those with learning difficulties face 
discrimination and can end up wrongfully accused of crimes (Chappell, 1994). The same thing 
happens to people from racial minorities (Weitzer, 1996).  
Research based on the firm-level data from 28 transitional European countries showed 
support for the hypothesis of the bias against female-led businesses in what concerned the 
probability of credit denials as the differences in decisions made could not be explained by 
observable characteristics of the firms (Aristei, Gallo, 2016). Similar issues were reported by 
self-employed non-European immigrants in Sweden (Aldén, Hammarstedt, 2016), as well as for 
loan applicants belonging to racial and ethnics minorities in the USA (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, 
1998).  
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Ethnic and racial discrimination is also persistent in consumer and housing markets in 
USA (Yinger, 1998; Ahmed, Hammarstedt, 2008; Gaddis, Ghoshal, 2015) and in Spain (Bosch, 
Carnero, Farré, 2015) as field experiments show.  
In the labour market of France, an extensive study of 2228 branches of companies 
showed a significant level of discrimination against applicants with physical disabilities. The 
same happens to the disabled in the UK, in spite of the introduction of 1996 Disability 
Discrimination Act in Britain which, at best, had no impact on their employment rate and, at 
worse, could have even decreased it (Bell, Heitmueller, 2009). Women still face considerable 
workplace discrimination in the USA (Gregory, 2003). Field experiment showed ethnic 
discrimination in the labour market (both in terms of wage levels and hiring) of Greece 
(Drydakis, Vlassis, 2010; Drydakis, 2012). Ozeren’s (2014) literature review of the papers 
concerning sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace pointed to the existence of the 
problems in terms of, for example, lower wages even if their situation differed across countries. 
The meta-analysis of field research on ethnic discrimination in hiring in OECD countries for the 
period 1990-2015 showed that this kind of discrimination is commonplace (Zschirnt, Ruedin, 
2015). There are various examples in different countries of age discrimination proved by field 
research that we will discuss later in more detail (e.g., Riach, 2015).  
These are only a few examples of different types of discrimination in different 
discriminative setting in different countries assessed with different methods (for discussion of 
the methodology, see below) to show the place that discrimination has in life of many people.  
The consequences from this all-encompassing discrimination phenomenon can 
psychological, physiological, sociological and economic. The first three have the most profound 
effect on discriminated groups both individually and collectively.  
The third and the last ones influence the society as a whole, either individually or at the 
group level. Psychologists and sociologists often emphasize the importance of psychological 
effects of prejudiced actions on the quality of life of different discriminated groups (Allport, 
1979; Arjava, 1996; Johnson, Thane, 1998; Fishbein, 2002; Isaac, 2006). They analyzed 
psychological causes and consequences, such as physical and mental health problems due to 
discrimination (Pascoe, Smart Richman, 2009; Shannon et al, 2009; Fisher, Wallace, Fenton, 
2000; Williams, Mohammed, 2009) and interdependence between self-esteem and perceived 
discrimination (i.e. whether low self-esteem comes as a result of feeling discriminated or vice 
versa) (Thijs, Piscoi, 2016); the influence of values on discriminatory attitudes (Wetherell, 
Brandt, Reyna, 2013) and the influence of discrimination source on its consequences (Benner, 
Graham, 2013).  
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On the other hand, economists look at a more rational side of the problem and on the 
situation within the economic system like price discrimination for various reasons such as 
imperfect competition (Kumar, Kutlu, 2016), asymmetric costs (Horstmann, Krämer, 2013) or 
different geographic areas (Ata, Dana 2015) and law researchers at the existing laws and at the 
legal cases of the anti-discriminatory legislation being broken (e.g., Hepple, Szyszczak, 1992; 
McColgan, 2005; Ellis, Watson, 2012; Khaitan, 2015).  
The interdisciplinary research tends to analyze the problem from a more complex point of 
view, looking both at economic and social side of the situation such as influence of 
discrimination on organizational performance (Kunze, Boehm, Bruch, 2011) or discrimination 
against immigrants in financial markets (Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, 1998; Aldén, Hammarstedt, 
2016).  
Thus, with discrimination being present at different levels and in different domains, it is 
very important to know macro-level as well as micro-level.  
In this sense Lucas’ (2008) approach to discrimination is important. He is against 
defining discrimination  
 
“in an atomistic, individualistic manner” (Lucas, 2008, pp. 239-240) 
 
and then tracing its  
 
“effects back to particular economics spheres” (Lucas, 2008, pp. 239-240) 
 
as researchers usually do. For example, if one firm discriminates against women it does 
not only influence women who apply for jobs in this firm and get discriminated. It also 
influences other firms who do not discriminate by increasing competition between women 
applying to this non-discriminating firms. Thus, even women who never even heard of 
discrimination will face its consequences. In addition to that, people who discriminate as 
employers may hold other roles in the society and discriminate in these other spheres as well. 
Therefore, tracing discrimination back to specific spheres only is not enough.  
According to Lucas (2008), discrimination is a damaged social relationship, that it is not 
done by just individuals but by social individuals who do not act independently of  
 
“norms, values, and public support mechanisms” (Lucas, 2008, p. 175).  
 
First of all, those social constructs, values, mechanisms and norms live much longer than 
specific individuals who make discriminatory actions. Moreover, these social constructs live for 
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so long that influence even those who had no connection to their creation but are still exposed to 
the consequences, meaning that even if individuals had not participated in the emergence and 
creation of discriminatory practices, they still live in the society that is full of discriminatory 
norms and attitudes. The relations between individuals are indeed relations between social 
individuals, i.e. types and groups of individuals, who are subject to social evaluation, who make 
social judgements and behave accordingly, thus possibly enforcing discrimination even if 
particular people do not mean to discriminate consciously. They just do what their “type” of 
individuals are supposed to do to other “types” of people. Thus, according to Lucas, a more 
serious analysis of social frameworks is necessary. He believes that it is not possible to find 
discrimination at an individual level as it does not encompass the global situation in the world 
which is represented by the way society is structured as a whole with its norms and legislations.  
This is where macro level studies enter the picture. Instead of analyzing behavioural 
factors that depend on identifiable actors and identifiable occurrences rather than on the relation 
between categories of people, Lucas suggested analyzing environmental factors  
 
“such as laws, regulations, policies” (Lucas, 2013, p. 97-99). 
 
According to Lucas, using legislations and indices is more profitable in the sense of 
social context as discrimination is usually so deeply ingrained in the society and people’s 
thinking that understanding the real level of discrimination is impossible because people tend not 
to understand themselves whether they discriminate or not. Laws, on the other hand, are 
objective reflections of societies’ attitudes towards potentially discriminated groups. Lucas 
proved his point by constructing indices for gender and racial discrimination in different USA 
states from 1940 to 1990. The most complicated thing with such approach is choosing suitable 
laws as indicators of discriminatory environment for discriminated groups, as well as 
comparable entities (such as countries, states or organizations) with different legislations. While 
in the beginning and the mid-20th century anti-discriminatory legislation was non-existent or 
almost non-existent and, thus, finding indicators of discrimination for this period and before 
them should be relatively easy, nowadays, with legislations against most types of discrimination 
in place, finding necessary laws in which discriminatory attitudes are ingrained may be more 
complicated. For this reason, we believe that conducting analysis on the micro (individual) level, 
even if understanding its limitations, can still be beneficial.  
Therefore, nowadays, although laws exist that prevent discrimination and protect 
vulnerable groups and the political correctness conceals and disguises discrimination, finding it 
is even harder, and, in certain situations, behavioural indicators, either at the micro or macro 
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level, are as important as laws. In addition, unlike what Lucas ideas about the prominence of the 
macro nature of discrimination, the micro level can also show discrimination, and also in the 
situations when it hides at the macro levels. For example, according to research on the influence 
of social networks on discrimination in the labour market,  
 
“although individual employers might be perfect discriminators, this may not generate employment 
inequality if mutual discrimination tendencies across different firms are balanced” (Takács, Bravo, 
Squazzoni, 2018).  
 
This means that individuals may act in a discriminatory manner, but this will not 
necessarily show at the aggregate level. Thus, the interconnection between micro and micro 
levels must be considered in that studying individual level and individual actions is no less 
important than studying the macro level.  
Now, after discussing the phenomenon of discrimination and presenting a general picture 
of its place and role in the life of the society, we will move on to a specific type of 
discrimination that is the focus of this PhD research — age discrimination in the labour market. 
3. Studying age discrimination in the labour market 
In November 2017, a husband and wife couple from Colorado who felt themselves 
victims of age discrimination launched a campaign named “I, too, am qualified”. They wanted to 
draw attention to the continued ageism issues in the workplace. On their website 
(https://itooamqualified.wordpress.com/), there are numerous stories of people shared in words 
and photographs who had employment problems (allegedly) due to their age. Someone had to lie 
about the length of their experience (“I have 23 years’ experience in IT. I had to remove 13 years 
from my resume before I got an interview”) or got lied to about why their candidature was 
rejected (the recruiter said that they chose another candidate with more experience, but the 
candidate soon found out that the vacancy was still open). In December 2017, companies such as 
T-Mobile and Amazon, got sued for targeting job advertisements to younger groups, thus 
complicating the job search for older candidates (Dwoskin, 2017).  
Do these two examples present proofs of age discrimination? The response may seem 
obvious, but it is not as easy as it may appear. While denying older age groups access to job 
advertisements is a rather objective fact, which reveals a discriminative treatment of older job 
searchers, personal claims of victims may be biased, by either not showing the full extent of 
discrimination or exaggerating it.  
Age discrimination in comparison with other forms of discrimination has its own 
peculiarities. First, it is less investigated and has less tradition compared to either gender or 
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racial/ethnic discrimination. Its origins trace back to three-four decades, starting when European 
countries began to face ageing issues, even though some papers can be found earlier, in the 
1970s.  
Age discrimination concerns both discrimination of young workers who have only 
recently entered the labor market and discrimination of older worker who are reaching their 
pensionable age. It has been a standard issue in the labor market that being young and 
inexperienced decreases chances of successful employment. The same holds for those who are 
“too old”: they are thought to be unable to cope with the workload physically or intellectually, to 
master new technologies, etc., so that their chances of being fired and having trouble of finding a 
new job for a long period of time increase as compared to those of younger, yet with some 
experience, workers.  
Discrimination of young people in the labour market is not the concern of this research, 
yet youth unemployment is an issue, with younger people being discriminated for lack of 
experience (Krings, Sczesny, Kluge, 2011). This is a tricky situation that tends to create a well-
known vicious cycle: employers seem to have a relatively reasonable claim of being in need of 
experienced workers, but it is impossible to gain experience without working. There is a 
substantial number of publications concerning youth unemployment (e.g. Barbulescu, 2012; 
Refrigeri, Aleandri, 2013; Gontkovičová, Mihalčová, Pružinský, 2015) with the reasons for it 
being attributed to different economics cycles and to the mismatch between knowledge gained 
by young people during their studies and the requirements of the labor market rather than to 
discrimination. It is also necessary to state that research shows little or no competition between 
youth and elderly workforce (Eichhorst et al., 2014) because of “the limited substitutability of 
the two age groups due to differences in sectors, occupations, experiences and skills” (Eichhorst 
et al., 2013, p. 8). 
In what concerns discrimination of elderly workers, the reasoning behind scientific 
interest, firstly, comes from the fact that people live longer now than before and, thus, stay 
longer in retirement (and in the labour market due to the increase in retirement age in many 
countries), and that their share in the population increases. If on average in 1950 life expectancy 
was 65 years in developed countries and 42 in developing ones, by 2010-2015 it was estimated 
at 78 and 68 years respectively, and by 2050 it is expected to increase to 83 and 75 respectively 
(United Nations, 2013, p. 6). In 2010-2015, women were expected to spend in retirement on 
average 20,8 years, while this figure is expected to become 25,8 years by 2060-2065. For men, 
the figures are 17,4 and 21,9 years respectively (OECD, 2015, p. 155). Moreover, according to 
the World Health Organization, between 2015 and 2050 the share of the population older than 60 
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years of age will increase from 12% to 22%, and in 2050, 80% of them will live in low-income 
and middle-income countries (WHO, 2018). 
Secondly, the birthrate is much lower than it was in the past and, thus, there are fewer 
young people in the labor market. Also, for countries with the redistributive pension systems it 
means a higher tax burden on the working population as the ratio of the working population to 
elderly retired population is decreasing. For example, “for the OECD as a whole, the dependence 
ratio of older people (i.e. those aged 65 and over as a proportion of those aged 20-64) will rise 
from the current figure of 22%, to 46% in 2050” (Official OECD website, 2015).  
All this put together lead a lot of countries to the conclusion that the retirement age needs 
to be increased, and almost all countries followed through with the increases to one extent or 
another (OECD, 2015). This, in turn, resulted in the necessity to understand the position of 
elderly workers in the labour market who, as we will see later when discussing literature on age 
discrimination in the labour market, could potentially face employment problems. 
4. Issues of ageing 
Age discrimination is, probably, one of the most complicated forms of discrimination to 
be studied as contrary to gender or race, age is a factor that can influence person’s abilities. Even 
European Union’s Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 specifies that  
 
“differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of 
national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment 
policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary” (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Article 6.1).  
 
For example, in respect to older workers it means that an employer can fix a maximum 
age for a position if this decision is based on certain training requirements and/or a necessity of a  
 
“reasonable period of employment before retirement” (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, Article 6.1 (c)).  
 
However, research is contradictory in what concerns the changes in people’s abilities as 
they age.  
On the one hand, there is proof of older workers being less able in certain situations than 
younger workers. On the other hand, certain research results showed the contrary or, at least, the 
facts that older workers are no worse than younger one. Finally, there are also studies that proved 
older workers having certain shortcomings linked to their age but being able to compensate for 
them in various ways.  
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It is true that certain abilities such as learning (e.g., Zancada-Menendez, 2015), 
memorizing (e.g., Luo, Craik, 2009; Etcheverry, Terrier, Marquié, 2011), reaction speed 
(Makishita, Matsunaga, 2007), other cognitive (Federmeier, Kutas, Schul, 2010; Rosenblum, 
Enger-Yeger, Fogel, 2013; Wagner, Hassanein, Head, 2014) and psychomotor functions (e.g., 
Oehl, Sutter, 2014) tend to deteriorate as people become older.  
For example (Kang, Yoon, 2008), when interacting with complicated electronic devices, 
younger (20-29 y.o.) and older (46-59 y.o.) people showed similar results in completing tasks but 
older people needed more steps to achieve the aims set for them. This can be explained by the 
fact that older people made more errors and more repeated errors that younger adults. Motor 
skills that tend to deteriorate with age and trouble with the application of previously acquired 
knowledge in the new domains of familiar tasks also prevented older adults from completing 
some tasks as quickly as younger adults. However, age was not the only factor: experience and 
background knowledge tended to be no less or even more important. Older adults often used a 
trial-and-error strategy, but, as the authors of the study argued, this is rather a characteristic of a 
novice user than an age factor. Because of this, older users became frustrated in the process of 
completing tasks as they were unfamiliar with the devices, not due to them being unable to 
master their usage. Thus, as research suggested, certain design modifications that would fit age-
related changes better and encouragement of older people to communicate more with electronic 
devices, should have improved the situation.  
It is true that older people require more time than younger ones to learn novel tasks. 
However, learning becomes especially complicated if older people have audio or visual 
distractions during the process. Therefore, elimination of these distractors can provide significant 
benefit of older learners on the early stages of learning. Later on, distractors do not have such a 
detrimental influence on the results (Schwerha, Wiker, Jaraiedi, 2007). 
Moreover, older people are often aware of their shortcomings and find ways to adjust and 
compensate for them. For example (Lobjois, Cavallo, 2006), when faced with a street-crossing 
decision-making experiment, older participants chose  
 
“larger time gaps than younger ones, enabling them to compensate for their longer crossing times resulting 
from their slower walking speeds” (Lobjois, Cavallo, 2006, p.941). 
 
It should also be mentioned that at times different studies present contradictory results as 
they depend a lot on the specific age group selected as “older”. The older are these groups the 
more often a significant age effect is found. For instance, a group aged 70-80 (Lobjois, Cavallo, 
2006) was better at compensating for their slower walking speed than an age group 75+ (Oxley 
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et al, 2005). And this the age as which most people already stop working while those who face 
discrimination issues in employment are from 10 to 30 years younger. 
However, in spite of older workers facing problems and having lower abilities on some 
levels, the research shows that often these do not have negative influence on job results (e.g., 
Rhodes, 1983; McEvoy and Cascio, 1989; Bennington, Tharenou, 1996), since older workers 
find ways to compensate for their deteriorating abilities (e.g., using a trackball instead of a 
mouse when working on the computer decreases exertion levels of older workers (Chaparro et al, 
1999); the implicit memory of older people being no worse than that of younger ones which 
could be used to older people advantage (Brooks et al, 2001)). Moreover, according to some 
studies, older workers perform even better than younger ones (Fyock, 1991; Rhodes, 1983).  
Therefore, the results of research regarding the abilities of older workers does not allow 
age to be considered a factor influential enough for a worker to be declined a job only because of 
his or her age, unless specific job requirements call for it or unless a worker has other issues that 
could prevent him from doing his or her job such as health problems or lack of necessary 
training.  
5. Current state of research on age discrimination 
As we have seen from the previous section, research provides contradictory evidence as 
to whether older workers differ from younger ones in their abilities and productivity (e.g., Warr, 
1994; Marszalek et al, 2000; Xu et al, 2014).  
Regardless of these research results not giving a strong proof of older workers being 
worse performers than younger once, according to previous studies, employers often tend to 
consider elderly workers less productive, less able to master innovative methods, less healthy, 
less motivated, etc. than their younger counterparts (e.g., Riach & Rich, 2007). Thus, with such 
contradictory results, any decisions based on age only will be discriminatory. To be true, the 
anti-discriminatory legislations put forward in the EU and the USA, as well as retirement age 
increase, did not help to absolutely eradicate age discrimination (Krings, Sczesny, Kluge, 2011). 
There is a lot of literature on the problems of ageism, in general, and specifically in the 
labour market. However, as we already mentioned before, age discrimination is less represented 
in the literature than race or gender discrimination (Finkelstein, Truxillo, 2013; Ruggs et al., 
2013), and finding publications covering age discrimination specifically is sometimes a bit 
tricky. It should be noted from the beginning that in general these studies more often than not 
make conclusions in favour of the existence of age discrimination, while the specificities and 
peculiarities may differ from country to country, especially, if changes in retirement ages where 
made in different times and the retirement age differs as well.  
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Researchers tend to approach problems of ageing from different angles. 
Some of them cover such topics as adjustment to ageing, employment issues in older ages 
and the ways to tackle these problems (Baumann, 2016; Cheng et al., 2015; Scherger, 2016; 
Torp, 2015; Von Humboldt, 2016; Hofäcker, Hess, König, 2016). While these books do not 
make discrimination their only focus, they recognize its existence and role. Some specify its 
detrimental influence on health (Von Humboldt, 2016), others mention legal context, anti-
discriminatory legislation, and its success in some countries (Scherger, 2016). However, in other 
countries high perceived discrimination among older workers, among other factors, lead to early 
retirement, in spite of the legislations in place (Torp, 2015; Hofäcker, Hess, König, 2016). Those 
books do not discuss mechanisms behind age discrimination, they just state it as a fact, based on 
previous research.  
A big part of research that delves more into the mechanisms that is found on age 
discrimination are studies conducted on secondary data or by the usage of surveys (we will delve 
in methodological aspects and their pro’s and con’s a bit later). Often these studies prove the 
existence of stereotypes and negative attitudes towards older workers. Some studies show that 
the age in which the terms “older worker” starts being used varied from industry to industry, 
sometimes even starting from 35 years old (Duncan, Loretto, 2004), while 45 years old onwards 
is regarded as more standard (Kalish, Williams, 1983). Considering that this demarcation was 
suggested more than 20 years ago, before serious changes in the pensionable ages in most 
countries, the general age when age discrimination is more likely to start should now, from our 
point of view, be considered a little higher.  
The survey studies usually take several directions: focus on self-perceived discrimination 
and/or its consequences (Hassell, Perrewé, 1983; Bennington, Tharenou, 1996; Bennington, 
Wein, 2003; Duncan. Loretto, 2004; Garstka, Hummert, Branscombe, 2005; Furunes, Mykletun, 
2010; Kunze, Boehm, Bruch, 2010, 2013; Bayl-Smith, Griffin, 2014); specific case-studies 
(Manning, Carol, Carp, 2004; Dewhurst, 2013), studies of outcomes (such as 
employment/unemployment rates) (Neumark, Button, 2004) and the role of legislation (Wood et 
al., 2004; Zysk, 2006; North, Fiske, 2013). 
Mostly, those studies put forward evidence of negative influence of discrimination not 
only on those discriminated but on the environment and work productivity as a whole. Among 
older workers perceived discrimination is often associated with low self-esteem which, in turn, 
leads to health problems, decreased productivity and results in behavior that enforces stereotypes 
about older people (e.g., conformity, risk-avoidance, etc.). On the other hand, there is a 
connection between job undertaken and perceived discrimination: older workers often consider 
themselves being discriminated (even if the employer is not being discriminative on purpose) if 
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they think that their work is not challenging enough (Hassell, Perrewé, 1983). This result holds 
for different countries, such as USA (Hassell, Perrewé, 1983) and Nordic countries (Furunes and 
Mykletun, 2010).  
Studies of anti-discriminatory legislation in different countries (New Zealand (Wood et 
al., 2004); Poland (Zysk, 2006), EU Member States (Dewhurst, 2013), UK (Fevre, Grainger, 
Brewer, 2011)) show that, although, introduction of protection against age discrimination is 
effective the results are far from ideal, with discrimination de facto still being in place. 
Researchers highlight the importance of socio-economic context and the cultural norms (this 
being in line with Lucas’ reasoning (Lucas, 2008, 2013) that are often so deeply engrained in the 
society that simple introduction of laws is not enough.  
Apart from studies based on secondary data and interviews, there is also a number of 
papers that can serve as good examples of field, laboratory and survey experiments/vignettes in 
age discrimination. Usually they are conducted to see whether discrimination actually exists.  
Usually, these experiments, as many other forms of experimental research in 
discrimination, are based on the manipulation of age in resumes of the candidates applying to 
certain job positions. In laboratory experiments subjects are usually asked to consider a list of 
resumes that vary mainly by age (sometimes appearance or employment experience can be also 
added) in regard to some kind of job applications and say whether they would hire this or that 
candidate or not. In field experiments researchers apply to real job proposals with different 
resumes. This can include later on real-life job interviews or (more often) not.  
For example, Riach and Rich (2010) conducted field research on English labor market to 
see whether the age discrimination actually existed. For this they created pairs of job 
applications that differed only in terms of age but not in terms of qualifications and professional 
experience required for the job. The first pair of applications was sent from the women aged 21 
and 39 for the job proposals that were requiring “new graduates”. The second pair of 
applications was for waiters’ positions from the men aged 27 and 47. The last one was from 
women of 27 and 47 years old applying for a position in job retail sales. Discrimination in favor 
of younger candidates in the first two cases and in favor of older candidates in the third case was 
found.  
Similar studies were conducted by the same authors in Spain (Riach, Rich, 2007) and 
France (Riach, Rich, 2006) in which pairs of CVs from younger and older applicants were 
submitted for the positions of waiters. In both countries, significant rates of discrimination 
against older workers were found. 
A similar cross-country field experiment about age discrimination in the labor markets of 
England, Germany, France and Spain was later conducted by Riach (2015) on the bases of email 
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applications for waiters’ positions from the applicants aged 27 and 47. Discrimination of older 
workers was apparent in all countries but higher in France and Spain than in England and 
Germany. A field experiment in Madrid (Albert, Escot, Fernández-Cornejo, 2011) concerning 
gender and age discrimination, used a similar research method of fictitious job applications, and 
showed evidence of age discrimination against applicants aged 38 (younger applicants were 24 
and 28 years old).  
In 2015, there was an experiment (Baert et al, 2015) that differed from the classical field 
experiments on age discrimination in that aside from age, the fictitious older applicants differed 
from their younger counterparts also by their employment experience. The authors distinguished 
between employment in an in-field job, employment in an out-of-field job and inactivity during 
their additional post-educational years (compared to the younger fictitious candidates). The 
results of the research showed that the probability of getting a job was low only for those older 
candidates who had out-of-field employment and who were inactive before. Otherwise, they had 
the same chances of getting hired as younger applicants. A later paper about field experiment 
(Neumark et al, 2015) included both differences in employment experience and human capital 
investment levels (i.e. skill levels) in the resumes of the fictitious candidates. They found out that 
there was solid evidence of discrimination in hiring against older female applicants, but much 
less so against older male applicants.  
However, while in these field experiments the researchers could control that their 
applicants differed in all but age, they could not control the environment in which the employers 
made their decisions. This limitation is shared by many field experiments. 
There are not many recent survey experiments and laboratory experiments on age 
discrimination, most of them being conducted in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. They usually 
create hypothetical environments with managers and/or students asked to evaluate hypothetical 
candidates. The subjects may be asked to evaluate hypothetical resumes (Haefner, 1977; Fusilier, 
Hitt, 1983; Cleveland et al., 1988; Singer, Sewell, 1989; Singer, Bruhns, 1991; Perry et al., 1996) 
and/or hypothetical interviews (Connor et al., 1978; Locke-Connor, Walsh, 1980; Avolio, 
Barrett, 1987; Singer, Sewell, 1989) and rate or choose proposed candidates that may differ only 
in age or in age and other characteristics such as gender, race, education, competences, 
experience, typed of vacancy, etc. As results showed, age was an important factor in hiring 
decisions but other factors, including objective ones, also played role. However, preference for 
younger candidates compared to older ones was quite prominent.  
To find laboratory experiments, we need to come back to the 70s and the 90s of the 20th 
century. They used hypothetical resumes and interviews with hypothetical candidates that 
differed in age and other factors. The results could be considered somewhat contradictory.  
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For example, in a hypothetical hiring experiment in which 286 participated Haefner 
(1977) found that younger candidates with high level of competencies were hired more often 
than older candidates with high level of competences. However, with low competent candidates 
age did not impact decisions significantly. Contrary to these findings, Connor and colleagues 
(1978) ran an experiment on psychology students who were asked to assess young and old 
candidates for a temporary job vacancy. The last was done to avoid bias concerning shorter 
working periods of older candidates. According to the authors, age did not impact the decisions, 
with other factors such as relevant background being more important. Additionally, experiment 
conducted by Locke-Connor and Walsh (1980) showed the importance of age only in the 
situations when the participants did not have enough other information about candidates on 
which they could base their decisions. However, younger participants tended to give higher 
evaluation to younger candidates and older — to the older ones (Gibson et al., 1993). 
Furthermore, some research (Perry et al., 1996; Perry, Bourhis, 1998) showed that older workers 
were evaluated lower than younger workers in general even if they were evaluated higher for the 
“old-typed” jobs (and lower for the “young-typed” jobs).  
Fusilier and Hitt (1983) conducted experiments with students presenting them candidates 
who varied in age, race, sex and experience. Experience proved to be the most important factor 
influencing the decisions, not age. However, the greatest influence of experience was for the 
eldest groups (aged 55). Nevertheless, Avolio and Barrett (1987) found that younger candidates 
were considered to have higher “future potential” than older candidates and were evaluated 
higher. However, if the participants were asked to compare an elderly candidate with the 
candidate whose age was not specified, there we no considerable differences in evaluation.  
Cleveland and colleagues (1988) showed that the ratio of older and younger candidates 
among all candidates presented to the participants of the experiment influenced their evaluation, 
i.e. older applicants received higher ratings if their share was higher among all participants and 
lower ratings if their share was lower. If there was equal number of the participants, then age had 
no significant influence.  
Singer and Sewell (1989) ran an experiment on managers and psychology students 
presenting them with resumes and videos of candidates who differed in age, type of job vacancy 
(financial manager and account clerk) and additional age-related information. The last one meant 
that one group of participants received information that older workers were responsible for the 
success of the company while another did not receive any kind of age-related information. Type 
of job had the most significant effect. Managers and students gave different responses. For 
managers’ decisions “purely” age was not significant while it was significant with students’ 
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decisions. Still, managers, in the case of account clerk job tended to hire older workers if they 
received age-related information and younger workers if they received no such information. 
With students the situation was different: for the financial manager job they hired older workers 
if there was no age-related information and younger workers if there was. Singer and Bruhns 
(1991) also showed the importance of work experience (which is connected to age) and that 
managers valued experience more while students valued academic qualifications more.  
As we can see, previous laboratory studies on age discrimination showed that age had a 
significant influence on hiring decisions, sometimes in favour of younger candidates, sometimes 
of the older ones (but with younger, in general, being preferred more frequently). However, they 
also showed that other factors can matter, such as the type of the job, experience, competence or 
additional age-related information. Thus, more research is required in this domain. Especially, as 
country differences can also impact the role of the age factor, and what could be correct for one 
country may turn out wrong for another.  
As for survey experiments, in a recent research Kauffmann and colleagues (2015) studied 
the ways in which job candidates’ facial age appearance influenced hiring decisions. This was a 
study conducted online. The candidates’ ages were manipulated either by the specification of the 
date of birth / age or by a headshot. The selection intentions were considered a dependent 
variable, and perceptions of person–job fit, health and fitness impressions served as mediators. 
Also, design-external anonymous job application condition, in which the candidate’s age was not 
specified, was added. The results showed that older looking candidates were considered less 
healthy and less fit for the job, and thus the likelihood of them being hired was lower than that of 
the younger candidates.  
Richardson and colleagues (2013) ran a similar research, but not based on facial 
impressions, just on age. Two types of participants (102 students and 54 organization-based 
employees) were asked to evaluate the competences and hiring likelihood of hypothetical 
applicants aged between 33 and 66. The results showed that candidates who were identical in 
everything, but age were treated differently in terms of hiring. Until the age 42-45, the 
probability of being hired increased as age increased, while after that the age increase lead to the 
decrease in the probability of being hired. The existence of work-related competences did not 
have a mediating effect on this relationship. Thus, it proved the existence of age discrimination. 
It should be noted that the results of students and organization-based workers did not differ a lot.  
All in all, we can see that previous research conducted in different countries in different 
time periods, some of them even as early as in the end of 1970s, even before the issue of 
increased age expectancy became an issue, show proofs of older workers often feeling 
discriminated with legal cases and experimental research supporting the facts of unequal 
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treatment even though numerous studies show that older workers cannot automatically be 
considered worse than younger ones on the basis of age only. 
However, as was said before, all methods are not ideal, and there is a lot to learn about 
the mechanisms behind discrimination and in terms of distinguishing objective decisions from 
discriminative ones. Thus, all-around studies are necessary with delving inside of the decision-
making process itself in order to really understand what is going on in this domain. 
6. Theories behind age discrimination 
While theoretical background for age discrimination is not as abundant as for gender 
discrimination, for example, there are, however, theories that need to be discussed.  
Wood and colleagues (2008)2 presented quite a full account of theoretical approaches 
towards age discrimination. They distinguished between neo-liberal approaches, political 
economy approaches, approaches from the point of view of rights and distributive justice and 
postmodern approaches. We will now briefly summarize all of them and then discuss each in 
more detail.  
So, the main reasons for age discrimination suggested by neo-liberalists are: 
• the expensiveness of older workers in terms of their higher pay which makes them 
less attractive for the employers who would prefer someone younger with lower 
pay demands (e.g., O’Boyle 2001, p. 960); 
• choices made by older workers themselves, meaning that some older workers do 
not engage enough in self-presentation in the labour market and upgrading of their 
skills thus becoming uncompetitive with younger workers (e.g., Peng, Kleiner, 
1999, p. 74; Shen, Kleiner, 2001, p. 25), while others prefer or are forced to find 
jobs in which they will be payed less but have more flexibility in terms of 
working hours (e.g., Sargeant, 2001, p. 114); 
• imperfect information in the labour market, which provides employers with 
biased and wrong knowledge about older workers’ skills and abilities (e.g. Glover 
and Branine, 1997, p. 275). 
Political economists highlight the following reasons: 
• in the periods of crisis (e.g., in the 1970s, during the classical Fordism crisis) 
employers need to decrease their costs with older workers who are closer to 
retirement and/or who work in the declining sectors more often than younger ones 
becoming more discriminated than the workers of younger ages (e.g., Kelly,1998; 
Taylor, Walker, 1997, p. 307–308);  
                                                 
2 All citations in section 6, unless specified differently, are provided by Wood et al. (2008) 
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• current cultural norms value youth higher than elderly (e.g., Branine, Glover, 
1997, p. 237; Macnicol. 2006, p. 11); 
• age discrimination being a result of a more profound and vast problem of social 
exclusion (workers who had less education (Barnes et al., 2006) or who worked in 
manual occupations (e.g., Boyes, McCormick, 2005, p. 3) all their lives tend to 
have the more problems with employment and health the older they become); 
• age discrimination is tied to other forms of discrimination (e.g. older women face 
more employment problems than older men due to worse education (Schuman, 
Kleiner, 2001, p. 50) or gaps in employment during the periods pregnancies and 
raising of children (e.g., Evandrou, Glaser, 2004, p. 771). 
The supporters of the rights and distributive justice point of view say that age 
discrimination is a result of absence of regulations in the free labour market that lead to social 
inequalities and distributive injustice and that are not only the result of abilities but also of risks 
of particular jobs that unjustly fall only on the shoulders of older workers (e.g., O’Boyle, 2001, 
p. 962; Branine, Glover, 1997, p. 237). 
Postmodernists say that in the recent times the society changed in a way that knowledge 
and experience of older workers get devalued with time (e.g., Glover, Branine, 1997, p. 277), 
thus making them less attractive for the employers and creating a generally negative image of the 
elderly in the society in general (Featherstone, Hepworth, 1989). Older workers, on the other 
hand, tend to consent to this and sometimes become even more conservative and not prone to 
adapt to changes (e.g., Glover, Branine, 1997, p. 277). 
It has to be noted that some of these theories may come true for some countries and/or 
even sectors of production but not true for others. Furthermore, some of them might have been 
relevant in the past but may no longer be relevant in the present days or in the near future. The 
society is aging in general, people live longer and are more active than before. Therefore, the 
views in the societies, albeit if not without help from social policies, tend to change and become 
more elderly friendly. Specifically, it concerns European countries with a high percentage of 
older people where increasing retirement age due to demographic problems leads to necessity of 
promotion of active and better image of ageing.  
In addition to that, while these explanations are quite thorough, we think that they need to 
be discussed; in fact, it can be argued that some of them mix together explanations for inequality 
due to discrimination and explanations for inequality due to factors that are not necessarily 
connected to discrimination.  
We will talk about them one by one. When elaborating on these theories, it is important 
to keep in mind the definition, the essence of the term “discrimination”, that it happens when a 
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person in denied equal treatment because he/she belongs to a certain group and not because of 
his or her own personal and objective characteristics. And we will analyze discrimination from 
this point specifically as inequality may happen due to different reasons.  
To start with, let’s turn back to neo-liberal explanations.  
Firstly, the costliness of older workers compared to younger workers will only become a 
source of discriminatory actions if an employer is already prejudiced against older worker in the 
sense of their costliness, i.e. if he/she is prone not to consider older applicants regardless of their 
experience and competencies. If he/she is not, and there are other reasons that make a younger 
worker a better fit than an older worker in professional sense than this is not discrimination.  
Secondly, neo-liberalistic explanations about elderly making their own choices may also 
have nothing to do with discriminatory actions of employers. These, actually, are choices, 
probably, indeed made by some elderly workers that lead to them ending up in an unequal 
position compared to younger workers. However, these decisions do not come from 
discrimination per se. For example, an older worker for any kind of personal reason (a wish to 
spend some more time with grandchildren or to health problems) may wish to have a more 
flexible work schedule. If this flexibility will not influence in any negative way his/her ability to 
perform her job functions, then denying it will be a form of discrimination. If, however, the 
specificities of the job do not allow more flexibility without the disruption of the work process, 
then denying it to the worker will not be an act of discrimination. Consequently, if the worker is 
unable to work without an increased level of flexibility and seeks a job, even a lower paid one, 
that will accommodate his/her needs in this sense, then the issue is not with discrimination but 
with the workers own abilities. If this happens due to the circumstances that do not depend on 
the worker (e.g., health or family problems), then, in order to avoid this person falling into a 
position of poverty and facing even more problems, actions are required form the governmental 
institutions in the forms of improvement of the health care services qualities, subsidies to the 
businesses that would make it possible to hire additional workers without letting an older person 
go, social benefits to older people who are unable to work as actively as before, promotion of 
active aging, etc.  
Another explanation about older workers not investing enough in their self-presentation 
and/or skills may also have two sides. Personal laziness is in no way discrimination from the side 
of employers. However, if workers due to their older age have been denied access to training, 
especially, if their younger peers did not face similar problems than this is the case of 
discrimination. If older workers, through no fault of their own, do not have information about the 
existence of training or the necessity of this training, due to them being considered too old to be 
interested in this, then this is, too, discrimination.  
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Probably, the imperfect information theory is the closest (among neo-liberal 
explanations) to explaining discrimination and not inequality arising due to other factors. The 
issue of imperfect information does distort the image that employers have about older workers. If 
they do not have the full picture, then their knowledge about older workers’ abilities may 
become biased and incorrect. In this case, the employer will fall the victim of statistical 
discrimination when, being unable to test the candidate’s abilities on the spot, he or she will 
hedge risk and hire a younger worker assuming based on the labour market imperfect 
information that the younger worker is likely to perform better than an older one.  
Political economy theories also seem to be better in explaining problems of older workers 
in terms of discrimination.  
The fact that the firms are attempting to decrease costs in the periods of crisis at the 
expense of older workers may certainly come from discriminative practices. However, here, as 
with some other previous explanations, a lot depends on the reasons. Decreasing costs is 
necessary for a firm to survive during crisis. Dismissing the least productive workers is also 
necessary. And if an older worker happens to be less productive than a younger one than 
dismissing him/her does not mean acting discriminatively. If the dismissal happens due to the 
assumptions about older workers being less motivated, too close to retirement, etc., than this is 
the case close to the imperfect information explanation, which is discrimination.  
Cultural norms that look at “youth” as positive and “elderly” as negative can be 
considered a situation of classical pure, tastes-based, discrimination that comes from prejudice 
and negative stereotypes and perceptions about elderly people. It also fits Lucas’s (2008, 2013) 
theory about discrimination being a social construct with certain “types” of people acting 
towards other “types” of people in a specific, negative, way due to the environment around them. 
These environmental and cultural issues may put older people at a disadvantage through no fault 
of their own. While there is, surely, more to it than simple images of “old” and “young”, these 
cultural norms approach seems to be fitting the age discrimination explanation better than most 
of the other ones.  
As for the social exclusion explanation, this approach, again, seems to tell more about 
inequality due to other factors than about discrimination. At the very least, it is about other forms 
of discrimination that do not concern age specifically. Obviously, a less educated or a less 
healthy person will have more problems finding a job at an older age than his/her better educated 
and healthier counterparts. However, these problems will not come from the age itself but from 
other objective and subjective characteristics, even, maybe other forms of discrimination, such as 
gender of racial discrimination, that, definitely, need to be dealt with, but outside the limits of 
age discrimination framework.  
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The connection with other forms of discrimination is a more complicated thing and 
requires discussion of those other forms and not just age discrimination. Still, we should always 
keep in mind that the situation when a person has worse skills at a certain age than another 
person even if as a result of discrimination (for example, based on gender), the employment 
problems will not result from age discrimination but rather from other forms of discrimination 
that he/she encountered in the past. 
The rights and distributive justice explanation also lie more in lines with inequality or 
simple fact that people are different than discrimination. Obviously, there are types of jobs, 
especially, manual, low-skilled ones that require abilities that older people are less likely to 
possess but if they have trouble keeping their jobs not because of prejudice and assumptions of 
employers made not on the grounds related to work skill but because of inability to keep up with 
the job, this is not discrimination.  
Postmodern explanations raise an important issue of today’s world being a very fast-
changing one in which knowledge received some years ago loses value much quicker than in the 
previous century. Thus, if older workers fail to keep up with recent technologies and any 
knowledge that is indispensable in their field of work be it computer knowledge or changing in 
the managerial practices, they risk losing their competitiveness. Discrimination, however, does 
not come in the picture just yet as lack of necessary skills is an objective factor, not a subjective 
one. However, discrimination of older workers does not come from the fact that the world is 
changing quicker. Putting it that way would actually mean that older people are automatically 
unable to keep up with changes which is discriminatory in itself.  
It is true that constant learning through the course of life is important, now more than in 
the previous centuries. However, as we have already said, when discussing other theories, there 
can be different reasons as to why older people lack necessary training. It can be their own 
choice, lack of ability to follow the changes, lack of access to necessary training, lack of 
necessary information about the importance of this training. If an older worker does not want to 
keep up with this fast-changing world or is absolutely unable to do that due to serious health 
problems, this is not a situation of discrimination. It is, however, if he does want to and can but 
faces obstacles on the way.  
As we have seen in the previous sections, the research about abilities of older workers to 
master new methods compared to the abilities of younger ones does not produce univocal results. 
Yes, people change with age, certain things become harder for them, some things become more 
difficult than before, but it does not mean that there is no way for them to learn at older ages. If 
older workers are denied this than there is an issue of discrimination.  
Thus, we can divide the theories presented into following categories: 
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• those that explain only inequality;  
• those that can explain either discrimination or inequality arising due to other 
factors depending on the reasoning behind the actions;  
• those that explain specifically discrimination.  
This categorization is presented in the Table 1. Here we can see that most of the theories 
depend hugely on what lies behind the decisions of the employers. This makes disentangling of 
inequality from discrimination a very tricky task, and when we look at the methodologies used to 
study discrimination, it becomes even trickier. In our research, we will make out best attempt to 
eliminate the doubtful theories (column two), focus only on the two discriminatory explanations 
(column 3) and, if possible, distinguish between the two. We will discuss this in more detail in 
the conclusions of this Chapter and throughout Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
Table 1 — Possible theories behind age discrimination 
Explain only inequality 
 
May explain either inequality 
of discrimination depending 
on the reasoning behind the 
decisions made 
Explain discrimination 
1. A result of a more profound 
and vast problem of social 
exclusion 
1. Costliness of older workers 
2. Choices made by older 
workers themselves 
3. Attempts to decrease costs 
in the periods of crisis 
4. Tied to other forms of 
discrimination (e.g., gender 
discrimination) 
5. Risks coming from certain 
types of jobs that only older 
people bear. 
6. Knowledge and education 
devalue with time => negative 
image of older workers 
1. Imperfect information in the 
labour market (statistical 
discrimination) 
2. Cultural norms that favour 
youth at the expense of older 
people (tastes-based 
discrimination) 
 
As so many possible explanations behind actions that create inequality can be results both 
of objective factors and discriminatory attitudes, it is very important to find ways to see what 
stands behind the actions, the reasoning, which is not always easy with the methodologies used 
to study discrimination.  
7. Methods for studying discrimination 
Since Becker (1971), Allport (1954 (1979)), Phelps (1972), Arrow (1973) and Aigner, 
Cain (1977)  methods employed to study discrimination have not changed much. Keuschnigg 
and Wolbring (2015) list them quite thoroughly. While these methods are being used for 
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studying various domains of discrimination, when discussing them we will make particular focus 
on their implementation in the labour market.  
Firstly, there are interviews. They are usually conducted among individuals who are 
either at risk of being discriminated due to their gender, age, race, etc., or who, due to their 
positions, may discriminated themselves (e.g., employers in the labour market). This is a good 
way to study attitudes towards discriminating and/or being discriminated, to understand how 
people actually feel and what they have actually experienced. Nevertheless, it is well-known 
that, on the one hand, people tend to give socially acceptable answers, i.e. they would not voice 
their discriminatory reasoning aloud and may even be unaware that they are acting in a 
discriminative way (Baumann, 2016). On the other hand, people often tend to underestimate they 
actions, overestimate their abilities, i.e. those who feel themselves being victims of 
discrimination may not be ready to face that there were objective factors that lead to them ending 
in an unfavourable position. There is also an opposite risk: the interviewees may not understand 
that they are being discriminated and consider their situation normal and just due to the 
environment they have been raised in, for example. Therefore, interviews often hold risks of 
either overestimating or underestimating the level of discrimination.  
Secondly, there are various experiments, field and laboratory being the main ones, with 
vignettes and survey experiments as their variations. Laboratory experiments, obviously, have 
problems with external validity, while field experiments — with internal validity (e.g., Gadlin, 
Ingle, 1975; Roe, Just, 2009). Field experiments conducted to analysis discrimination in the 
labour market have the benefits of seeing real decisions by employers who do not know that 
there is an experiment going on. Researchers send resumes the candidates who differ only in a 
particular factor based on which they can be discriminated to the firms. Then, they analyze the 
response rates. The downside of is that researchers have no way in finding out how the decision 
process took place and what other factors influenced recruiters’ decisions. Contrary to that, in the 
laboratory experiments it is easier to control for most of the factors that may influence the 
decisions, but it is impossible to completely recreate reality, hence arguments about the external 
validity of such experiments. Thus, researchers need to be careful in designing experiments in 
both cases as they are both useful in understanding the situation with discrimination, but each 
have their weak sides. Which type of experiment is better, depends on the specific aims of the 
study conducted.  
Next, the third method of studying discrimination is the analysis of the outcomes such as 
rates of unemployment or income. However, this approach is strongly criticized by Lucas (2008, 
2013). According to him, on the one hand, if the results do not show any inequality in the rates 
of employment or incomes, it does not mean that there is no discrimination going on, it still may 
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be present, just in a different form. On the other hand, finding inequality also does not help 
understanding discrimination. It is hard to disentangle inequality in outcomes arising from 
discrimination from inequality arising from other factors. He, in turn, as we already mentioned 
above, suggested analyzing the level of discrimination with the help on environmental factors 
and uses juridical, social, economic and political domains to single out environmental indicators. 
After choosing these indicators, he compares outcomes in the USA states that have high levels of 
discrimination with the states that have low levels of discrimination.  
This approach allows to see how the position of people from discriminated groups differ 
depending on the rate of discrimination in the environment that they live in. From Lucas’s point 
of view, this is a better way than comparing discriminated groups with non-discriminated 
groups. He claimed that a black person can never become a white person and a woman can never 
become a man. Thus, comparing these groups between each other does not produce the correct 
results for discrimination studies. It is more useful to analyze how the same groups fares in 
different environments. While this is a new and very useful approach which allows to study 
discrimination from a completely new angle, it also seems to have certain problems. Mainly, as 
we have said, an as Lucas points out himself, these issues lie with, firstly, finding appropriate 
environments to compare that do differ in terms of discrimination level (e.g. cities and regions, 
depending on the countries, may not have enough differences in indicators if there is need to 
assess discrimination inside one country). Secondly, choosing appropriate indicators also takes 
time and care, and it may be complicated in today’s world where legal framework is aimed at 
prohibiting discrimination. Thus, finding indicators will be a subtler job for contemporary 
society than it would be for studies of discrimination in the past decades.  
Finally, there is a method of agent-based modelling (ABM). It is “the computational 
study of social agents as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents” (Janssen, Ostrom, 
2006, p.1). Recently, empirically-based ABMs became particularly popular in the social sciences 
(Janssen, Ostrom, 2006, p.2). It is also, yet less often than other methods, used to study labour 
market discrimination (e.g., Lewkovicz, Domingue, Kant, 2009). It is particularly helpful in 
understanding  
 
“the functioning of labor markets and the consequences of the labour market policies” (Neugart, Richiardi, 
2012). 
 
On the one hand, the properly specified and calibrated models turn out to be useful tools. 
On the other hand, there are some issues with empirical validation of the models (Fagiolo, 
Moneta, Windrum, 2007, p. 217). Moreover, their quality depends a lot on  
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“the availability, quality and bias of available data sets” (Fagiolo, Moneta, Windrum, 2007, p. 222). 
 
As it is possible to see, all methods used to study discrimination have their strong and 
weak points. A lot of them risk mixing discrimination and inequality that arises due to non-
discriminatory reasons. In order to conduct a thorough analysis of discrimination, it may be 
useful to use different approaches to study the same topic.  
Discussion and conclusion 
In this review, we have discussed the concept of discrimination, considered different 
approaches and presented the state-of-the-art in this domain and in age discrimination in the 
labour market more specifically.  
Our excursus suggests that while discrimination is a very popular and widely researched 
topic, it is a very delicate and ambiguous phenomenon that needs to be studied carefully and 
with the help of various approaches in order to be able to grasp its full extent, roots and the 
mechanisms that lie behind discriminatory actions.   
It means that to our opinion the only way to research discrimination thoroughly and to 
distinguish it from inequality, is to methodically study it with all means available. There does not 
exist, as of yet, any method that would guarantee a correct response to the questions that we 
usually raise. Are these groups being discriminated or not? If this is discrimination, where does it 
come from? What are the reasons behind it?  
Trying to reach this goal within the scope of dissertation research, even for one country 
only, would be overly ambitious. However, we will try to at least touch the issue from some of 
the angles.  
The main focus of this research is on issues with the employment status of the older 
workers, i.e., in our case, employment rates and hiring.  
Thus, here we will approach this problem from different sides: micro (analysis of hiring 
decisions through laboratory experiment) and macro (policy analysis through the use of quasi 
experimental technique).  
We will not be using interviews because (as was discussed in Section 7) the participants 
are usually prone to provide biased and socially acceptable response, thus underestimating or 
overestimating the level of discrimination while here we will be trying to see a more objective 
picture. We also will not only outcomes as they the risks of finding inequlity and not 
discrimination are very high (also discussed in Section 7). Finally, ABMs is not out method of 
choice because we would like to analyze not only mechanisms but also the reasoning behind the 
decisions made and the role of policies that are already in place, for ABM will not be the optimal 
choice. 
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In both papers we will be using experimental approaches that, in recent years, have not 
been widely used in age discrimination research.  
In the next chapter we will, use secondary data (European Union Labour Force Survey) 
to analyze the effect of the introduction of the anti-discriminatory legislation in Italy in 2003, 
specifically, how it influenced the older age group (55-59). While it is very complicated to 
directly study the existence of discrimination through the use of secondary data from the 
surveys, it is quite possible to see whether the legislation changed the situation,  and whether it 
had specific influence on the target group without influencing younger age groups, i.e. those who 
are old enough not to be at risk of discriminated due to being too young (35-39, in our case). 
And in this way, we can find indirect proof of existence or absence of discrimination.  
In the third chapter, we will introduce a laboratory experiment based on the methodology 
more often used in field experiments and survey experiments/vignettes with certain 
modifications to control for unobservable factors at the same time creating an environment as 
close as possible to real-life situation.  
As we discussed in Section 6 of this review, there are two theories on age discrimination 
that could explain purely discrimination: imperfect information, or statistical discrimination, and 
cultural norms, i.e. tasted-based discrimination; and several that could explain both 
discrimination and simple inequality happening due to non-discriminatory issues.  
In Chapter 2, the methodology we used will help us understand whether, other things 
being constant, the introduction of the anti-discriminatory policy improved the employment rates 
of older workers. We will not be able to distinguish between the two types of discrimination, but 
we will be able to control for such factors as personal choices, crisis issues, other forms of 
discrimination, types of job and education levels. While we will not be able to completely 
eliminate the factors that could arise from unobservable factors, we will be able eliminate most 
of them and analyze others through the logic of ceteris paribus before and after the policy 
introduction.  
In Chapter 3, we get rid of the factors that could explain both and try to see whether we 
there is an issue of discrimination of older workers and, if there is, whether we can distinguish 
between the two “purely” discriminative approaches. 
We believe that in these two papers will be using the most suitable and available 
approaches to address discrimination specifically (and not inequality arising due non-
discriminatory issues), to eliminate as many unobservable factors as possible and to get a more 
prominent view of the situation.  
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Chapter 2. The influence of anti-discriminatory 
legislation on the employment of elderly workers in 
Italy3 
 
Introduction and motivation 
Age discrimination in employment has been a proven issue in USA and European 
countries for several decades now. Both young and old workers can be the target of 
discrimination, the former because of lack of experience (Krings, Sczesny, Kluge, 2011), the 
latter on the basis of stereotypes concerning their abilities, motivation and productivity (Riach, 
Rich, 2007; Rosen, Jerdee, 1976). As Roscigno, Mong, Byron and Tester point out, older 
workers tend to be seen by both younger co-workers and the management as  
 
“inflexible, slow, unorganized, difficult and expensive to train” (2007, p. 314).  
 
However, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, empirical research shows that, 
even though older age does have a negative influence on certain abilities (e.g., Kang, Yoon, 
2008; Luo, Craik, 2009; Wagner, Hassanein, Head, 2014; Zancada-Menendez et al, 2015), it 
does not necessarily have negative consequences on job results (e.g., Rhodes, 1983; McEvoy and 
Cascio, 1989; Bennington, Tharenou, 1996), since older workers find ways to compensate for 
this (e.g., Chaparro et al, 1999; Brooks et al, 2001; Lobjois, Cavallo, 2006; Schwerha, Wiker, 
Jaraiedi, 2007). Actually, according to some studies, older workers perform even better than 
younger ones (Fyock, 1991; Rhodes, 1983).  
As was mentioned in the Section 6 of Chapter 1 where we discussed the theories behind 
age discrimination, older workers may suffer termination also because they command higher 
wages than younger ones, hence being the target of opportunistic behavior on the side of 
employers (Mercat-Bruns, Holt, Kutz, 2016), which is the kind of behavior that 
antidiscrimination laws prevent. Similarly, they can be excluded from on-the-job and other forms 
of training that might be reserved to younger workers, who are seen as a worthier long-term 
investment (Adams, 2002; Cohn, 1982; Maxwell, 1989; O'Rand and MacLean, 1986). 
Age is, of course, a matter of culture too, that can be interpreted in many ways: the 
question “how old are you?” has only one answer, but many possible interpretations (Mercat-
                                                 
3 This chapter was written in collaboration with Prof. Cinzia Meraviglia  (University of Milan) 
The authors express their gratitude to Prof. Raffaele Guetto (University of Florence) for his very useful suggestions 
on the difference-in-difference models. 
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Bruns et al., 2016), all susceptible of leading to different conducts on the side of employers, co-
workers, and the workers themselves. In this light, the nature of age as a basis for discrimination 
stands out against that of gender and ethnicity: age  
 
“marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span” (Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 US 307, 1976).  
 
In other words, if age is an ascribed factor, just as gender or ethnicity, unlike the latter it 
is bound to change over life, making it more complex to design regulations and policies that aim 
at protecting some age groups from discrimination. Furthermore, age is both an indicator of 
personal characteristics and a marker that places the individual within a social and historical 
frame, i.e. a generation (Mercat-Bruns et al., 2016). Actually, analysts speak of period, age and 
cohort effects as all being indexed by age (Firebaugh, 1997). The first refers to the historical 
period and the kind of changes that it brings about; the second refers to the meaning we usually 
associate to age, namely the life-cycle status one individual is in, while the third concerns the 
specificity of a given cohort. For example, a period effect is when empirical research shows that 
age discrimination becomes more likely the more our societies age, which is a process that 
started a few decades ago and that is bound to continue in the near future (Lozon, Barratt, 2013; 
Rippon et al., 2013). A life-cycle effect is when a worker is fired because of his/her older age, 
which demands a higher pay than in the case of a younger worker. Finally, a cohort effect is 
found when a cohort of older workers experiences termination, job displacement or involuntary 
exit from the labor market more often than both older and younger cohorts. 
Another aspect of age being a cultural factor – despite being an apparently “objective” 
characteristic – is underlined by some studies that point at the fact that culture in Western 
contemporary societies promotes “young” as being better than “old” (Wood et al., 2008); this 
idea becomes part of our everyday life through socialization, shaping everyday life interactions 
in organizations and institutions (Coupland, Coupland, Giles, 1991; Levy, Banaji, Nelson, 2002; 
Schrank, Waring, 1989), including the labor market. 
It could be argued that, in spite of the positive image of being young and negative of 
being old, young workers still end at a disadvantage in the labour market, i.e. face problems 
finding jobs. The issue here is that the explanations behind them coming across such problems is 
often linked to non-discriminatory factors. Studies on this topic show that troubles finding 
employment for young workers happen due to mismatch between the knowledge they gained 
when studying and the demands that employers have (e.g. Barbulescu, 2012; Refrigeri, Aleandri, 
2013; Gontkovičová, Mihalčová, Pružinský, 2015). These kinds of problems could be solved by 
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a better dialogue between educational institutions and firms, i.e. the adjustment of study 
programs in line with the demands of the labour market or by additional training of young 
graduates. This would be more complicated with older workers as they are often regarded as too 
old and not motivated enough to get any new training (Riach, Rich, 2007, p. 3). In this sense, 
younger workers have more possibilities to gain necessary training and/or experience that will fit 
better in the market as they are likely to face less prejudice and less obstacles based on it. 
Apart from that, the issue of age discrimination against older workers is a bit more 
pressing due to demographic issues. Firstly, population in ageing quickly, quicker than before. 
This happens in the form of longer life-expectancy, lower fertility rates and, as a consequential 
result, higher share of older people and higher dependency ratios. For example, life expectancy 
at birth in OECD countries is now 80 and more, which is 10 years more that it was in 1960s 
(OECD, 2018). Life expectancy at 65 is now 21.3 years for women and 18.2 for years men, and 
it is expected to increase to 25.5 years and 22.8 years respectively by 2060s (OECD, 2017, p. 
120). Fertility rates, on the other hand, have decreased from 2.7 in 1970 to 1.7 in 2014 (OECD, 
2016, p. 81).  Additionally, according to the World Health Organization (2018) in the next 30-35 
years the share of the population over 60 years old will be almost twice what it is now (from 
12% in 2015 to 22% in 2050). Moreover, by 2020 there will be more people aged 60 than 
children younger than 5 years old.  
This means that in the upcoming decades the issues of elderly people will be among the 
important issues for the societies. This will include the position of older workers in the labour 
market, as the increase in life-expectancy leads most of the countries to increase retirement age, 
thus, increasing the share of older workers in the labour market (OECD, 2017). 
European countries (as compared to, for example, the USA) addressed age discrimination 
in the labour marker only recently. If the USA legislation started to cover this problem about 
five-six decades ago, in Europe this happened only in 2000; before that, almost all European 
Union (EU) countries (aside from Poland and Finland) did not prohibit discrimination based on 
age (Kapp, 2013). In 2000, the Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000) concerning various forms of discrimination, 
including age, was issued, with EU countries having to adopt it by December 2003, with possible 
extensions for age and disability (Arrowsmith, 2004).  
As of 2000, in Italy there was no specific legislation against age discrimination, aside 
from Article 37 of the Constitution about juvenile workers having to receive equal pay as other 
workers (Arrowsmith, 2004). Hence, there was no legislation protecting older workers from 
discrimination in the labour market when this Directive was implemented, in 2003. Actually, the 
scant empirical research on age discrimination around this time shows that older workers did 
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experience certain discriminatory treatment in the past (Segalla, Jacobs-Belschak, Muller, 2001; 
Rymkevitch, Villosio, 2007; Lazazzara, Bombelli, 2011). For example, in 2006, 72% of workers 
belonging to a 45-54 age group reported encountering age discrimination, according to the 2006 
Kelly Global Workforce Index. However, the survey conducted in Italy by Institute for the 
Development of Vocational Training of Workers (ISFOL) placed Italy among the countries with 
the lowest level of discrimination in the workplace. Still, in a research conducted in 2002, age 
discrimination was first in ranking (7.5% of respondents encountered it), among other forms of 
discrimination (political opinion, 5.5%, and gender, 4,9%). Older people reported having been 
discriminated more frequently than younger people (Rymkevitch, Villosio, 2007, p. 4). 
Moreover, Paulli and Tagliabue (2002) stated that older workers faced particular discrimination 
in what concerned job recruitment and training courses, especially with the low-skilled types of 
work (by Rymkevitch, Villosio, 2007, p. 5). The same is confirmed by Lazazzara and Bombelli 
(2011, p. 814), who maintain that human resource management made little investment in older 
workers and created obstacles in promotion for workers 45 years old and above. Additionally, 
according to Rymkevitch and Villosio (2007, p. 6), among 5189 advertisements in the 1993-
2004 time period, more than 40% included age requirements, and more than 85% of them 
required candidates less than 44 years old. Older workers were also the first ones to become 
redundant in case of restructuring (Segalla, Jacobs-Belschak, Muller, 2001).  
Moreover, in Italy there are no requirements to stop working after reaching retirement 
age for private sector workers, but it exists for public sector workers. According to some 
researchers,  
 
“the use of age-based stereotypes has never been perceived as being potentially discriminatory” 
(Guaglianone, Ravelli, 2015, p. 175).  
 
In addition to that employers are allowed to dismiss the workers who have reached 
retirement age without any justification (Guaglianone, Ravelli, 2017, p. 120).  
When discussing the implementation of Council Directive 2000/78/EC in Italy, 
Rymkevitch and Villosio (2007, p. 18) claim that, in spite of its formal introduction, the 
consolidated anti-discrimination approach is still lacking. In this paper, we will conduct some 
analyses to ascertain whether the Directive, however, had served its purpose and had any 
influence on the employment rate of older workers.  
1. Elderly workers in the Italian labour market 
Italy, as many other countries, faces the fact that its population is ageing. As it can be 
seen in Figure 1, in 2015 the percentage of people aged 55 and above was 35,5%, as compared to 
 50 
21,7% in 1975. Hence, we can see that it has increased more than 1,5 times during the period and 
it is expected to continue increasing, up to almost 46% in 2050. The same increase concerns the 
share of people aged over 65 (i.e. those who are nearest to retirement), which is expected to 
increase from 22.4% in 2015 to 34.6 % in 2050. In addition to that, Figure 1 shows that the 
dependency ratio has increased as well, and it is expected by 2050 to get to twice as much as it 
was in 2015. This dependency ratio is a pressure in itself on the working population. If 
discrimination of older workers is added to it, the situation is expected to become even more 
difficult for discriminated workers, for retirees and for younger people in employment.  
 
Figure 1 — Elderly population in Italy, 1975-2050 (projections for 2025 and 2050) 
Sources: OECD, 2017; Eurostat, 2017; United Nations, 2017; Author’s calculations 
 
Table 2 shows some retirement statistics on Italy. The pensionable age has now become 
rather high, and it will continue increasing up to 70 years old, until 2050 (Pensionioggi.it). It 
should, however, also be noted that the average effective retirement age in Italy, currently, is 
remarkably lower than the official pensionable age, and while people have quite a high life 
expectancy, they spend a lot of time in retirement which, as was said above, increases the 
dependency ratio and, thus, the pressure on employed population. Therefore, it is important for 
older people who have not reached retirement age yet to stay in employment. However, early 
retirement is quite popular in Italy, employers often encourage older workers to retire early and 
are more prone to dismiss them on the grounds that they will retire soon anyway (e.g., Segalla et 
al., 2001; Lazazzara, Bombelli, 2011).  
 51 
 
Table 2 – The elderly in the Italian pension system  
Pensionable age (2018) 66 years and 7 months 
Change in pensionable age 
67 by 2020 
70 by 2050 
Average effective retirement age (2016) 
Men – 62,1 
Women – 61,3 
Early retirement (2018) 
Men —42 years and 10 months 
Women — 41 years and 10 months 
Life expectancy at birth (2015-2020) 
Men – 81,1 
Women – 85,4 
Life expectancy at 65 (2015-2020) 
Men – 19.5 
Women – 22,4 
Life expectancy at 65 (2060-2065) 
Men — 23.9 
Women — 26.9 
Sources: Pensionioggi.it; OECD, 2017 ; ISTAT, 2018 
 
Due to the alarming dependency ratio forecasts, the issue of elderly workers staying in 
employment longer is important. Table 3 shows the employment situation in Italy in 2004 and 
2017. As we can see, the employment rates in all age groups aside from the youngest (15-24 
years old) have been in 2004 and still are now higher than in the oldest group (55-64 years old). 
However, we can also see that employment rates in all groups aside from the oldest one have 
decreased. The decrease was slight for the middle-aged (35-44 and 45-54 age groups) and 
remarkable for the younger groups (15-24 years old). 
 
Table 3 — Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates in Italy by age cohorts (2004 
and 2017), % 
 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
2004 2017 2004 2017 2004 2017 2004 2017 2004 2017 
Employment 
rate  
27.3 17.1 70.0 61.3 76.4 73.1 69.9 71.7 30.6 52.2 
Unemployment 
rate 
23.5 34.7 10.3 17.0 5.7 9.7 4.1 7.9 4.2 5.8 
Inactivity rate  64.3 73.8 22.0 26.2 18.0 19.0 27.2 22.1 68.1 44.6 
Changes in 
employment 
rates  
- 37.2 -12.5 -4.4 -2.6 +70.5 
Source: Istat, 2018; Author’s calculations 
 
We will discuss the youngest and the oldest cohorts in a more detailed way, as they faced 
the most significant changes. 
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According to Istat, people are considered to be in the “elderly” age group from 55 years 
of age, while the “youth” age group goes from 15 to 34 years. As we can see in Table 3, almost 
half of the population aged between 55 and 64 was inactive in 2017, but this percentage is much 
lower than in 2004. Additionally, the employment rate of older workers has increased 
considerably in the last 13 years, by 70.5. The unemployment rate is rather low (5.5%); this 
could be due to the fact that, starting from a certain age, people become inactive after losing their 
job (even if they cannot officially retire yet), or they possibly go on early retirement, as it is too 
hard to find a job if a person has been made redundant close to retirement age (Lazazzara, 
Bombelli, 2011).  
Regarding younger workers, we can see that the highest unemployment rate is in the 
youngest cohort (15-24 years), when people are fresh from school and do not possess a lot of 
working skills, which makes it hard for them to find a job. As for the employment rate (Table 3), 
workers aged 25-34 have a higher level of employment than as those aged 55-64 (61.3 vs. 52.2), 
even if the level of employment of the younger group has slightly decreased since 2004. The 
unemployment rate of the youngest group of workers is considerably higher, mainly due to the 
2008-2009 crisis (Tanveer Choudhry, Marelli, Signorelli, 2012) and labour market flexibilization 
(Barbieri, Scherer, 2009).  
As for the older workers, the questions are: what has brought about this increase in 
employment, either the increase in the retirement age, the effectiveness of anti-discriminatory 
legislation, or both? And to what extent has either factor pushed the employment rate? 
2. Policies targeting older workers and their evaluation 
In the above section, we have shown that the employment rate of older workers has 
considerably increased since 2004. Judging by the legislation changes that happened in Italy 
since then, there could be two possible reasons behind this fact.  
The first one refers to the two new legislations that influenced older workers in 2003-
2004. In June 2003 the Council Directive 2000/78/EC was adopted, which aimed at decreasing 
age discrimination by directly prohibiting age discrimination in the labour market, that we 
already cited. The second one concerns the pension reform (Legge 23 agosto 2004, n. 243) that 
was issued in September 2004, announcing a gradual upward shift of retirement age, from 57 to 
60 in 2008, to 61 in 2010 and to 62 in 2014.  
Obviously, an increase in retirement age leads to an increased share of older people in the 
labour market, hence definitely influencing the employment status of older people. Similarly, the 
introduction of the anti-discriminatory legislation, if it had achieved its aims, should have had a 
positive influence on the employment prospects of older workers, while not influencing the 
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employment prospects of those age groups (possibly excluding the younger ones) that were not 
targets of this legislation.  
Evaluating the impact of a policy amounts to entering the domain of causality and that of 
its empirical assessment. Of course, causality is an old and debated issue in statistics, philosophy 
and in the social sciences (see for example Goldthorpe, 2007). To be strict, the only way of 
assessing whether a causal factor is at work lays within the counterfactual approach4, which 
requires to observe the outcome Y on unit i both when the unit has been exposed to treatment t 
(Yt) and not exposed to the treatment itself (Yc); the difference between the two outcomes (Yt  – 
Yc) is the realized causal effect of the treatment. Clearly, this is impossible to observe5. Holland 
(1986) defines this as the fundamental problem of causal inference, that potentially blocks all 
ways to empirically ascertaining causality at work. Scholars have then devised a number of 
methods for bypassing this impasse, depending on which domain a researcher is in – either 
experimental research, or observational, nonexperimental research. The latter field is more 
challenging, since the researcher has no possibility to define and select ex ante the control and 
the treatment groups on the basis of randomization – one of the key requirements for bypassing 
the fundamental problem of causal inference, together with the unit homogeneity assumption6 
and the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA; Rubin 1986; Morgan, Winship, 
2014).  
Matching is one of these techniques, used in nonexperimental studies, in which there is a 
well-defined treatment group exposed to treatment, but no specific experimental design is used 
to form a control group (e.g., Bassi, 1984; Czajka et al., 1992; Dehejia, S Wahba, 2002). As 
King and Nielsen put it,  
 
“the goal of matching is to reduce imbalance in the empirical distribution of the pre-treatment confounders 
between the treated and control groups” (2016, p.1),  
 
so to get closer to an experimental framework.  
There are several matching methods that can be used to analyze policy effects, such as 
propensity score marching (PSM; Rosenbaum, Rubin, 1983), synthetic control method (Abadie, 
Diamond, Hainmueller, 2015), coarsened exact matching (CEM; Blackwell, Iacus, King, Porro, 
2009). However popular these methods have been, the literature has highlighted their biases and 
                                                 
4 See among others: Winship, Morgan, 1999; Morgan, Winship, 2014; Holland 1986; Holland, Rubin 1983.  
5 A very simple approach to evaluating the impact of a given policy is represented by logistic regression, through 
which it is possible to assess, for example, whether the targets of the policy at hand are better off than nontargets in 
a given time period – should be excluded, since it produces more biased results than other methods (e.g., Cepeda et 
al., 2003).  
6 For an introduction to the requirements of experimental and nonexperimental research, see King, Keohane, Verba, 
(1994). 
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warned against their application in a causal inference setting. For example, King and Nielsen 
claim that PSM – as a matching technique – leads to  
 
“unnecessary imbalance, which generates model dependence, researcher discretion, and statistical bias” 
(2016, p. 2).  
 
In sum, PSM ends up re-introducing in the data the biases it aimed at minimizing. 
Still part of the counterfactual framework, the difference-in-differences (DID) approach 
offers some advantages over competing techniques. Being a quasi-experimental method, it is 
useful when exchangeability between the treatment and control groups cannot be assumed, hence 
when randomization is not possible. While propensity score matching pairs treatment and control 
units that are  
 
“similar in terms of their observable characteristics” (Dehejia, Wahba, 2002, p. 151),  
 
the main point of using the DID approach is when the average outcomes of treatment and 
control groups follow a parallel trend before a given time point, then diverge afterwards (O’Neill 
et al., 2016, p. 1). While other matching techniques provide less biased results when parallel 
trend assumption does not hold, DID presents unbiased results when it does (O’Neill et al., 2016, 
p. 11), especially if applied symmetrically (Chabé-Ferret, 2015, p. 110), i.e. when there is an 
equal number of time periods before and after the treatment.  
In our case, we have a particular age group – that of older workers – who was targeted by 
the anti-discriminatory legislation (as well as by the increase of retirement age). A suitable 
treatment group to contrast older workers against is that of middle-age workers, who were not 
targets of the anti-discriminatory policy, as they were not at risk of age discrimination yet. At the 
same time, they are far enough from retirement to not be influenced by the increase of retirement 
age over the upcoming years.  
We will also distinguish between cumulative effect of both the EU legislation against age 
discrimination and the increase of pensionable age, while aiming at assessing the specific effect 
of the anti-discriminatory legislation.  
3. Research questions and hypotheses 
The employment status of older workers is a suitable indicator of any eventual effect of 
the anti-discrimination policy. As we discussed in the Introduction, older workers are more at 
risk of termination the closer they get to standard retirement age and find it more difficult to find 
a new job, once fired (Lazazzara, Bombelli, 2011). Hence, should we observe an increased share 
 55 
of older workers among the employed after 2003, there could be grounds to claim that the anti-
discriminatory legislation actually had its intended effect. 
At the same time, as we anticipated in the previous Section, a confounding effect could 
come from the increase of pensionable age in force since 2004: of course, such measure has the 
effect of keeping older workers in the labour market – hence potentially increasing the risk of 
them being the target of discrimination on the basis of age, as well as the probability for them to 
be employed instead than inactive. 
In order to disentangle these matters, we will consider the employment probability of a 
cohort of older workers and contrast it against that of two different groups: that of workers who 
are either unemployed or inactive (thus including the normally retired); and that of workers who 
are unemployed or inactive, excluding the normally retired. We will come back to this strategy 
of analysis in the next Section. 
Our main research questions are the following: 
1. Did the probability to be employed rather than either unemployed or inactive of 
elderly workers increase after the year 2003? 
2. Could this increase be attributed to the implementation of the Council Directive 
2000/78/EC, which prohibits age discrimination, or is it only the result of the 
pensions system reform in 2004, which increased retirement age? 
Our main hypothesis is based on the assumption that, as the anti-discriminatory 
legislation is aimed at improving the situation of those who belong to the risk groups, its 
introduction should do exactly this. In the case of age discrimination in the labour market, 
employers should start acting in accordance with the laws, e.g. stop pressuring older workers to 
retire early or firing them without any legitimate explanation.  
Thus, our hypotheses are the following: 
1. The probability of older workers (55-59 years old) of being employed rather than 
either unemployed or inactive increased after 2003, as compared to before, and in 
contrast with that of younger workers. 
2. This increase is due to the implementation of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 
which prohibits age discrimination, instead than to the 2004 pension reform. 
4. Data and method 
In our analysis we use the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) cross-
sectional data for Italy from 1992 to 2016. The policy was introduced in Italy in 2003 and, thus, 
there is enough data to look at the outcome before and after 2003.  
 56 
We will run two models (see Table 5) having employment status as their outcome. The 
probability to be employed is calculated as the ratio of everyone employed to all employed, 
unemployed and inactive, with two specifications. The first one concerns permanently disabled 
people and those in military service, who have been excluded from the inactive population in our 
first model. The logic behind this is that disabled people are (often) permanently inactive, 
regardless of the policies introduced and, thus, cannot represent an alternative outcome to being 
employed7. Similarly, those in military service are highly unlikely to be of the age groups that 
concern us and, thus, it is preferable to exclude all cases belonging to this category. Also, being 
in military service was compulsory only until 2004, and configures an employment status that is 
hardly comparable to unemployment or inactivity, that can be both related to the labour market 
instead than to formal regulations.  
However, we keep in the group of the inactive the students, as this category is vast and 
includes those in further training and having an unpaid work experience, thus making it possible 
for respondents in the studied age groups to be among them. We also keep in those who are 
fulfilling domestic tasks, as it is totally possible that among them there are older people who are 
not working due to inability to find a job, and those in retirement and early retirement, as these 
are categories in which those who were forced into retirement may be, as well as those from 
younger cohorts, especially women, who can get back to employment after an inactivity spell.  
Since the year 2004 (very close in time to the introduction of the anti-discriminatory 
legislation in 2003) was also marked by the Maroni pension system reform, which increased 
retirement age, we should make sure that the effects that we might be finding are the results of 
the anti-discriminatory policy introduction and not of the changes in the retirement age. For this 
purpose, in our second model we remove the normally retired from the inactive group, against 
which the employed among the selected age group will be contrasted, as shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 — Composition of the contrasted groups by models and sampling frame 
Model Outcome Contrasted groups Sampling frame 
1 
Employment 
status 
Employed vs. Unemployed + Inactive (without 
disabled and those in military service) 
Active individuals in the 
sample 1992-2016 
2 
Employment 
status 
Employed vs. Unemployed + Inactive (without 
disabled, those in military service and normally 
retired) 
 
                                                 
7 Of course, a worker – regardless of her/his age, might turn disabled while in the labour market, and/or can enter or 
leave the active population depending on her/his condition. What we are saying here is that on average the reason 
behind an older worker leaving the labor market is more often related to becoming unemployed or retired, than 
disabled, and for this reason the latter category is excluded from the contrast group.  
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Table 5 — Design of the DID quasi-experiment 
 
55-59 age 
cohort 
(T) 
35-39 age 
cohort 
(C) 
Difference  
(T-C) 
Difference-in-
difference 
Before 2003 P1(T) P1(C) P1 = P1(T) – P1(C) 
P = P1 - P2 
After 2003 P2(T) P2(C) P2 = P2(T) – P2(C) 
 
The DID design typically needs two groups to be compared before and after the 
treatment, i.e. the passing of the anti-discrimination law, as for an outcome measure, in our case 
the probability of being employed rather than unemployed or inactive. The design of the 
contrasts is detailed in Table 5.  
Hence, the probability of being employed rather than unemployed or inactive of older 
workers (55-59 years old) will be observed before and after 2003 and contrasted against that of 
workers in the age cohort of 35-39.  
These two age cohorts were chosen because we needed to compare those who are at the 
lowest risk of getting discriminated, due to their age, and those who were at the highest risk. 
Thus, the age cohort of 35-39 years old seemed to be the most suited reference group. While the 
age at which people start their professional path varies with time, in the past starting earlier and 
in the recent years continuing to their education for longer, 35-39 years old is a safe age for long 
time periods. At this age, one is either a professional with status or, at the very least, someone 
who is past his/her first years of work. Also, according to Istat, people aged 35 and more no 
longer belong to “youth”, which makes them the age group that is typically not the target of anti-
discriminatory legislation.  
Although, according to the literature, for a long time the ideal age at which it made sense 
to look for signs of discrimination was 45 years old (Kalish, Williams, 1983), in Italy those aged 
between 40 and 50 have, on average, have the highest employment rates, hence making it 
pointless to choose them as our treatment group. Instead, we needed a group that showed a 
certain decline in employment levels and that is moving towards retirement age, as this is the age 
at which discrimination should be more prominent and, thus, easier to catch. In this sense, the 
group aged 55-59 seems a perfect choice. From this age on, according to Istat, people start to 
belong to the “elderly”; the age cohorts before are very well employed and the age cohorts after 
(60 and older) are a lot closer to retirement, with inactivity rate relatively high. Indeed, as we 
showed above, in 2003 the retirement age was below 60 (starting to increase from 57 to 60 by 
2008 and to 62 by 2014). Thus, most of those from the age group 60+ were already in retirement. 
Under these conditions, the results could be biased by such things as voluntary unemployment 
and/or inactivity that is not connected to discrimination. This is why chose 55-59 age group. 
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Most of the members of this age group were close to retirement at that point but not expected to 
be normally retired yet. Thus, exactly the group we needed. Figure 2 shows the share of 
employed workers on both the unemployed and inactive in our data (with the exception of those 
in military service and the permanently disabled, as we explained). 
 
 
Figure 2 — Share of employed workers by 5-year wide age groups, 1992-2016 (EU LFS) 
 
In our models we control for a list of factors that we consider important for the situation 
in the labour market. These are gender, education level, training undertaken in the last four 
weeks, year of survey, sector of activity (current for those employed, and the last one for those 
unemployed or inactive), ISCO-88 code of the occupation (1-digit) and macroregion of residence 
(see  
Table 6 for details).  
Finally, it is to be mentioned that we ran a DID analysis for each of three different time 
periods. The first one is the entire period for which we have available data, i.e., 1992-2016. The 
second period goes from 1999 to 2007, hence still including 2003 as a middle point but being 
shorter than the previous time specification. We choose 2007 because the crisis of 2008-2009 
has significantly influenced employment prospects of all age groups and, thus, the inclusion of 
this period and the years after it might distort the results. By right-censoring our data to 2007, 
then, we aim at checking whether the results obtained on the longest time span are possibly 
biased by the crisis as an external shock that could interfere with the effect of the policy under 
study. Finally, we restricted the analysis to the period for which we have the strongest proof of 
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the parallel trend, both visually and analytically, and for both models (with or without the 
normally retired), i.e. from 2002 to 2004. In all these cases, we selected the years of survey so to 
have a symmetrical time span before and after the year 2003. 
 
Table 6 — Variables in the models 
Variable Measurement 
Number of 
categories 
Description of categories 
Age groups Binary 2 35-39 and 55-59 age groups 
Gender Binary 2 Male, Female 
Educational level Categorical 3 Low, Medium, High 
Sector of activity 
of current / last 
job 
Categorical 3 Agriculture, Industry, Services 
Current/ last 
occupation 
Categorical 10 
ISCO-88 code, 1 digit (Legislators, senior officials 
and managers; Professionals; 
Technicians and associate professionals; Clerks; 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers; Craft and 
related trades workers; Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers; Elementary occupations) 
Macroregion Categorical 5 North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands 
Training or 
education in the 
last 4 weeks 
Binary 2 Yes, No 
Year of survey Categorical8 27 1992-2016 
 
The whole sample for the period under study consists of 10288352 cases from which we, 
obviously, removed everyone who is not in the right age range (8900285 cases). After this 
selection, we were left with 1388067 cases. Then we removed cases that did not belong to the 
categories of interest as for the outcome variable (employed/unemployed/inactive minus those in 
military service and permanently disabled for Model 1; all the above minus those in normal 
retirement for Model 2).  
This left us with 1061561 cases (Model 1) and 984226 cases (Model 2). We then 
removed cases that lacked information on education and training, sector of activity and ISCO-88 
code. As for ISCO-88, we also removed the army professions, as the military is a very specific 
type of career that works in a different way from ordinary occupations. Thus, we removed them 
to avoid any potential bias9.  
                                                 
8 We take year as a categorical variable as per DID method we will need to analysis the interaction between the year 
of survey and treatment group which we will discuss in the upcoming sections. 
9 Table 17 and Table 18 in the Appendix show the details of the selection procedures that led to the valid sample. 
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5. Descriptive statistics  
Here we will present the descriptive analysis of the variables used in this study by both 
age cohorts and time for Model 1 (which includes the normally retired among the inactive) and 
Model 2 (which excludes them) in order to see whether there are any remarkable and/or 
unexpected differences between the Models and/or time periods and/or age groups that could 
distort the results of our study of the role of legislation.  
As we can see in Figure 12 to Figure 15 and in Table 19 in the Appendix 2, the 
distribution of gender is slightly less balanced in the older cohort, which points at the fact that 
women entered the labor market less often in those cohort, and/or that they already left it by the 
age of 55. For both age cohorts in Model 1 and over time, there is the same tendency of 
convergence towards a 50:50 distribution: from 40.4% females and 59.6% males in 1992 to 
47.7% and 52.3% respectively in 2016 for 35-39 age cohort; from 33.0% females and 67.0% 
males in 1992 to 45.2% and 54.8% in 2016 for 55-59 age cohort.  
The same holds for Model 2: there were 29.2% of females and 70.8% males in 1992, 
while in 2016 there were 45.2% of females and 54.8% females. The change is more prominent 
for the older than for the younger cohort. While the share of women in the labour force in the 
past has always been lower than that of men (since a high share of them stays or quickly 
becomes housewives) and has been increasing with time, in the past this effect was amplified by 
lower retirement age. In 1990s a high percentage of them would already be in retirement at the 
age of 55-59. However, with the retirement age increase, the number of women at this age in the 
labour market also increased. This could explain why the increased share of women in Model 2 
for the older cohort is sharper in the 1990s and becomes more gradual with time than in Model 1: 
removing the normally retired had a higher impact on gender distribution as compared to when 
retirement age was lower.  
In terms of education (Figure 16 to Figure 19; Table 20 and Table 21 in the Appendix 2), 
including or excluding the normally retired makes little difference. In fact, in both models the 
level of education tends to increase with time for both age cohorts, i.e. the share of those with 
only lower secondary education tends to decrease and the share of those with upper secondary 
and tertiary education tends to increase. As expected, in both models the level of education is 
higher for the younger cohort than for the older. There were around 50% of the work force with 
lower secondary education in the younger cohort and around 80% in the older cohort in 1992; 
around 37% against around 14% respectively with upper secondary education and around 12% 
against 5-6% respectively with tertiary education. In 2016, these figures were less than 29% 
(lower secondary), approximately 48% (upper secondary) and almost 24% (tertiary) for the 
younger cohort, against approximately 42-43%, 42-43% and 14-15% respectively for the older 
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cohort. This is consistent with the fact that the share of people with higher education tends to 
increase with time.  
Figure 20 to Figure 23 and Table 22 in Appendix 2 show that there is no big difference 
across models in terms of additional training over the last four weeks. We can, however, see that 
the share of those who did have training increases over time (from less than 1% in the older 
cohort and about 2% in the younger cohort in 1992, to 7.2% in the older cohort to 8.2% in the 
younger cohort in 2016). We can also see that the difference between the younger and the older 
cohorts has decreased over time.  
When macroregions are considered (Figure 24 to Figure 27;  Table 23 and Table 24 in 
Appendix 2), there is no remarkable difference neither between age cohorts nor across models. 
The only difference that is worth mentioning is that gradual decrease of the share of the Southern 
macroregion (from approximately 24-26% depending on the cohort and model to 19-20%) in the 
sample. The share of North-West in the sample has, at same time, increased by 3-4 percentage 
points. The shares of other regions have stayed relatively stable.  
As for the occupation (Figure 28 to Figure 35; Table 25 Table 28 in Appendix 2), in 
Model 1 we can see that on the 35-39 age cohort the share of legislators, senior officials and 
managers saw a 5-timed increase (from 2.2% to 10.9%)10. The share of professionals went from 
a temporary decrease (13.0% in 1992 to 8.3% in 2006) to a return to the same level (to 13.5% in 
2016). The share of technicians, on the other hand, faced a temporary decrease (from 14.8% in 
1992 to 22% in 2007) that was followed by the decrease to the same level as in the beginning of 
the studied period (14.6% in 2016). The share of clerks (between 10% and 14%), plant and 
machine operators (between 8 and 10%), and elementary occupations (between 10 and 13%) 
stayed relatively stable through the period. Service workers saw a slight increase (from 14.7% in 
1992 to 17.5% in 2003) that was followed by gradual decrease to less than 10% in 2011; and a 
slow but steady increase since then (up to 11.4% in 2016). The share of service workers also 
decreased slightly from 18.9% to 14.4%. The share of agricultural workers has decreased from 
3.6% in 1992 to 1.9% in 2016. The same tendencies are true for the Model 2.  
As for the older cohort, for the Model 1, we can see that the share of legislators has 
increase more than 3 times (from 3.0% in 1992 to 9.5% in 2016). The share of professionals saw 
a steady decrease from 6.2% in 1992 to 13.8% in 2016. The share of technicians, similarly to the 
                                                 
10 It should be mentioned that in 2005 the method for calculating yearly figures in the EU-LFS database changed: 
until 2004, yearly results were calculated on the basis of Spring quarter information; from 2005 on, the same figures 
are calculated either as averages of the four quarters, or using the yearly datasets (Eurostat 2016). However, the 
major reason behind the sometimes abrupt changes in the figures before/after 2004 is that in that year Istat 
restructured the Labor Force Survey to meet the Eurostat requirement. Hence – while these changes do not affect the 
way in which the main indicators of the labour market are calculated, such as employment or unemployment rates – 
finer comparisons before/after 2004 might result in unexpected outcomes, as in the case of Isco-88 major group 1. 
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younger cohort, saw an increase from 7.4% in 1992 to 18.9% in 2008 which was followed by a 
decrease to 14.6% in 2016. The clerks experienced an increase from 8.3% to 14.2% through the 
period. Service workers faced a steady decrease (from 15.3% in 1992 to 6.7% in 2005) that was 
then followed by a steady increase up to 10.4% in 2016. The share of agricultural workers has 
decreased more than thrice (from 11.1% in 1992 to 3.0% in 201). The similar happened to crafts 
workers (from 20.3% to 13.0%). The shares of plant workers (10.9% to 8.1%) and elementary 
occupations (17.7% to 13.4%) decreased only slightly. Similar tendencies can be observed in the 
data used for Model 2.  
In terms of the sectors of activity (Figure 36 to Figure 39; Table 29 in Appendix 2), we 
can see that the difference between models for the younger cohort is almost non-existent and the 
distribution across sectors remains stable over time. In 1992 around 7% in younger cohort was 
employed in agriculture, around 31% in manufacturing and around 63% in services (for both 
models). In 2016 these figures were 4%, around 28% and around 68% respectively. For the older 
group the situation is slightly different. In the past for both models they were much more often 
employed in agriculture (around 17%) and much less in the services (around 50%) than the 
younger cohort, as it can be expected from the fact that the service sector in Italy only started 
developing in the 80s. The share of manufacturing was practically the same (32-34% depending 
on the model). In 2016, those figures changed to less than 6%, more than 61% and around 25% 
respectively. This is consistent with the fact that the share of agricultural jobs tends to decrease 
and the share of jobs in services tends to increase with time.  
As we can see, in terms of these variables, the difference either do not exist (between 
cohorts, Models or time periods) or are easily explained. There are no remarkable or 
unexplainable figures that could raise questions. 
6. Results of the Difference-In-Differences analysis  
6.1 Parallel trends analysis (Model 1) 
In order to ascertain whether a crucial precondition of a DID model holds in our data 
(namely, the existence of parallel trends in the share of employed workers before 2003 across the 
two age cohorts, and a divergent trend afterwards), we will firstly perform a visual inspection of 
the data,  then we will revert to logistic regression for confirming on a sounder statistical basis 
the outcome of the visual inspection itself. 
As we said, the share of employed workers for each age cohort is calculated as the ratio 
of everyone employed to both the unemployed and the inactive. Hence, our measure differs from 
the employment rate, which is routinely calculated as the ratio between the employed and the 
remaining active population (unemployed, looking for first job). Since we are studying the anti-
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discriminatory legislation aimed at those who are close to their retirement age or have recently 
reached it, we need to see what share of this age group is employed, including in the base also 
those who have already retired.  
As anticipated, in order to assess whether we can compare the effect of the legislation on 
treatment and control groups through the DID approach, we have to determine whether there was 
a parallel trend between the two before the introduction of the legislation, and whether it has 
changed afterwards.  
As we can see in Figure 3, the two lines show a rather similar trend over time before 
2003, without being perfectly parallel. What is much clearer is that, after 2003, the two trends 
converge, with the line of the older age cohort almost reaching that of the younger cohort by 
201611. 
 
Figure 3 — Share of employed workers in the treatment (55-59 years old) and control (35-
39 years old) groups, %, Model 1 (with normally retired) 
As encouraging as the visual inspection can be, it is not enough for assessing beyond any 
doubt whether – notwithstanding the apparent, albeit not great, difference between the trend lines 
of the two cohorts before 2003 – the employment prospects of the two age groups were actually 
similar before 2003, or not. For this reason we ran a binomial logistic regression with 
employment status as a dependent variable (coded as 1=employed, 0=unemployed or inactive). 
The independent control variables are treatment group, gender, level of education, existence of 
                                                 
11 It is also worth mentioning that the trend line of the 55-59 age cohort is the same before and after the removal of 
missing variables (see Appendix 3, Figure 40). Actually, as long as the missingness of cases is random, including or 
removing the cases with missing values on the relevant variables should not affect the bigger picture. Furthermore, 
the missingness depends not only on the outcome and on the treatment, but also on the control variables, that of 
course may vary according to the theory that underlies the analyses, and/or the researcher’s taste. 
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additional training in the last four weeks, macroregion, occupation, sector of current or previous 
(for the unemployed and inactive) occupation and year of survey.  
What we specifically look at in the parallel trend analysis, as in the DID method, is the 
interaction between year of survey and treatment vs. control group with the year 2003, with the 
control group as the reference. Were we to find that before 2003 this coefficient is not 
significant, it would mean – as we hope – that there was no actual difference in the trends 
between the two groups in the period before the introduction of the anti-discriminatory 
legislation. Similarly, were the coefficient to become significant after 2003, then this would 
mean that there was an actual change in this trend (e.g. Abadie, 2005), in line with our 
expectations. 
As Table 7 shows12, the interaction between treatment vs. control group and the year of 
survey is significant from 2004 onwards (at 1% significance level), and insignificant before that 
year, with the exception of year 2000, which falls slightly out from that trend (1% significance). 
Thus, the parallel trend that the visual inspection encouraged us to envision proves analytically 
for most of the period before the introduction of the legislation, while its absence is proven for 
all the period after 2003.  
 
Table 7 — Parameters of the binary logistic regression (year of survey х treatment group 
interaction) (Model 1, with normally retired) 
Reference =  
control group, 2003 
Coefficients Significance level 
1992 0.03 n.s. 
1993 0.02 n.s. 
1994 -0.04 n.s. 
1995 -0.12 n.s. 
1996 -0.03 n.s. 
1997 -0.10 n.s. 
1998 -0.05 n.s. 
1999 -0.04 n.s. 
2000 -0.13 1% 
2001 -0.10 n.s. 
2002 -0.04 n.s. 
2004 0.40 1% 
2005 0.50 1% 
2006 0.50 1% 
2007 0.57 1% 
2008 0.65 1% 
                                                 
12 The entire set of coefficients of the estimated model is shown in Table 31 of Appendix 3. 
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Reference =  
control group, 2003 
Coefficients Significance level 
2009 0.94 1% 
2010 1.10 1% 
2011 1.25 1% 
2012 1.52 1% 
2013 1.64 1% 
2014 1.80 1% 
2015 1.86 1% 
2016 1.84 1% 
 
For the longest time span (1992-2016) the DID parameter (0.179) is significant at 1% 
(Table 8)  and the probability of being employed instead than either unemployed or inactive for 
the control group is always higher than for the treated group (0.740 vs 0.435 before the 
legislation was introduced, and 0.665 vs. 0.540 afterwards) (see Table 33 and Table 34 in 
Appendix 4). For the period 1999-2007, the DID effect is lower than for the whole period from 
1992 to 2016 (0.079), however what matters most is that it is still significant at 1% (Table 8)13. 
Finally, when we consider a very short period of time (2002-2004), the DID is still significant at 
1%, though it is lower than in the previous model (0.03), both for the control and treatment 
groups. Nevertheless, for the treatment group, the decrease is smaller (0.021) than for the control 
group (0.051) which could be due to the introduction of the legislation which protected older 
workers rather than workers who are not of the age more at risk of discrimination (Table 37 and 
Table 38 in the Appendix 4). 
 
Table 8 — Summary of DID parameters by time span considered (Model 1) 
 DID parameter Std. error 
1992-2016 0.179 0.002 
1999-2007 0.079 0.004 
2002-2004 0.030 0.009 
 
So far, our analysis shows that the probability of being employed (rather than either 
unemployed or inactive) for workers between 55 and 59 years of age increased after 2003, as 
compared to that of workers in the age range 35-39. This would point at a positive effect of the 
adoption of the EU legislation against age discrimination. However, as we previously discussed, 
a relevant confounding factor is represented by the increase of pensionable age that went into 
force from 2004 on. Hence, given the short time distance that intervenes between the two events, 
                                                 
13 The detailed results of the models are shown in Table 35 and Table 36 in Appendix 4. 
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we should be pretty cautious in concluding at this stage that what we see is the effect of the anti-
discrimination legislation, rather than of the extended permanence of workers aged 55-59 
(especially women, who used to retire earlier than men) in the labour force. 
In order to control for the confounding influence of the pension reform, we opted for 
removing all normally retired people from the valid sample, which then includes among the 
inactive group only those who went on early retirement – the latter event being a totally possible 
outcome of more or less overt discrimination of older workers close to pensionable age. This 
way, the evaluation of the effect of the anti-discriminatory legislation is not biased by the fact 
that the increase in the share of employed workers in the age range 55-59 happened simply due 
to the fact that people started to retire later.  
6.2 Parallel trends analysis (Model 2) 
We start our analysis with a visual inspection of the trend of employed workers in the two 
age groups over time, before and after 2003. The parallel trend can be seen quite well, as much 
as we can see it is no longer there after 2003. As with Model 1, the removal of cases due to 
missing values leads to a less smooth picture (for the visual representation of the trend before the 
removal of missing values see Appendix 3, Figure 41); however, the parallelism before 2003 and 
the changes after that year are still discernible.  
 
 
Figure 4 — Employment rates of the treatment (55-59 years old) and control (35-39 years 
old) groups, %, Model 2 (without normally retired; after removal of missing variables) 
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The results of the logistic regression show a weaker parallel trend than in the previous 
model. However, from 1996 to 2002 the parameter relative to the interaction between year of 
survey and the treatment variable is either insignificant or significant at 5%, while after 2003 the 
significance is 1% (Table 9). Hence, the parallelism between the two trend lines is weaker than 
in the Model 1, but still holds for a slightly shorter time span (1996-2003 instead than 1992-
2003) (for the coefficients of control variables see Table 32 in the Appendix 3). 
 
Table 9 — Parameters of the binary logistic regression (year of survey х treatment group 
interaction) (Model 2, without normally retired) 
Reference =  
control group, 2003 
Coefficients Significance level 
1992 -0.39 1% 
1993 -0.33 1% 
1994 -0.22 1% 
1995 -0.30 1% 
1996 -0.18 5% 
1997 -0.10 n.s. 
1998 -0.14 n.s. 
1999 -0.13 n.s. 
2000 -0.18 5% 
2001 -0.13 5% 
2002 -0.04 n.s. 
2004 0.38 1% 
2005 0.40 1% 
2006 0.42 1% 
2007 0.46 1% 
2008 0.29 1% 
2009 0.43 1% 
2010 0.50 1% 
2011 0.58 1% 
2012 0.68 1% 
2013 0.72 1% 
2014 0.82 1% 
2015 0.87 1% 
2016 0.83 1% 
 
Here, as with the Model 1, we ran a model for each of the three time periods: 1992-2016, 
1999-2007 and 2002-2004. Given the results of the visual inspection, we expect the DID 
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parameter being lower than in Model 1 when calculated on the longest time span (1992-2016), 
and possibly not significant, since the difference in employment prospects of the two cohorts 
(and especially of the older one which is our treatment group) has been discounted of the effect 
of the pension reform. As for the DID parameters of the period from 1999 to 2007, and from 
2002 to 2004, we expect them both to be significant and not remarkably lower than that of the 
longest time span, since the effect of the pension reform should be more visible in the long run, 
instead than in the short one, hence inflating the DID estimates of the time span from 1992 to 
2016 in Model 1 and producing a severe drop in the coefficient size in Model 2, as we actually 
saw. 
The overall effect of the legislation for Model 2 can be seen in Table 10. For all time 
spans the effect for the Model 2 is smaller than for the Model 1. However, it stands. The time 
period from 1999 to 2007 actually shows a lower coefficient than the longer one, however the 
distance between the two periods in much lower in Model 2 than in Model 1, as expected. The 
DID coefficient for the time period 1999-2007 is rather close – albeit lower – to that of Model 1; 
the same happens considering the DID parameter of the shortest time period (2002-2004), which 
is even slightly higher than that of Model 1. 
 
Table 10 — Summary of DID parameters by time span considered (Models 1 and 2) 
Year 
Model 1 Model 2 
Diff-in-diff- 
parameter 
Std. error 
Diff-in-diff- 
parameter 
Std. error 
1992-2016 .179 .002 .078 .002 
1999-2007 .079 .004 .055 .004 
2002-2004 .030 .009 .031 .008 
 
Overall, it is not surprising that the effects are smaller for this model than for the previous 
one, which included the normally retired. As long as the pension reform forced workers who 
were close to pensionable age to remain active in the labor market, this effect would add to that 
of the anti-discriminatory legislation. If the pension reform would be the only factor behind the 
increase of the probability to be employed of the treatment group, then we should observe that 
the DID parameter becomes insignificant, once the normally retired have been removed from the 
analysis. At the opposite, should the pension reform have no impact on the employment 
prospects of older workers, as unlikely as this event would be, Model 2 should show more or less 
the same parameter estimates than Model 1. 
 69 
Our actual results stand in the middle, as could be expected, since the DID parameters are 
lower than those showed by Model 1 for each time span considered, however they are still 
significant.  
It is interesting to note that the shorter the time span considered, the less difference is 
found between the effects of Model 1 and 2. In other words, in the short run, including or not the 
normally retired does not make much of a difference. This is probably due to the fact that the 
more time passes, the stronger becomes the effect of the pension system reform, while in the first 
years it is much less noticeable, probably with only the effect of anti-discriminatory legislation 
being in place (Table 41). The same logic could be used for commenting on the fact that the 
difference between the DID parameters of Model 2 according to the time span considered are 
much closer to one another than the analogous parameters of Model 1. On the one hand, this 
means that the effect of the pension reform can be better seen in the long run, given the 
noticeable distance between the DID coefficient of Model 1 for the time span 1992-2016 
(0.0179) as compared to that of the other two periods (0.079 and 0.030). On the other hand, it 
means that – having removed the most of the effect of the pension reform – what is left (i.e., the 
effect of the anti-discriminatory legislation) is found to differ before-after 2003, and not as much 
as the time span considered varies in length. 
Conclusion and discussion 
In this chapter, we analyzed the influence of the anti-discriminatory legislation, introduced 
in Italy in 2004, on the employment prospects of older workers by comparing two age groups: 
35-39 years old (which is not the target group for this legislation, hence serving as our control 
group) and 55-59 years old (who are among the target group of the legislation).  
We designed a quasi-experimental setting in which we compared the probability to be 
employed, instead of either unemployed or inactive, between the treatment and the control 
groups as a consequence of the anti-discriminatory legislation adopted in 2003, at the same time 
controlling for the confounding effect of the pension reform that was passed in 2004. 
As we reasoned in the first part of the chapter, this research design was intended to 
possibly infer the presence of discrimination against older workers in the labour market a 
contrario, that is, not aiming at disclosing discrimination per se – a difficult task in an era of 
contested prejudice, as Lucas (2008) contends – but focusing on its possible effects on its targets.  
Were we to find no effect of the legislation against age discrimination on our treatment 
group (workers between 55 and 59 years of age), we should have forcedly admitted to the 
absence of discrimination against them in the labour market. Of course, this would not have 
necessarily meant that discrimination had not been there, but just that it would not have been 
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visible in the time period and concerning the age range we have considered. On the contrary, a 
positive effect of the legislation on the employment prospects of older workers – once removed 
the confounding influence of the pension reform – would have been an indirect proof of 
discrimination against older workers being in operation. 
The latter is exactly our conclusion. Our results indeed show that the introduction of the 
legislation against age discrimination in the labour market had a positive effect on the probability 
of employment for workers of the age group 55-59. This result stands even controlling for the 
effect of the pension system reform, and irrespectively of how long the period under observation 
spans. In fact, we looked at three time periods: from the shortest one, with only one year before 
and after the policy introduction, to a middle-length one — four years before and after 2003 – to 
the longest, i.e. 11 years before and after the introduction of the policy under evaluation. 
Probably, the middle one can be considered giving more reliable estimates: the shorter period 
might not be enough for the policy to deploy its effect, while in the longest period a lot of other 
factors (such as the economic crisis) could distort the results. Notwithstanding this, we found 
that the difference in the employment prospects of the treatment and control groups significantly 
differed even in the most unfavourable time specification, i.e., from 2002 to 2004.  
The results we got are rather strong and significant and could be checked by means of 
other techniques and/or research designs in the future. For now, given the difficulties in finding 
age discrimination in operation in the labour market beyond any reasonable doubt, and even 
given the theoretical debates surrounding the notion of discrimination itself (Lucas 2008), we 
believe that our analysis constitutes a first, albeit indirect, evidence of age discrimination against 
older workers in Italy upon which future research can build. 
  
Chapter 3. Age discrimination: experimental research14 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we have discussed how studying discrimination has been a hard 
challenge for anyone, especially considering the blurring boundaries between discrimination and 
inequality happening due to non-discriminatory reasons. We concluded that using different approaches 
and methods is key to capture the complexity of this concept.  
In the first chapter we also discussed the importance of such factors as job type or experience 
on the hiring decisions made when the choice is between an older or a younger applicant. Another 
important factor (also, discussed in chapter 1) is the role of norms and social influence that weighs on 
the people when they are making potentially discriminatory decisions.  
In this chapter we would like to elaborate on the role of those factors and distinguish between 
them and the purely age factor.  
We will present the results of a laboratory study that we conducted among Italian students of 
the University of Brescia, Italy with the help of Ztree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Here, we will focus 
on age discrimination in hiring. This type of discrimination occurs when a potential employee is not 
accepted for a job position not because of his or her professional abilities but because of his/her age, 
i.e., being too old or too young. In our case, we concentrated on older job applicants for the reasons we 
have already discussed previously.  
In the first chapter we have discussed in detail and with various examples the use of 
experimental approach to studying discrimination, specifically in hiring (see sections 5 and 7 of that 
chapter). There we have also talked about the pro’s and con’s of those methods and the facts that 
laboratory experiments compared to other methods have been rarely used in the last years.  
While there are many examples of field experiments on age discrimination (e.g., Riach, Rich, 
2006, 2007, 2010; Albert, Escot, Fernández-Cornejo, 2011; Baert et al, 2015; Riach, 2015), with the 
laboratory research most of the previous studies are attributed to the 1970s and 1980s. Recently, 
                                                 
14 The experiment was conducted with the help of GECS laboratory at the University of Brescia. The 
author would like to thank its members: Prof. Flaminio Squazzoni, Prof. Marco Castellani, Niccolò Casnici, 
Linda Alengoz, Federico Bianchi, Jonnabelle Asis and Aliakbar Akbaritabar — for their useful comments on the 
experimental design and help with the organization and realization of the experiment. The author also expresses 
her to thanks Prof. Giangiacomo Bravo (Linnaeus University) for his useful comments on the experimental 
design and methods of data analysis.  
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Richardson and colleagues (2013) and Kauffmann and colleagues (2015) have used survey experiments 
to analyze people’s choices between hypothetical candidates depending on their age and other factors. 
Their findings indicated that older or older looking candidates were chosen less frequently than 
younger or younger looking ones. In this chapter we will follow in their footsteps and those of 
researchers of the past to see in the laboratory setting as to whether the issue is with age or other factors 
are more important? 
In the first chapter, we have discussed the importance of distinguishing among different 
motivations behind discriminatory or seemingly discriminatory actions. As we have pinpointed in the 
section 6 of the first chapter, there are two main purely discriminative reasons behind hiring decisions: 
imperfect information in the labour market (i.e., statistical discrimination) and cultural norms that 
favour youth at the expense of older people (tastes-based discrimination). Apart from them there are 
many other reasons (Table 1 on page 41) that can be attributed to both discriminatory reasoning and 
reasoning based on objective facts (i.e., the result is inequality that happens due to non-discriminatory 
reasons). Research on age discrimination unfortunately disregards these important, yet subtle 
distinctions in reasoning of the decision-makers, thus, potentially considering certain decisions as 
discriminatory whereas they are driven by non-discriminatory intentions, and vice versa. In order to 
disentangle this nexus of intentions and motivations, it is essential to control the decision environment, 
and this is what experimental research is suitable for (e.g., Boero et al., 2009). 
We have already discussed certain limitations of secondary data studies in capturing the 
differences in outcomes from different groups of individuals, which makes any attempt at 
distinguishing discrimination from inequality happening due to non-discriminatory reasons particularly 
difficult (Lucas, 2008, 2013). Indeed, these studies can at best explore the difference that may point 
towards discrimination or may not.  At worst, we may find seemingly no difference in the situations of 
the risk groups and the groups that are not at risk of discrimination. The last finding will not necessarily 
mean that the discrimination is not there. It may just hide in other actions and situations, even with 
people having, for example, equal pay but being harassed at work due to their age.  
On the other hand, field experiments on age discrimination have similar limitations as we have 
discussed in the first chapter. They do not allow to control for the factors that influence the potential 
employers’ decisions as consist only of resumes of the candidates sent in response to the vacancies and 
response rates received. The researcher, for example, cannot know who were other candidates with 
whom were compared the fictitious candidates. The researchers, in this situation, also cannot follow the 
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decisions-making process, thus, leaving any motivations behind the decisions out of the scope of the 
study.  
Although with all caveats, laboratory experiments are most suitable to control for the 
confounding factors and remove unnecessary ones by exploiting the artificiality of the setting. While 
real settings are context-specific and incorporate a variety of factors which might have an influence, 
our aim has been to concentrate on specific factors without pretension of empirical richness. 
Furthermore, while we understand the cautious attitude towards using students as experimental subjects 
and the fact that students and employed people can potentially act differently (e.g., Singer, Sewell, 
1989; Singer, Bruhns, 1991), more recent research did not find any significant difference between 
different subject pools, i.e., students vs. workers, in age discrimination research (e.g., Richardson et al., 
2013). Secondly, considering that we aimed to analyze discriminatory attitudes and the environment in 
which they could persist, a student population is suitable in representing the establishment of recent 
cultural frameworks and attitudes which will probably characterize the economy and the labour market 
in the next years. In this sense, students represent the upcoming future of the labour market in terms of 
attitudes and stereotypes.  
1. Research questions and hypotheses 
As we have discussed in the introduction, we believe that distinguishing, at least attempting to 
do it, it necessary for understanding of the finer points of discrimination process. This is why in this 
part of the thesis, we focused on, firstly, looking at the importance of various factors that could 
influence the employment of older people apart from age specifically. As was already said in the 
introduction to this chapter and in the first chapter, the type of vacancy and experience are no less 
important than age itself, according to the previous research. Aside from that, more subjective attitudes 
that often arise from the cultural and social environment play important role too, even if disentangling 
them is much more difficult than analysing more tangible factors. Thus, in our research we also aim to 
see whether reinforcing the pressure to comply with socially acceptable norms will result in the 
participants of the research to be more discriminative.  
Hence, in our research, we have focused on two main questions regarding the role of age and 
other factors that can influence recruitment decisions and the environment around recruiters. Here we 
will only state them and present some more explanations and elaborations below.  
The research questions are as follows:  
 74 
1. Are there objective characteristics of a job vacancy (i.e., executive vs. supervised), 
objective characteristics of applicants (education; additional training; experience), 
objective characteristics (age, gender) or subjective attitudes of recruiters that influence 
age discrimination among job applicants?  
2. Does an environment with strong social influence and pressure to comply with existing 
norms increase the level of age discrimination?  
While the first question is built on previous experimental research studying age discrimination, 
the second one aimed to enlarge the perspective to look at the social context in which decisions take 
place in more detail.  
Previous research suggested that older workers are often considered less motivated, competent 
and efficient, as well as less healthy than their younger counterparts (Riach, Rich, 2007; Kaufmann et 
al., 2015). This can probably explain the division of between young-type and old-type jobs with older 
workers being less discriminated when applying for old-type jobs (Perry & Bourhis, 1998). Research 
also found that competence matters, with younger applicants who are rated higher than older ones even 
when candidates have the same level of competence (Haefner, 1977). 
However, it is probable that the situation has changed today. On the one hand, people study 
longer and enter the job market later (e.g., Fernandes-Alcantara, 2018). On the other hand, the 
increasing life expectancy in most countries worldwide, the importance of off-the-job training and on-
the-job experience and later retirement policies and plans could have led to two different outcomes. 
The first one, as we pointed in the second chapter, is that the the increase of older people in the job 
market could have resulted in the enhanced age discrimination (Lozon, Barratt, 2013; Rippon et al., 
2013. However, the second one is the contrary: the various attempts at creating an ageing friendly 
society (e.g., WHO, 2002) could have made age differences less relevant.  
Nevertheless, health stereotypes can be important when the employer has to fill a vacancy that 
requires physical work and/or more intensive work effort, even if, as we said in the second chapter, 
some research shows that older workers have ways to compensate for age-related problems when 
working (e.g., Chaparro et al, 1999; Brooks et al, 2001; Lobjois, Cavallo, 2006; Schwerha, Wiker, 
Jaraiedi, 2007). However, this may be typically reconsidered when the job requires potential candidates 
to have some managerial, supervision experience and so be familiar with roles of autonomy and 
responsibility. Reaching supervisory positions usually requires years of professional work experience. 
To become an effective and reliable executive, an employee also needs to spend extensive time 
performing this role. Thus, more experienced albeit older workers may be more competitive than 
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younger workers for some positions. As we have seen in the introduction, experience often proves to be 
more important than other factors, thus, making older workers more competitive. 
Following this, we presented the first three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. For job vacancies with prevailing operative functions, if age is the only factor 
differentiating between two candidates, employers will choose younger candidates, thus systematically 
discriminating older applicants. 
Hypothesis 2. For the job vacancies with executive functions, if age is the only factor 
differentiating between two candidates, there will be no discrimination against either older workers or 
younger workers, i.e., decisions in favour of older or younger candidates will be equally distributed. 
Hypothesis 3. Higher experience and/or higher competence will outweigh the negative influence 
of age and decrease discrimination against older workers. 
Our final Hypothesis 4 is based, firstly, on previous studies on the importance of social 
influence (e.g. the role of social networks, rumors, social judgment, etc.) in individual decision-making 
(e.g. Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Muchnik et al., 2013) and hiring specifically (e.g. Takács et al., 2014; 
Dalal et al., 2015). Secondly, as we have discussed in the first chapter, one of the theories behind age 
discrimination is that cultural norms often position “young” as better than “old”. And, as we have 
already established in the first chapter, stereotypes play a very important role in the discriminatory 
decisions. Moreover, if we can also look at the other theory behind discrimination, i.e. the issues of 
imperfect information. In case of uncertainty in an attempt to avoid risky decisions, employers may 
start using age as a proxy for the candidates’ abilities if they cannot test those abilities on the spot (e.g., 
Aigner, Cain, 1977) and do not have all available information about those abilities. Or they may simply 
decide to follow their prejudiced beliefs often induced on them by the societal norms and values 
(Lucas, 2008). Either way, if imperfect information and/or social norms will give the employers the 
image of older people being worse at the job than younger people, they will act in a discriminative way. 
In a reverse situation, which we do not expect to be the case of age discrimination, they will act in a 
non-discriminative way. 
In this paper we induce on our participants from treatment group, who are playing the role of 
recruiters, an environment that is rather strict and homogeneous that requires the participants to comply 
with the way other people act, i.e. their reward depends on how close their responses will be to the 
responses of the previous participants. Their actions — whether discriminatory or not — will be a good 
indicator of how they frame their own environment and figure out the role of norms inside it. The 
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comparison with the control group (who will not be subjected to this influence) will serve as an 
indicator as to whether personal beliefs of the participants are consistent with the environment they feel 
to be in, i.e. whether their beliefs without open pressure are consistent with their actions when they are 
openly pressured to act as other people around them.  
By using this financial stimulus, we are adding an endogenous pressure on participants, in order 
to understand what they would consider “the standard”, “the habit”, “the norm”, in the hiring 
environment. Since participants are students who will soon be leaving education, we should be able to 
highlight the attitudes with which they are likely to enter the labour market. They will be working with 
people of different ages and experiences, and many of them within some years will either have 
connection to hiring decisions or, at the very least, to the in-place environment and the attitudes 
towards different groups of people, older workers among them.  
There can, of course, be two lines of reasoning. On the one hand, we may say that conforming 
to norms for the participants will mean conforming to the socially acceptable behavior, which will 
mean not discriminating, especially, if the participants are familiar with the anti-discriminatory 
legislation. However, this will only be the case if they believe that the firms around them are also 
strong believers of age not being a valid factor in decision-making. As we know from previous works 
about Italy, there are examples of age discrimination in labour market of Italy (Segalla, Jacobs-
Belschak, Muller, 2001; Rymkevitch, Villosio, 2007; Lazazzara, Bombelli, 2011) with age stereotypes 
not being considered something negative or discriminatory (Guaglianone, Ravelli, 2015). Thus, it is 
more likely that the participants will be also inclined to follow in this line of reasoning and, trying to 
conform to the environment, will become more discriminative. Hence, Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4. An initially unequal distribution of preferred applicants by previous recruiters 
will tend to amplify when the recruiters act in the environment of strong social pressure. Recruiters’ 
compensation will depend on their conformity with the majority decisions made by previous ones. 
Participants are expected to consider the social norm the belief shared by many employers about older 
workers to be less apt than younger workers.  
2. Methodology and experimental procedure 
As we said before, we are building our methodology of research on the previous laboratory and 
field studies in which researchers either simulated job market situations (laboratory experiments) or 
send fictitious resumes to the companies (field experiments).  
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In the simulated job market situations, participants are usually presented with CVs or videos of 
interviews with the candidates who vary in age, gender, race, experience, etc. and are either asked to 
evaluate these candidates (Locke-Connor, Walsh, 1980; Fusilier, Hitt, 1983; Avolio, Barrett, 1987; 
Cleveland et al., 1988; Gibson et al., 1993; Perry et al., 1996; Perry, Bourhis, 1998; Richardson et al., 
2013) or to make hiring decisions  (Haefner, 1977; Connor et al., 1978; Singer, Sewell, 1989; 
Kauffman et al., 2015). In laboratory experiments evaluation is more popular than direct choices. In our 
study we will ask participants to make a choice between the pairs of candidates in order to make the 
simulation as close as possible to the real-life situation.  
To examine the questions and hypotheses discussed in the previous sections, distinguishing 
among objective characteristics of the job vacancies, as well as among certain subjective characteristics 
of the job applicant is crucial. Furthermore, it is important to control for formal training and work 
experience as recruiters could consider this while deciding among alternatives (Haefner, 1977; Locke-
Connor, Walsh, 1980). This will also help us to distinguish discriminative preferences from rational 
risk reduction under uncertainty.  
Thus, for this study we simulated a hiring situation where the participants were asked to 
consider themselves employees of an agency which has to hire people for two vacancies: electrician 
and managing director for mergers and acquisitions. The first job is a physical one (which may provoke 
some age-stereotyping due to older workers being often considered less healthy) but also requiring 
knowledge and experience while the second one has executive functions, thus, requiring high level of 
experience and competence.  
The participants were presented with the vacancy description and pairs of short CVs of the 
candidates in which there was information about their age, gender, education, years of experience and 
whether they had any additional training in the recent years, 24 pairs of choices in total (see Appendix 
7). The vacancies were created based on the real vacancies on the job search websites. 
To control for possible confounding factors, we imposed certain simplifications to the 
recruitment process. Firstly, we assumed that all competing applicants had the same cost for the 
company who would eventually hire them (in terms of wages, social security payments, etc.). 
Secondly, all applicants were presented to recruiters with a short bio, without personal details, pictures 
or more vivid CVs. Finally, recruiters were asked to choose between pairs of candidates instead of a list 
so as to remove the impact of ordered sequence. While this is not what usually happens during real-life 
hiring processes, these simplifications are introduced in order to avoid the potential influence of 
unobservable factors.  
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By manipulating the variables inside the CVs and the participants’ decisions, we were able to 
check the first three hypotheses.  
To evaluate the fourth hypothesis, we divided our participants into control and treatment group. 
The control group was not informed about the specific form of remuneration, only that they will be 
paid in the end of the experiment, and, in the end, each participant received the same sum of 15 euros. 
The treatment group was informed that there was a group of participants who already took part in this 
experiment. The participants of the treatment group were told that for each decision matching the 
majority of responses (i.e. more than 50%) made by the control group they will receive 80 cents; for 
each decision not matching the majority of responses they would lose 80 cents. In case they lost more 
than gained, they would receive 5 euros for participating. Thus, they could earn between 5 and almost 
25 euros.  
In the end of the experiment, participants were presented with a questionnaire (see Appendix 7) 
whose purpose was to evaluate participants’ attitude towards older workers (aged 50+) in terms of their 
personal traits, not related to their professional abilities, and in terms of their professional abilities. The 
questionnaires were based on the previously performed surveys (Power (1987); Burdyak et al (2015)) 
conducted to study attitudes towards elderly people and/or workers.  
The detailed materials that were presented to the participants can be found in the Appendices 6 
and 7 in the end of this thesis.  
3. Data 
The study was conducted among 121 students of the University of Brescia randomly selected 
and aged from 18 to 34 (mean = 22.4; standard deviation = 2.5). 61 participants were part of the control 
group (from 19 to 27; mean = 21.9; standard deviation = 1.8), while 60 were part of the treatment 
group (18 to 34; mean = 22.9; standard deviation = 3.0). There were 70 females and 51 males with 36 
and 35 in the control group and 34 and 26 in the treatment group respectively (see Table 11). 
Table 11 — Data description (age and gender) 
Group Age Gender 
Control 
Min = 19; 
Max = 27; 
Mean = 21.9; 
Std. Dev. = 1.8 
36 females; 
25 males 
Treatment 
Min = 18; 
Max = 34; 
Mean = 22.9; 
34 females; 
26 males 
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Group Age Gender 
Std. Dev. = 23.0 
Both 
Min = 18; 
Max = 34; 
Mean = 22.4 
Std. Dev = 2.5 
70 females 
51 males 
 
Among all the participants, 43.8% had professional experience working with people age 50 and 
more (44.5% and 55.7% in the control group and 43.3% and 56.7% in the treatment group 
respectively). Almost 100% of those who did have experience reported it as “positive” (94.1% in all 
groups; 92.3% in the control, 96% in the treatment group). All participants had relatives of that age. 1/3 
of the participants were aware of anti-age discrimination legislation in the labour market (31.4% in 
total; 29.5% in the control group and 33.3% in treatment group) (see Table 12). 
 
Table 12 — Data description (Professional experience with older people; relatives age 50+ and 
knowledge about anti-discriminatory legislation) 
Group 
Professional 
experience with 
older people 
Quality of that 
experience 
Relatives aged 
50+ 
Knowledge about 
anti-
discriminatory 
legislation 
Control 
Yes — 44.5% 
No — 55.7% 
Positive — 92.3%; 
Negative — 7.7% 
100% 
Yes — 29.5% 
No — 70.5% 
Treatment 
Yes — 43.3% 
No — 56.7% 
Positive — 96.0%; 
Negative — 4.0% 
100% 
Yes — 33.3% 
No — 66.7% 
Both 
Yes — 43.8% 
No — 56.2% 
Positive — 94.1%; 
Negative — 5.9% 
100% 
Yes — 31.4% 
No — 68.6% 
 
Thus, we can see that the treatment groups did not differ a lot in terms of gender and age. They 
also possessed very similar level of experience in what concerned communications with older people 
and older workers and had similar level of knowledge of anti-discriminatory legislation. Thus, all those 
factors could not have influenced responses in the control and treatment groups and be the reason to the 
difference between them (if any).  
4. Results 
Firstly, we conducted a McNemar's test for binary data to test the main hypotheses.  
However, additionally to that we also conducted descriptive analysis to see whether there was 
any reason to believe that there is a difference due to gender of the candidates. After that we analysed 
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of the contingency pairs (a standard approach used in the type of research, e.g. Riach, Rich, 2006) and 
building of a mixed-effects logistic regression with random-effects on the participant (see, e.g., 
Williams, 1975; Stiratelli, Laird, and Ware, 1984; Kuk, 1995) for a more in-depth approach to analyze 
the effects of all the variables 
 
4.1 Direct hypotheses testing 
As per classical approach (e.g. Fisher, 1966), we took as a H0 hypothesis that there was no 
difference between responses, i.e. the responses of the participants did not change regardless of the type 
of job or differences in levels of experience and training. If p-values, resulting from the tests ran, were 
at least less than 0.1 or smaller, than we could reject the hypothesis of the equal distribution and accept 
the alternative hypothesis that there was a difference between the two. If not, then we did not reject H0 
and assumed that there was no difference and, thus, the responses given were independent. 
From the Table 13 below, for the first two hypotheses we can see that there is a difference 
between the choices made depending on the type of job as p-value is below 0.1 if the candidates had 
the same experience. However, the test here does not allow us to see the exact influence on decisions, 
i.e. who the participants favoured: older or younger candidates. We will discuss this in the next sections 
and see that the participants tended to choose younger candidates much more often if they possessed 
the same level of experience as older workers. 
For the third hypothesis, we can also see that experience and training influence the decision-
making process as p-value is less than 0.1. In the next sections we will discuss that higher experience 
and additional training made older candidates no less attractive for the recruiters and sometimes even 
more do than younger ones.  
Finally, for the fourth hypothesis we can see a high p-value, bigger than even 0.1. Thus, the 
extra social influence induced on the participants did not have any significant role in the decisions-
made and the responses of the control group did not significantly differ from the responses of the 
treatment group.  
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Table 13 — McNemar's test 
Hypotheses McNemar's chi2 P-value 
Hypothesis 1. For job vacancies with 
prevailing operative functions, if age 
is the only factor differentiating 
between two candidates, employers 
will choose younger candidates, thus 
systematically discriminating older 
applicants. 
241,06 0,0000 
Hypothesis 2. For the job vacancies 
with executive functions, if age is the 
only factor differentiating between 
two candidates, there will be no 
discrimination against either older 
workers or younger workers, i.e., 
decisions in favour of older or 
younger candidates will be equally 
distributed. 
272.92 0,0000 
Hypothesis 3. Higher experience 
and/or higher competence will 
outweigh the negative influence of 
age and decrease discrimination 
against older workers. 
  
Experience 97,45 0,0000 
Experience and competence 142,52 0,0000 
Hypothesis 4. An initially unequal 
distribution of preferred applicants by 
previous recruiters will tend to 
amplify when the recruiters act in the 
environment of strong social 
pressure. Recruiters’ compensation 
will depend on their conformity with 
the majority decisions made by 
previous ones. Participants are 
expected to consider the social norm 
the belief shared by many employers 
about older workers to be less apt 
than younger workers. 
0,23 0,6302 
 
However, as we used additional control and factors that could have influences the decision-
making, in the next sections we will delve into a more detailed analysis, particularly of the gender 
issue. It was not in the focus of this study, but we need to make sure that it does not influence the 
results in a significant way or, if it does, then how.  
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4.2 Descriptive analysis 
Here we analyzed the responses that were given by the participants from the control and 
treatment groups (see Appendix 8 from Figure 43 to Figure 66).  
For example, for the position of electrician, when both candidates were males we can see that 
when candidates differed only in age with the same experience and absence of additional training, the 
participants tended to remarkably prefer younger candidates to older ones (Figure 43), while when the 
older candidates were more experienced, the distribution was closer to 50:50 with a slight favour 
towards older candidates (Figure 44). When older candidate also had proof of additional recent 
training, the preference for older people became even higher. However, more than 20% of the 
participants still preferred younger candidates (Figure 45). This holds both for control group and for 
treatment group.  
When the candidates were both females, the overall preference was close to the one that we saw 
with the male candidates. The picture was the same for the situation with the difference in age only 
(Figure 46) and in age and experience (Figure 47). i.e. a strong preference towards younger candidates 
in the first case and a close to 50:50 situation in the second one. However, in the case of difference in 
age, experience and additional training the situation was slightly different from the one we saw with 
male candidates. While participants still preferred older candidates, the responses here were a lot closer 
to 50:50 than in the case of males, more that 34% in the control group and almost 42% in the treatment 
group preferred younger candidates. We can also see that the treatment group was more favourable 
towards older candidates than the control group, which was not the case for male candidates (Figure 
48).  
In case of comparison between younger male candidate and older female candidate, we can see 
that the preference for younger candidates was far more prominent than in previous cases. When age 
was the only difference (aside from gender), the younger candidate still preferred the older one to the 
same extent as when the candidates were of the same gender (Figure 49). However, the younger 
candidates were also preferred when the older candidate was more experienced, and treatment group 
was slightly more favourable towards younger ones than the control group (Figure 50). When older 
candidate also had additional training, the older candidates became chosen more often but still the older 
candidate was not preferred as often as it was in the case of two male candidates but the distribution 
was close to the one that we saw when looking at the female candidates: more than 30% from control 
group and more than 40% from treatment group prefer younger candidates (Figure 51). 
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In the case of younger female candidate and older male one, the situation was reversed. In the 
case of difference only in age, younger candidates were still preferred but to lesser extent than in all 
previous cases. More than 20% from control group and more than 30% from treatment group chose 
older males over younger females (Figure 52). In the case of difference in age and experience, the 
distribution was very far from 50:50 with older candidates being favoured more (Figure 53). When the 
older candidate also had additional training, the preference for older candidate was also much higher 
than in previous cases (Figure 54).  
For the position of managing director situation was a bit different from the position of 
electrician. For two male candidates, when the only difference was age, the preference for older 
candidates was slightly higher than in the case of electrician, even though the younger candidate choice 
was dominant (Figure 55). In the same time, when there was also a difference in experience, the 
distribution was very close to 50:50 as was with the position of electrician (Figure 56). The existence of 
additional experience among older candidates made the situation much more different: older candidates 
were a lot more preferred compared to the same thing with the electrician position even if for both 
positions older candidate was preferred (Figure 57). 
The response distribution for two female candidates was very close to the one for female 
candidates. It was almost the same when the difference was only in age with slightly higher preference 
for younger candidates (Figure 58). For the difference in age and experience, the picture was almost the 
same in the case of control group (almost 50:50) and different for the treatment group (older candidate 
is preferred) (Figure 59). With the additional experience thrown into the mix, the older candidates were 
prioritized as in the case of male candidates but to a slightly lesser extent (Figure 60). 
For the comparison between a younger male candidate and an older female candidate, older 
candidates here ended up in a better position than in the case of the electrician vacancy. A younger 
candidate was still significantly preferred than an older candidate if age was the only difference (Figure 
61) but preference for older candidates was shown in the treatment group when there was also 
difference in experience. Control group still preferred younger candidates but came close to 50:50 
distribution (Figure 62). When older candidate also had additional training, the decisions were largely 
in favour of older candidates (Figure 63), which was not the case for the electrician position.  
The picture was almost the same when the genders were reversed. An older male was favoured 
if he had more experience (Figure 65) and if he had more experience and training (Figure 66) than a 
younger woman but more than in the case of younger male and older female, i.e. the distribution was 
further from 50:50. When the only difference was age, the younger candidate was still preferred a lot 
more (Figure 64). 
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To summarize, we can say that the simple comparison between decisions showed us the 
following. 
1) Both in control and treatment groups the subjects tended to favour younger candidates 
against older candidates if the only difference between them was age for both electrician and managing 
director positions. However, in certain cases, the preferences between control and treatment groups 
differed slightly if genders of the participants were different. Treatment group showed slightly more 
favour towards older women for the managing director vacancy and to older males in case of 
electrician vacancy.  
2) When the older candidates had more experience than the younger ones, the distribution 
tended to become close to 50% vs. 50% for the position of the managing director. For the position of an 
electrician, the close 50% vs. 50% distribution held for the decisions when both candidates were of the 
same gender. As for the decisions when the candidates were of different genders, subjects tended to 
favour male candidates more (i.e., they preferred a younger male against an older female and an older 
male against a younger female).  
3) When older candidates had more experience and additional training than younger ones, older 
candidates were preferred but not as much as younger candidates were preferred compared to older 
ones if there was no difference in experience and training.  
Thus, we can theorize that there is discrimination against older applicants in the situations when 
they have no advantage against younger workers. The more advantages they have in terms of their 
professional experience and proof of their up-to-date knowledge, the more is the tendency of younger 
workers ending in a less favourable situation with no evidence of discrimination against older workers. 
In addition to that, women tend to end in less favourable position compared to men regardless of their 
age, especially if we are talking about the position of electrician which can be considered a “male”-type 
of job. They were slightly less disadvantaged in the case of the managing director position. This stands 
both for control and treatment groups, with the treatment group being slightly more favourable towards 
older candidates when it concerned the difference only in experience.  
We will now move onto the analysis of the contingency tables that will help us understand 
whether the differences seen in descriptive analysis are significant.  
4.3 Hypotheses correspondence tables’ tests with control for gender 
Here, we ran standard tests aimed at analyzing differences between responses in case gender 
differenced influenced the results. We used Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b 
test, as we had here binary and/or categorical variables (see tables in the Appendix 9). Ideally, those 
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tests should produce the same results. However, for example, chi-square is not the best measure if there 
are less than 5 values in any of the cells of the contingency table (Larntz, 1978). In this case, Fisher 
exact test is better. Thus, we used several tests to establish consistent results. 
Firstly, we checked the first two hypotheses, from which we expected to see whether difference 
in job types had a significant influence on the decisions made.  
Hypothesis 1. For job vacancies with prevailing operative functions, if age is the only factor 
differentiating between the two candidates, employers will choose younger candidates, thus 
systematically discriminating older applicants. 
Hypothesis 2. For the job vacancies with executive functions, if age is the only factor 
differentiating between the two candidates, there will be no discrimination against either older workers 
or younger workers, i.e. the decisions in favour of older or younger candidate will be equally 
distributed. 
First, to check our hypotheses, we ran tests on whether there is a relation between decisions 
made for the same pairs of candidates that differed only in the type of job. The tests showed that while 
for some decisions there was a dependency, for others — there was none. We ran these tests both for 
control and treatment groups. It is hard to draw any final conclusions as depending on the age and 
gender of the participants the results were different. We found strong significant results for the cases of 
both males when older candidate had more experience than a younger one and had additional training 
in the recent years at the top of it (5% significance); for younger male and older female with the same 
experience and training (1% for Chi-square and Kendall’s Tau-b and 5% for Fisher exact test); for 
younger male and older female with older candidate having more experience (5% for Chi-square and 
Kendall’s Tau-b and 10% for Fisher exact test); for younger female and older male with older 
candidate having more experience (10%) in the control group (see Table 47 in Appendix 9) and for 
both males with the same experience and training (5%), for both males when older candidate had more 
experience (5% for Chi-square and Kendall’s Tau-b and 10% for Fisher exact test), for both females 
with the same experience and training (5% for Chi-square and Kendall’s Tau-b; insignificant in Fisher 
exact test); for younger male and older female with the same experience and training (5%) in the 
treatment group (see Table 48 in Appendix 9). 
So, what we can conclude at this level is that the type of vacancy did have influence on the 
choice between an older and a younger candidate (as we also do in the descriptive analysis) but we 
need to do some more in-depth analysis (like regression analysis) to better understand the mechanisms. 
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At this stage, it is not possible to confirm of reject the hypothesis, as there are too many other variables 
that can play role.  
We ran the same tests to see whether we can accept or reject the hypothesis about the role of 
objective factors such as experience and additional training when there is also gender in the picture.  
Hypothesis 3. Higher experience and/or higher competence will outweigh the negative influence 
of age and decrease discrimination against older workers. 
Here we got a very strong connection between the decisions made and the form in which the 
candidates differed which was significant at 1% for all genders and job vacancies, as well as for control 
and treatment groups (see Table 49 and Table 50 in Appendix 9). This is in line with what we saw in 
our descriptive analysis. 
Finally, we ran the tests for the hypothesis about social influence. 
Hypothesis 4. An initially unequal distribution of preferred applicants by previous recruiters 
will tend to amplify when the recruiters act in the environment of induced organizational isomorphism. 
Recruiters’ compensation will depend on their conformity with the majority decisions made by 
previous ones. Participants are expected to consider the social norm the belief shared by many 
employers about older workers to be less apt than younger workers. 
Here the results were also inconclusive, showing the influence of treatment on some of the 
decisions but not on all of them. We found significant results for the position of electrician when a 
younger candidate was male and an older one was female. There was no difference in additional 
training and experience (5% for Chi-square and Kendall’s Tau-b and 10% for Fisher exact test), when 
older candidate was male and younger candidate is female and they only differ in age (10%), when 
older candidate was male and younger candidate was female and they also differed in experience (5%); 
when older candidate was male and younger candidate was female and they differ in experience and 
training (5%). For the managing director position we had differences when the younger candidate was 
male, older candidate was female and they differed in experience (1%) and younger candidate was 
female, older candidate was male and they differed in experience (10%) (see Table 51 in Appendix 9). 
As we can see, it is hard to say whether treatment had any influence as significant difference 
between groups showed only for some situations but not for most of them. Also, if we use strict 
approach (i.e., the 1% significance level as a cut point) we will see practically no difference between 
the two groups. 
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Currently, we can only say with certainty that other factors aside from age (experience and 
training) have an undeniable influence on recruiters’ decisions while gender role and factors aside from 
experience and training more in-depth analysis in needed. As classical tests do not give us conclusive 
results due to the existence of too many variables in our case, we will move onto modeling which we 
will discuss in next section. 
4.4 Mixed-effects logistic regression with random-effects  
All previous tests do not give us enough proofs or disproof of our hypotheses. For this reason, 
we are running a more complex model that will allow us to look at all the factors that could possibly be 
influencing the subjects’ decisions. This is mixed-effects logistic regression with random effects on the 
participants. 
It should be noted that some questions used in the questionnaire had to be excluded from the 
model: the subjects opinion of their working experience with older people (almost all subjects 
characterized it as positive, making it impossible to see any kind of variance); the opinion of subjects 
regarding the ability of younger and older people to master new technologies (almost all subjects 
considered younger people more capable to do this) and the questions about subjects having relatives 
aged older than 50 (all subjects had relatives of this age). All other variables used in the regression are 
presented and discussed in the Table 14 below). 
Table 14 — Variables' description 
Dependent variable Measurement Baseline Comments 
Age of the chosen 
candidate 
Dummy (1 — younger 
candidate; 0 — older 
candidate) 
Younger candidate  
Independent variables    
Type of position  
Dummy (1 — 
electrician; 0 — 
managing director) 
Managing director  
Treatment 
Dummy (1 — 
treatment group; 0 — 
control group) 
Control group  
Interaction: type of 
position and treatment 
 No treatment and 
managing direction 
position 
 
Candidates’ 
characteristics variables 
   
Candidates experience 
Dummy (1 — older 
candidate has more 
experience than 
younger one; 0 — 
Same experience for 
both candidates 
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Dependent variable Measurement Baseline Comments 
same experience for 
both candidates) 
Interaction: experience and 
treatment 
 No treatment and same 
experience for both 
candidates  
 
Candidates recent training 
Dummy (1 — older 
candidate had recent 
training; 0 — both 
candidates did not 
have training) 
Both candidates did 
not have training 
recently 
 
Interaction: training and 
treatment 
 No treatment and no 
recent training 
 
Candidate’s gender 
Categorical (1 — both 
males; 2 — both 
females; 3 — younger 
male and older female; 
4 — younger female 
and older male) 
Both males  
Interaction: candidates’ 
gender and treatment 
 No treatment and both 
males 
 
Participants’ 
characteristics variables 
   
Participants’ gender 
Dummy (1 — male; 0 
— female) 
Female  
Participants’ age Continuous —  
Personal professional 
experience with older 
workers 
Dummy (1 — has this 
experience; 0 — does 
not have this 
experience) 
Does not have this 
experience 
 
Knowledge about 
legislation against age 
discrimination in the 
labour market 
Dummy (1 — knows; 
0 — does not know) 
Does not know  
Father’s age Continuous —  
Mother’s age Continuous —  
Father’s employment 
status 
Categorical (1 — 
unemployed/inactive; 
2 — employed/self-
employed) 
Unemployed/inactive  
Mother’s employment 
status 
Categorical (1 — 
unemployed/inactive; 
2 — employed/self-
employed) 
Unemployed/inactive  
Participants’ attitudes 
towards older workers 
variables 
   
Who:    
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Dependent variable Measurement Baseline Comments 
— is more productive 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— is more competent 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— is more responsible 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— is better in mastering 
new technologies 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— takes more leaves due 
to illness 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— is more prepared to 
work overtime 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
— older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
— is better in group work 
Categorical variable (1 
— younger worker; 2 
—older worker; 3 — 
age does not matter) 
Age does not matter  
Participants’ attitudes 
towards older people in 
general variables 
   
Attitude (how they feel 
around older people) 
Categorical variable (1 
— positive; 2 — 
negative; 3 — neutral) 
Neutral The variable was 
created on the basis of 
a multiple-choice 
question (Which of the 
following words 
would best describe 
your general attitude 
towards and 
relationship with 
people aged 50 or 
more (choose no more 
than 3 answers)?)) 
with several possible 
responses. Responses 
“distant, wary, 
uneasy” were 
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Dependent variable Measurement Baseline Comments 
considered and 
negative; responses 
“sympathetic, friendly, 
co-operative, 
respectful, interested” 
— as positive; 
indifferent, 
responsible, none of 
the above” as neutral. 
If the number of 
“positive” responses 
was higher than the 
number of negative or 
neutral responses, the 
person was attributed a 
positive attitude; if the 
negative responses 
outweighed — the 
negative attitude was 
attributed. In case of if 
equal number of 
positive and negative 
choices, a neutral 
attitude was attributed; 
if there was equal 
number of all types of 
responses, a neutral 
attitude was attributed.  
Characteristics (what they 
think about older people) 
Categorical variable (1 
— positive; 2 — 
negative; 3 — neutral) 
Neutral The approach was the 
same as with the 
previous question. “Do 
you consider that most 
people over 50 are 
(choose no more than 
3 answers)? 
”Demanding, very 
conservative, boring, 
difficult to please” was 
coded as negative. 
“Cheerful, helpful, 
easy to get on with, 
encouraging, flexible, 
interesting” — as 
positive. None of the 
above as neutral.  
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First, we ran the model with only effects of the treatment, the position and the characteristics of 
the candidates, i.e. only on the variables that are directly connected to the job and to our main 
hypotheses (Model 1). The results are presented in the Table 15 and Formula 1. 
Formula 1: 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔)
= 𝟏, 𝟗𝟗 +  𝟎. 𝟒𝟑 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟒 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕
− 𝟐. 𝟐𝟒 ∗ 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 − 𝟎. 𝟒𝟔 ∗ 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟏. 𝟔𝟔 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑
∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓 ∗ 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟑 ∗ 𝒚𝒎𝒐𝒇 − 𝟎. 𝟒𝟓 ∗ 𝒚𝒇𝒐𝒎 + 𝟎. 𝟐
∗ 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔 ∗ 𝒚𝒎𝒐𝒇 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟎. 𝟔𝟔 ∗ 𝒚𝒇𝒐𝒎 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 
Table 15 — Mixed-effects logistic model (only effects of the position; candidates' characteristics 
and treatment) 
Variables Odds ratios Coefficients Significance level 
Type of position 
(base = Managing 
Director) 
Electrician 1.54  0.43 1 % 
Treatment (base = 
control group) 
Treatment group 0.90 - 0.10 n.s. 
Interaction: type of 
position and 
treatment 
Treatment group; 
Electrician 
1.41 0.34 10% 
Candidates’ 
characteristics 
variables 
    
Candidates’ 
experience (base = 
same experience for 
both candidates) 
Older candidate 
has higher 
experience 
0.11 - 2.24 1% 
Interaction: 
experience and 
training 
Treatment group; 
Older candidate 
has higher 
experience 
0.63 - 0.46 10% 
Candidates recent 
training (base = both 
candidates did not 
have recent training) 
Older candidate 
had recent 
training 
0.19 - 1.66 1% 
Interaction: training 
and treatment 
Treatment group; 
older candidate 
has recent 
training 
1.55 0.43 10% 
Candidates’ gender Both females 1.42 0.35 10% 
 
Younger male, 
older female 
1.53 0.43 5% 
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Variables Odds ratios Coefficients Significance level 
 
Older male, 
younger female 
0.64 - 0.45 5% 
Interaction: 
candidates’ gender 
and treatment 
Both females 1.02 0.2 n.s 
 
Younger male, 
older female 
1.17 0.16 n.s. 
 
Older male, 
younger female 
0.52 - 0.66 5% 
Constant  7.31 1.99 1% 
 
Here we see proof of the Hypotheses 1 and 2: a job that requires more physical activity is 
regarded as a better fit for younger workers than for older workers. We found that the position has a 
positive significant (at 1%) influence on the probability of choosing younger candidate compared to an 
old one. According to the odds ratios, younger person is 1.54 times more likely to be chosen than an 
older one for the position is electrician compared to the position of managing director Table 14.  
We see confirmation for Hypothesis 3: experience and additional training worked in favour of 
older candidates. Coefficients are significant at 1% level and negative, meaning that younger 
candidates are less likely to be chosen than older candidates. Judging by the odds ratios, younger 
candidates are 0.11 times less likely to be chosen compared to older candidates if an older candidate 
has more experience and 0.19 times less likely to be chosen if older candidate also has additional 
training (significance – 1%) (see Table 14). When these variables are interacted with treatment 
variable, the significance stays at 10% but as was the case with the job position, the predictive margins 
are so close that the difference is almost non-existent both for with experience and additional training 
(see Figure 5 and Figure 6). So, the treatment did not change the role of training in the choices made. 
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Figure 5 — Predictive margins for experience and treatment, Model 1 
 
Figure 6 — Predictive margins for training and treatment, Model 1 
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Hypotheses 4, according to these results, needs to be rejected: the influence of the treatment 
variable is insignificant, i.e. the decisions of the participants from the control group did not differ a lot 
from the decisions of the participants from the treatment group. This means that after we induced social 
influence on the participants and asked them to perform in the way that they would expect other people 
to perform the actions did not change much. Thus, social influence or no social influence the behaviour 
was more or less the same which could come from the fact that certain norms and attitudes are 
embedded in the peoples mind so strongly that they do not distinguish between their own attitudes and 
“what others think”. Their actions are already consistent with what is considered correct by other 
people. The interaction between position and treatment is slightly significant (10%) but when we look 
at the predictive margins (Figure 7) we can see that the confidence intervals overlap so strongly that 
there is practically no difference at all. So, the treatment did not have any particular influence on the 
role of the position in the choices made.  
 
Figure 7 — Predictive margins for the position and treatment, Model 1 
The candidates’ gender effect is weakly significant. According to the odds ratios, younger 
candidates were 1.42 times more likely to be chosen if both candidates were females compared to both 
males; 1.53 more likely if younger candidate was male and older was female and 0.64 less likely if 
younger candidate was female and older candidate was male at 10%, 5% and 5% level of significance 
respectively. Interacting it with the treatment did not present any significant results, aside from the last 
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group with 5% significance. We can also this from the predictive margins (Figure 8), i.e. treatment did 
not change the role of gender in the decisions made.  
 
 
Figure 8 — Predictive margins for applicant’s gender and treatment, Model 1 
With the next step, we introduced the characteristics of the participants both objective (age, 
gender, family characteristics) and subjective (attitudes towards older people) (Model 2). The results 
are in the Table 16 and Formula 2. 
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Formula 2 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (𝒄𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒚𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆)
= −𝟎. 𝟎𝟖 +. 𝟒𝟕 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟗 ∗ 𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟐. 𝟎𝟑
∗ 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 − 𝟎. 𝟖𝟏 ∗ 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟏. 𝟖𝟓 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 + 𝟎. 𝟓𝟐
∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 + 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎 ∗ 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 + 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓 ∗ 𝒚𝒎𝒐𝒇 − 𝟎. 𝟑𝟗 ∗ 𝒚𝒇𝒐𝒎 − 𝟎. 𝟐
∗ 𝒇𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝒚𝒎𝒐𝒇 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 − 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓 ∗ 𝒚𝒇𝒐𝒎 ∗ 𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕
− 𝟎. 𝟐 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒂𝒈𝒆 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 − 𝟎. 𝟐𝟑 ∗ 𝒍𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒔𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
+ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝒂𝒈𝒆 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝒂𝒈𝒆 +  𝟏. 𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝒑. 𝒇𝒂𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓
∗ 𝒑. 𝒎𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓. 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 ∗ 𝒚. 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟏 ∗ 𝒐. 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖
∗ 𝒚. 𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 − 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎 ∗ 𝒐. 𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟓 ∗ 𝒚. 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟑
∗ 𝒐. 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒑𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 − 𝟎. 𝟒𝟏 ∗ 𝒚. 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 + 𝟎. 𝟓𝟓 ∗ 𝒐. 𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔 − 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖 ∗ 𝒚. 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆
+ 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎 ∗ 𝒐. 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟏 ∗ 𝒚. 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟓 ∗ 𝒐. 𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒑 − 𝟎. 𝟑𝟎 ∗ 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆. 𝒑𝒐𝒔
+ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔 ∗ 𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒆. 𝒏𝒆𝒈 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟔 ∗ 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓. 𝒏𝒆𝒈 − 𝟎. 𝟓𝟎 ∗ 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓. 𝒑𝒐𝒔 
Table 16 — Mixed-effects logistic model (with participants' characteristics) 
Variables Odds ratios Coefficients Significance level 
Type of position (base = 
Managing Director) 
Electrician 1.60 0.47 1 % 
Treatment (base = 
control group) 
Treatment group 1.34 0.30 n.s. 
Interaction: type of 
position and treatment 
Treatment 
group; 
Electrician 
1.20 0.19 n.s. 
Candidates’ 
characteristics 
variables 
    
Candidates experience 
(base = same experience 
for both candidates) 
Older candidate 
has higher 
experience 
0.13 - 2.03 1% 
Interaction: experience 
and treatment 
Treatment 
group; Older 
candidate has 
higher 
experience 
0.44 - 0.81 1% 
Candidates’ recent 
training (base = both 
candidates did not have 
recent training) 
Older candidate 
had recent 
training 
0.16 - 1.85 1% 
Interaction: training and 
treatment 
Treatment 
group; both 
candidates did 
not have recent 
training 
1.68 0.52 10% 
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Variables Odds ratios Coefficients Significance level 
Candidates’ gender Both females 1.83 0.60 1% 
 
Younger male, 
older female 
2.12 0.75 1% 
 
Older male, 
younger female 
0.68 - 0.39 10% 
Interaction: candidates’ 
gender and treatment 
Both females 0.82 - 0.20 n.s. 
 
Younger male, 
older female 
0.90 - 0.11 n.s. 
 
Older male, 
younger female 
0.47 - 0.75 5% 
Participants’ 
characteristics 
variables 
    
Participants’ gender 
(base = female) 
Male 0.82 - 0.20 10%. 
Participants’ age  0.99 - 0.01 n.s. 
Personal professional 
experience with older 
workers (base = no 
experience) 
Has some 
experience 
working with 
older people 
1.06 0.06 n.s. 
Knowledge about 
legislation against age 
discrimination in the 
labour market 
 0.80 - 0.23 n.s. 
Father’s age  1.09 0.08 5% 
Mother’s age  0.95 - 0.06 10% 
Father’s employment 
status (base = 
unemployed/inactive) 
Employed 2.92 1.11 1% 
Mother’s employment 
status (base = 
unemployed/inactive) 
Employed 1.02 0.05 n.s. 
Participants’ attitudes 
towards older workers 
variables 
    
Who:     
— is more productive 
(base = age is not 
important) 
Younger than 
50 
0.98 - 0.02 n.s. 
 Older than 50 1.16 0.11 n.s. 
— is more competent 
(base = age is not 
important) 
Younger than 
50 
0.92 0.08 n.s. 
 Older than 50 0.74 - 0.30 n.s. 
— is more responsible 
(base = age is not 
Younger than 
50 
1.59 0.45 n.s. 
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Variables Odds ratios Coefficients Significance level 
important) 
 Older than 50 0.87 - 0.13 n.s. 
— takes more leaves 
due to illness (base = 
age is not important) 
Younger than 
50 
0.66 - 0.41 n.s. 
 Older than 50 1.75 0.55 5% 
— is more prepared to 
work overtime (base = 
age is not important) 
Younger than 
50 
0.83 - 0.18 n.s. 
 Older than 50 1.11 0.10 n.s. 
— is better in group 
work (base = age is not 
important) 
Younger than 
50 
1.36 0.31 n.s. 
 Older than 50 1.58 0.45 n.s. 
Participants’ attitudes 
towards older people in 
general variables 
    
Attitude (how they feel 
around older people) 
(base = neutral) 
Positive 0.74 - 0.30 n.s. 
 Negative 1.06 0.06 n.s. 
Characteristics (what 
they think about older 
people) (base = neutral) 
Positive 0.95 - 0.06 n.s. 
 Negative 0.61 - 0.50 5% 
Constant  0.92 - 0.08 n.s. 
 
As for the Hypotheses 1 and 2, we can conclude that the effect of position stays the same as in 
the Model 1, but the interaction with the treatment is not significant, i.e. the role of position does not 
depend on the treatment. This is not surprising as the treatment itself is not significant (see Table 16).  
For Hypothesis 3, higher experience and existence of additional training for older candidates 
decreased the probability of younger candidates being chosen, i.e. we do not reject the hypothesis. 
There is also a significant effect of interaction between experience and treatment (Table 16) and 
training and treatment (Table 16). 
However, for Hypothesis 4, we can see that treatment had practically no influence on the 
decisions made. When looking at the predictive margins, we can see that the confidence intervals 
overlap and, thus, the influence of treatment is barely noticeable  (Figure 9 and Figure 10).  
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Figure 9 — Predictive margins for experience and treatment, Model 2 
 
Figure 10 — Predictive margins for training and treatment, Model 2 
The pure candidates’ gender effect is also still significant (Table 16). According to the odds 
ratios, younger candidates were 1.83 times more likely to be chosen if both candidates are both female 
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compared to both males; 2.12 more likely if younger candidate was male and older was female and 
0.68 less likely if younger candidate was female and older candidate was male at 1%, 1% and 10% 
respectively. When the interaction with the treatment was introduced the significance remained only for 
the last group, which we can also see in the Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11 — Predictive margins for applicant’s gender and treatment, Model 2 
 
Most of other factors that could have influenced the decisions of the participants turned out to 
be insignificant or weakly significant (Table 16). Thus, gender of the participants is significant at 10% 
with male participants being 0.82 less likely to choose younger candidates than female participants. 
Father’s age, which was between 44 and 73 with the mean of 56.5, and mother’s age, which was 
between 41 and 68 with the mean 52.9, were significant at 5% and 10% respectively. The older the 
father, the higher was the probability of choosing younger candidate (1.09 times more likely). And, on 
the contrary, the older was the mother, the lower was the probability of choosing younger candidate 
(0.95 times less likely). Moreover, if the father was working, the participant was 2.92 times more likely 
to choose younger candidate. These results are hard to interpret as to better understand them it might be 
necessary to analyze family situations of the participants, delve more in the type of work that their 
parents were doing, see whether for some reasons for these participants their working or older fathers 
 101 
represented some stereotypes about older people or whether those subjects held certain views about 
younger people being more apt in the job than older ones. This could be an important proof of the fact 
that the environment around the participants plays a crucial role in their actions. On the other hand, as 
these results (apart from the father’s job) are very weakly significant and might not hold on bigger 
samples.  
Among attitudes only two variables proved to be significant. Firstly, those who believed that 
older people took sick leaves more often, were 1.75 times more likely to choose younger candidates 
(5% significance). This goes in line with the previous research about older people being considered less 
healthy and less physically capable and, thus, being discriminated because of this stereotype. In 
addition to that those who, in general, characterized older people with negative adjectives to choose 
older candidates instead of young ones (0.61 times less likely to choose a young candidate). One of the 
explanations for this could be that “demanding” was coded as a negative trait. It has negative 
connotations in general but could prove useful in terms of working environment.  
The main point of adding questions about attitudes of the participants towards older people was 
to try to distinguish between the two possible theories behind discrimination discussed in the first 
chapter: discrimination due to imperfect information in the labour market (i.e., statistical 
discrimination) and discrimination due to the cultural attitudes that consider “young” being better than 
“old” (i.e.,  tastes-based discrimination).  
As we can see, personal attitudes did not influence the decisions a lot, moreover, certain 
negativity towards older people lead to an inverse effect — participants who chose adjectives with 
negative meaning tended to choose older candidates more often. On the other hand, objective 
characteristics, such as experience and training played in favour of older workers. Additionally, 
stereotypes about the type of the profession and about the health status of older workers decreased their 
chances of getting hired. Both seem to swing more towards imperfect information theory than towards 
cultural stereotypes that consider “youth” being better than “old age”.  
Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we were studying discrimination among older workers (50+) through the use of 
laboratory experiment. Our aims were to see whether older people would be in any way disadvantaged 
compared to younger workers and, ideally, see whether discrimination played any role in this.  
We had four hypotheses among which we found proof for the first three. As previous research 
suggested, type of job (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and experience (Hypothesis 3) had more influence on the 
hiring decisions than age. For the job that required more physical action and that could have been 
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considered too demanding for in this sense for older workers, the subjects indeed preferred to choose 
younger candidates. On the other hand, older workers stood much better chances with a non-physical 
job with executive functions.  
We also showed the importance of on-going training (Hypothesis 3) for older workers that 
according to past research they are often denied (Adams, 2002; Cohn, 1982; Maxwell, 1989; O'Rand 
and MacLean, 1986) but that it is indispensable for them to stay competitive. Additionally, we saw that 
real discrimination happened only to those who at older age had the same experience as younger 
workers which is consistent with previous findings that we discussed in the first chapter (Baert et 1l., 
2015). Otherwise, with proper experience and training older workers sometimes become even more 
competitive than younger workers, as our results suggest.  
Social influence (Hypothesis 4), on the other hand, did not prove to play any role on the 
participants’ decision. Responses of the control group were quite consistent with the responses of the 
treatment group which proves that the attitudes and the level of discrimination do not fluctuate due to 
exogenous forces as the participants already have views quite close to what they expected to be correct 
for the most of the people around them. It could mean that beliefs and attitudes regarding age are rather 
deeply settled inside of participants’ mind and do not depend on additional exogenous stimulus and/or 
pressures.  
We, however, find that family has a role in the decision-making that is hard to explain due to 
lack of details. Specifically, we see that the age of both parents and the employment status of the father 
had statistically significant influence on the decision-making which could mean that the environment 
and the beliefs ingrained through personal experience with the family members may have serious 
influence on the attitudes towards older and younger people’s employment choices, even more so than 
some personal beliefs. Nevertheless, the mechanisms behind this influence are not clear from the 
results as more research is needed to uncover the specific details about the link that family environment 
had on the decisions-made.  
Among possible stereotypes, only health stereotype proved to be significant and decreasing 
chances of older people to be hired. Personal attitudes towards older people did not have any negative 
influence on older people chances and certain negativity towards them, as being considered 
“demanding” actually played in their favour. This could be interpreted in favour of statistical 
discrimination rather than tastes-based one as only factors  such as type of job that requires workers to 
be physically feat and worry about their health status actually decreased the chances of older people to 
be hired, i.e. it is probably based on the stereotype of older people being less healthy which is a belief 
that has ground based on the fact that people to become less healthy as they age. However, the reality is 
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such that it influences different people differently. Thus, basing hiring choice on an assumption about 
someone’s health without any proof (such as a medical certificate) would be discriminatory because the 
employer would be using someone’s age as a proxy. Nevertheless, as we said in the first chapter, this 
distinction in not ideal and may not cover all motivation behind the decisions made.  
Another important factor which was not the focus of this research but still requires some 
discussion is gender. Women seemed to be more at risk regarding recruitment decisions regardless of 
their age, especially if it concerned a “male” profession (electrician), while for the managing director 
professional experience and training had more chances to outweigh gender bias. However, all other 
things held constant, men were preferred over women both in case of women being older and younger.  
The results of the research point more towards discrimination due to imperfect information than 
towards cultural attitudes that picture “youth” as better than “older age”.  
All in all, the results of this research are useful for several reasons. 
Firstly, we can see that discrimination of older people is more likely to happen in situations 
when they had long career breaks or spend a lot of time in another type of job. In this case, even if they 
had enough experience to fill the position a younger candidate with the same experience was likelier to 
get the position. Thus, the issues of unemployment need to be tackled already with the younger cohorts 
which raises the questions of youth unemployment issues that we slightly discussed in the first chapter. 
Unemployment at younger ages which often happens due to younger people lacking necessary 
experience or knowledge for the jobs may lead to the increased problems with discrimination of elderly 
workers in future.  
Secondly, while we did not consider low-skilled job that required more physical work than 
knowledge and experience as some previous studies that we discussed in the first chapter (Riach, Rich, 
2006, 2007), we can still see that a with job that is physically more tiresome is likelier to put older 
people at disadvantage. Mainly, as we can also see from our results due to the health stereotypes. 
Changing them requires good health care from one side and promotion of active ageing from the other.  
Thirdly, the attitudes of employers who consider older workers not worthy of investment in 
terms of their training lead to older workers becoming incompatible in the labour market. And, as we 
saw, training is one of the crucial methods for tackling age discrimination in the labour market. 
Fourthly, attitudes come as a result of environment and culture that may, at least partially, 
influence the decision-making. This, again, in the conditions of ageing population and decreasing birth 
rates, requires the promotion of active ageing and fight against stereotypes that follow older age.  
Finally, our results show that Italy is not different from other countries in Europe in terms of 
attitudes towards older workers.  
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Limitations and further research 
This is an exploratory, for Italy especially, research which could benefit from a larger amount of 
participants and from experiment conducted with older participants who have more professional 
experience. In addition to that, it could benefit from more in-depth analysis of the influence of family 
factors on attitudes towards older workers, and from introduction of cognitive and/or psychological 
methods such as Implicit Association Test (IAT)15, for example, aimed at identifying unconscious and 
automatic reaction to concepts (older age, in our case). This could help delve more in the motivation 
behind potentially discriminative actions and to extract motivations that support the theory about 
cultural attitudes towards older age. As of now, finding proof for it (if such kind of discrimination 
indeed exist) is rather difficult.  
 
                                                 
15 Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation addressed issues of age discrimination of elderly workers in the labour 
market. This topic, as we have discussed in the first chapter, had received less attention than 
other forms of discrimination. This is due to the fact it has become really relevant only in the 
two-three decades when the society came to face with the situation of low birth rates, high life 
expectancy and, as a consequence, high dependency ratio. As a result, in most of the countries 
the retirement age was raised which resulted in the increased of the number older workers in the 
labour market.  
As was shown in the first chapter, there is substantial proof that older workers face 
discrimination in different countries due to their age as they are often considered not motivated 
enough, too old for the firms to invest in their training or too old to be able to learn new methods 
of work (e.g., Riach, Rich, 2007). And past research does show that with time cognitive and 
physical abilities tend to deteriorate (e.g., Zancada-Menendez, 2015, Federmeier, Kutas, Schul, 
2010; Rosenblum, Enger-Yeger, Fogel, 2013, etc.). However, the research also shows that older 
people can find ways to deal with their shortcomings (e.g., Chaparro et al, 1999; Brooks et al, 
2001) or even more — that their productivity does not suffer because of their age (Warr, 1994; 
Rhodes, 1983; McEvoy, Cascio, 1989; Bennington, Tharenou, 1996) or is even better than that 
of younger workers (e.g., Fyock, 1991; Rhodes, 1983). However, there is a lot of proof of older 
people being discriminated (e.g., Hassell, Perrewé, 1983; Kalish, Williams, 1983; Duncan, 
Loretto, 2004; Furunes, Mykletun, 2010; Riach, 2015). 
When analyzing definitions, types and different theories behind age discrimination, we 
came to a conclusion that distinguishing between real discrimination and inequality that arises 
from objective facts is not a straightforward task. There are many theories as to why older people 
end in an unfavourable position but whether they are discriminated or not depends a lot on the 
reasoning behind the decisions made employers. There are, however, two theories that we 
pinpointed as “purely discriminative”. The first one is the theory about imperfect information in 
the labour market which could be also considered statistical discrimination (defined by Arrow, 
1973; Aigner, Cain, 1977, etc.). The second one is the theory about cultural attitudes that 
consider “being young” a positive thing and “being old” a negative one. This one can be 
regarded as tasted-based discrimination (defined by Becker, 1971). We discussed that 
understanding what lies behind discriminatory or seemingly discriminatory actions is important 
as it is makes it easier to find ways to tackle discrimination.  
However, as was already said, understanding these mechanisms is difficult and the 
current methods of studies are not optimal to achieve the necessary result (Lucas, 2008, 2013). 
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Still, after presenting and analyzing the different approaches to studying discrimination, we 
settled that experimental and quasi-experimental approach can help us better, than other ones, in 
our attempts to shed light on these issues as they allow us to minimize the effects of 
unobservable variables and to focus only on the variables that matter for our study.  
Thus, in the second chapter we focused on the role of anti-discriminatory legislation that 
was introduced in Italy in 2003. Through the quasi-experimental, difference-in-difference 
approach we achieved to aims. Firstly, we proved that existence of the effect of this legislation 
on the probability of older workers to be employed. Secondly, through this, we indirectly 
showed that discrimination against older does exist in Italy. While in this study we could not 
look at the motivations behind these decisions, we, however, were able to prove the existence of 
the issue and the fact that legislation aimed at tackling them are needed and can function. 
However, in this chapter we also saw that the increased retirement age had a bigger role than 
anti-discriminatory legislation. 
In the third chapter, we addressed the more subtle sides of discrimination by running a 
laboratory experiment that simulated a hiring situation among students in the University of 
Brescia and to speculate about the two age discrimination theories behind decision-making. We 
were able to determine that older workers were severely disadvantaged than younger workers if 
younger and older workers had the same level of experience. They ended, however, even in a 
better position than younger workers if they had more experience and had proof of undergoing 
additional professional training in recent years. We have also seen that proof that older women 
faced higher discriminatory risks than men.  
However, we could also see that experience and up-to-date training played a very 
important role in decision-making, which means that older workers have a much higher chances 
in the labour market if they keep their professionalism on the level required by the labour 
market.  
We were able to touch upon motivations behind decisions, even though this pilot 
research, in this domain, raised more questions than answers. The environmental, in our case, 
family factors such as parent’s age and employment status, had significant influence on the 
decisions. However, the mechanisms behind them are unclear and require more research.  
While we were not able to find connection between decisions made and personal 
(positive or negative) attitudes towards older people or most of the stereotypes regarding old age, 
we could see that health stereotypes had influence on the decisions. Those participants who 
considered older people less healthy were more prone to choose younger candidates. In favour of 
the existence of this stereotype works also the fact that the type of job turned out significant: 
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electricians had higher probability of not being hired at older age than managing directors, and 
electrician requires to do more physical work that managing directors.  
The introduction of social influence in the laboratory experiment allowed us to see that 
the decisions made by treatment group (who was subjected to the pressure of making decisions 
that would be as close as possible to the decisions made previous by their peers) and control 
group (who was not subjected to this pressure) did not have any significant differences. This 
allowed us to indirectly conclude that the level of discrimination did not depend on any 
additional open pressure. The attitude of participants towards older and younger workers was 
already ingrained in their minds. However, we cannot state that these attitudes were due to 
disliked towards older people in general. None of the questionnaire responses allow for this 
explanation. Moreover, had the theory of cultural dislike towards older people been a relevant 
explanation, the tendency towards choosing younger people would have been much more 
prominent also in the situations when older people were more experienced than younger ones. 
However, this was not the case. The theory of imperfect information, though, would seem to fit 
as a better explanation. The participants did not know what were the reasons behind older people 
having the same level of experience as younger ones, they did not have enough information and, 
probably, just went with a safer solution.  
Additionally, health stereotypes (although obviously based on the real fact the health 
does deteriorate with age) were more in line with the theory of imperfect information. In our 
experiment, we did not provide the participants with information about the candidate’s health 
status. Thus, they, apparently, made assumptions based on their own understanding and general 
knowledge they had.  
While this study allowed us to understand a bit more about the process of decision-
making when hiring people of different ages, including the role of norms and stereotypes, there 
is a lot to be gained when conducting further research.  
More studies are necessary to understand the mechanisms behind these decisions, 
especially the more subjective ones, such as environmental role and subconscious attitudes that 
are hard to uncover with questionnaires. For example, cognitive approach towards prejudiced 
and discriminatory attitudes could benefit further studies a lot. The addition of Harvard  Implicit 
Association Test that relates to intergroup discrimination or to explicit measures of prejudice to 
such an experiment would help uncover more about the unconscious attitudes towards older 
people and their connection to decision-making.  
Farther research would also benefit from the repetition of the experimental study with 
older, more experienced in the job market, participants to see whether their responses will not 
differ from the responses of younger participants and if they will — in which form. 
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Additional studies of legislation may be a good idea in order to see that other laws 
influenced decisions regarding older workers. In our study, we only considered the role of 
retirement policies. However, there definitely exist other laws concerning labour market that 
could create room for discrimination or for protection against it and have an indirect effect on the 
employment situation of older workers.  
All in all, our research allowed us to conclude that certain level of discrimination does 
exist against older workers in the labour market in Italy and that the factors influencing the 
situation of older workers have both discriminatory and non-discriminatory roots. More studies 
of environmental factors and motivations behind decisions to further disentangle the finer 
specifics of the phenomenon.  
Moreover, the results show three directions in which actions aimed at tackling 
discrimination could go.  
Firstly, the legislations against discrimination do have effect. However, a more in-depth 
approach could benefit future legislations. 
Secondly, experience and training do have effect that outweighs the effect of age. Thus, 
the future problems of older workers (whose share will continue to increase with time) can be 
tackled by already addressing the issues of employment of younger people. 
Thirdly, positive image of ageing is necessary, as proven by past studies, being older 
does not mean incapable. Creating a more positive image of ageing, as well as helping older 
people by providing them with necessary training and devices that could help tackle age related 
problems could seriously improve their productivity and competitiveness in the labour market. 
All in all, this research provides useful insight into the existence of age discrimination 
and possible mechanisms behind it with more in-depth analysis than was done before, especially 
for Italian situation.  
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Appendix 1 — Chapter 2. Missing values 
Table 17 — Missing or removed for other reasons cases (Model 1) 
 All cases Treatment 
Outcome variable 
(with normally 
retired) 
Education 
and 
training 
Sector ISCO 
1992 201,007 175,184 945 0 6,095 156 
1993 200,550 174,584 998 0 6,380 146 
1994 198,935 172,896 1,045 0 6,348 155 
1995 203,434 176,422 1,121 0 6,394 167 
1996 202,432 175,350 1,139 0 6,349 184 
1997 201,541 173,885 1,203 0 6,362 192 
1998 201,835 174,289 408 876 6,373 927 
1999 200,625 172,869 408 777 6,370 898 
2000 199,367 171,670 401 738 6,509 0 
2001 196,236 169,309 404 0 6,710 179 
2002 194,041 166,840 416 0 6,776 172 
2003 192,359 164,886 410 0 6,760 198 
2004 172,264 147,577 475 138 5,527 209 
2005 704,372 602,298 1,853 992 22,115 727 
2006 684,303 586,219 1,816 183 20,884 623 
2007 677,746 582,386 1,783 139 19,493 579 
2008 671,939 579,255 1,794 343 18,504 572 
2009 659,561 570,265 1,754 200 17,331 553 
2010 662,986 574,021 1,624 273 16,730 572 
2011 657,569 571,443 1,497 244 16,290 523 
2012 606,972 527,304 1,332 255 13,775 574 
2013 611,255 531,373 1,319 247 13,685 536 
2014 604,580 526,846 1,339 660 13,479 525 
2015 597,872 522,283 1,365 580 12,913 589 
2016 584,571 510,831 1,368 422 12,443 671 
Total 10,288,352 8,900,285 28,217 7,067 280,595 10,627 
 
Table 18 — Missing or removed for other reasons variables (Model 2) 
 All cases Treatment 
Outcome variable 
(without normally 
retired) 
Education 
and 
training 
Sector ISCO 
1992 201,007 175,184 2,603 0 6,095 130 
1993 200,550 174,584 2,700 0 6,380 123 
1994 198,935 172,896 3,008 0 6,348 132 
1995 203,434 176,422 3,424 0 6,394 128 
1996 202,432 175,350 3,492 0 6,349 149 
1997 201,541 173,885 3,820 0 6,362 167 
1998 201,835 174,289 2,966 772 6,373 822 
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 All cases Treatment 
Outcome variable 
(without normally 
retired) 
Education 
and 
training 
Sector ISCO 
1999 200,625 172,869 2,859 697 6,370 802 
2000 199,367 171,670 2,662 686 6,509 0 
2001 196,236 169,309 2,550 0 6,710 179 
2002 194,041 166,840 2,476 0 6,776 172 
2003 192,359 164,886 2,450 0 6,760 198 
2004 172,264 147,577 2,527 133 5,527 177 
2005 704,372 602,298 10,095 937 22,115 627 
2006 684,303 586,219 9,752 173 20,884 548 
2007 677,746 582,386 9,334 135 19,493 498 
2008 671,939 579,255 7,906 338 18,504 512 
2009 659,561 570,265 6,548 200 17,331 485 
2010 662,986 574,021 5,779 272 16,730 477 
2011 657,569 571,443 4,850 244 16,290 416 
2012 606,972 527,304 3,699 254 13,775 442 
2013 611,255 531,373 3,426 247 13,685 401 
2014 604,580 526,846 2,982 652 13,479 392 
2015 597,872 522,283 2,899 572 12,913 410 
2016 584,571 510,831 2,834 419 12,443 487 
Total 10,288,352 8,900,285 107,641 6,731 280,595 8,874 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 — Chapter 2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 19 — Gender by age cohort, year and Model, %, 1992-2016 
 Model 1 (with normally retired) Model 2(without normally retired) 
  35-39 55-59 35-39 55-59 
Year female male female male female male female male 
1992 40.4 59.6 33.0 67.0 40.3 59.7 29.2 70.8 
1993 40.2 59.8 32.8 67.2 40.1 59.9 29.4 70.6 
1994 39.7 60.3 33.3 66.7 39.7 60.3 30.2 69.8 
1995 40.8 59.2 34.0 66.0 40.8 59.2 31.4 68.6 
1996 41.2 58.8 33.8 66.2 41.2 58.8 32.2 67.8 
1997 41.2 58.8 33.1 66.9 41.2 58.8 33.3 66.7 
1998 41.4 58.6 33.6 66.4 41.4 58.6 35.3 64.7 
1999 42.3 57.7 33.6 66.4 42.3 57.7 35.1 64.9 
2000 42.6 57.4 32.8 67.2 42.6 57.4 35.0 65.0 
2001 43.6 56.4 33.3 66.7 43.6 56.4 35.6 64.4 
2002 42.4 57.6 34.0 66.0 42.4 57.6 36.5 63.5 
2003 43.9 56.1 34.1 65.9 43.9 56.1 36.5 63.5 
2004 45.4 54.6 35.9 64.1 45.4 54.6 39.4 60.6 
2005 45.9 54.1 36.7 63.3 45.9 54.1 39.9 60.1 
2006 46.1 53.9 37.2 62.8 46.1 53.9 39.9 60.1 
2007 46.5 53.5 38.2 61.8 46.5 53.5 40.7 59.3 
2008 46.5 53.5 39.4 60.6 46.5 53.5 41.0 59.0 
2009 46.7 53.3 40.5 59.5 46.7 53.3 41.8 58.2 
2010 46.7 53.3 41.6 58.4 46.7 53.3 42.5 57.5 
2011 46.5 53.5 42.0 58.0 46.5 53.5 43.1 56.9 
2012 47.1 52.9 42.4 57.6 47.1 52.9 43.1 56.9 
2013 47.6 52.4 43.0 57.0 47.6 52.4 43.7 56.3 
2014 47.8 52.2 43.7 56.3 47.8 52.2 44.0 56.0 
2015 48.3 51.7 44.4 55.6 48.3 51.7 44.6 55.4 
2016 47.7 52.3 45.2 54.8 47.7 52.3 45.2 54.8 
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Figure 12 — Gender, 35-39 age cohort, Model 1, by year, %, 1992-2016 
 
Figure 13 — Gender, 55-59 age cohort, Model 1, by year, %, 1992-2016 
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Figure 14 — Gender, 35-39 age cohort, Model 2, by year, %, 1992-2016 
 
Figure 15 — Gender, 55-39 age cohort, Model 2, by year, %, 1992-2016 
Table 20 —  The distribution of the sample by level of education by age cohorts and year Model 1 
(with normally retired), %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
1992 51.1 36.7 12.2 80.8 14.0 5.2 
1993 50.5 37.9 11.6 81.1 14.0 4.9 
1994 48.9 39.4 11.7 78.8 15.5 5.7 
1995 47.0 40.9 12.1 76.2 17.8 6.0 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
1996 47.1 40.9 12.0 73.8 19.8 6.3 
1997 44.2 44.0 11.7 72.9 20.6 6.5 
1998 44.9 43.0 12.2 72.7 19.6 7.7 
1999 45.6 42.2 12.2 70.2 21.1 8.7 
2000 43.5 44.9 11.7 68.0 23.7 8.3 
2001 45.8 42.1 12.1 68.6 22.3 9.1 
2002 45.2 42.2 12.6 66.1 23.7 10.2 
2003 43.4 43.3 13.3 63.4 26.2 10.4 
2004 43.4 43.6 13.0 62.3 26.9 10.8 
2005 41.9 43.8 14.2 59.8 28.4 11.8 
2006 40.8 44.0 15.2 57.5 30.4 12.2 
2007 39.4 44.2 16.3 56.0 31.0 13.1 
2008 37.8 44.6 17.7 54.2 32.3 13.5 
2009 35.8 45.9 18.2 52.3 33.7 14.0 
2010 34.8 46.7 18.6 49.6 35.8 14.6 
2011 33.9 47.1 19.0 48.4 37.1 14.5 
2012 32.4 47.5 20.1 47.3 38.1 14.7 
2013 31.0 47.9 21.2 46.0 39.0 15.0 
2014 29.5 48.7 21.8 44.1 41.0 14.9 
2015 29.0 47.6 23.4 43.3 42.2 14.5 
2016 28.7 47.8 23.5 42.8 42.5 14.7 
 
 
Figure 16 — The distribution of the sample by level of education, 35-39 age cohort by year, 
Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
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Figure 17 — The distribution of the sample by level of education, 55-59 age cohort by year, 
Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
 
 
Table 21 — The distribution of the sample by level of education by age cohorts and year Model 2 
(without normally retired), %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
1992 51.1 36.7 12.3 79.4 14.6 6.0 
1993 50.5 37.9 11.6 79.6 14.7 5.7 
1994 48.9 39.4 11.7 76.9 16.2 6.8 
1995 47.0 40.9 12.1 74.2 18.7 7.1 
1996 47.1 40.9 12.0 71.2 21.1 7.7 
1997 44.2 44.0 11.7 69.7 22.1 8.2 
1998 44.8 43.0 12.2 69.7 21.2 9.1 
1999 45.6 42.2 12.2 68.0 21.9 10.1 
2000 43.4 44.9 11.7 65.6 24.8 9.6 
2001 45.8 42.1 12.1 65.9 23.4 10.8 
2002 45.2 42.2 12.6 63.4 24.7 11.9 
2003 43.4 43.3 13.3 60.3 27.5 12.2 
2004 43.4 43.6 13.0 58.9 28.5 12.5 
2005 41.9 43.9 14.2 56.2 29.8 14.0 
2006 40.8 44.0 15.2 54.0 31.7 14.3 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Tertiary 
2007 39.4 44.2 16.3 52.7 32.3 15.0 
2008 37.8 44.6 17.7 51.3 33.7 15.0 
2009 35.8 45.9 18.2 49.7 35.1 15.3 
2010 34.8 46.7 18.6 47.1 37.1 15.8 
2011 33.9 47.1 19.0 45.6 38.7 15.6 
2012 32.4 47.5 20.1 45.1 39.3 15.6 
2013 31.0 47.9 21.2 44.1 40.0 15.9 
2014 29.5 48.6 21.8 42.6 41.8 15.6 
2015 29.0 47.6 23.4 42.1 42.9 15.0 
2016 28.7 47.8 23.5 41.8 43.1 15.1 
 
 
 
Figure 18 — The distribution of the sample by level of education, 35-39 age cohort by year, 
Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
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Figure 19 — The distribution of the sample by level of education, 55-59 age cohort by year, 
Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
 
 
Table 22 — The distribution of the sample by existence of additional training in the last 4 weeks 
by age cohorts, year and Model, %, 1992-2016 
 With normally retired Without normally retired 
 35-39 55-59 35-39 55-59 
Year No training Training No training Training No training Training No training Training 
1992 97.6 2.4 99.4 0.6 97.6 2.4 99.2 0.8 
1993 97.3 2.7 99.2 0.8 97.3 2.7 99.2 0.8 
1994 97.2 2.8 99.4 0.6 97.2 2.8 99.3 0.7 
1995 97.0 3.0 99.1 0.9 97.0 3.0 98.9 1.1 
1996 96.6 3.4 98.9 1.1 96.6 3.4 98.6 1.4 
1997 96.2 3.8 98.8 1.2 96.2 3.8 98.6 1.4 
1998 96.0 4.0 98.6 1.4 96.0 4.0 98.2 1.8 
1999 94.9 5.1 98.0 2.0 94.9 5.1 97.6 2.4 
2000 95.2 4.8 98.4 1.6 95.2 4.8 98.3 1.7 
2001 95.6 4.4 98.6 1.4 95.6 4.4 98.2 1.8 
2002 96.4 3.6 98.6 1.4 96.4 3.6 98.4 1.6 
2003 96.5 3.5 98.3 1.7 96.5 3.5 98.3 1.7 
2004 93.8 6.2 96.9 3.1 93.8 6.2 96.2 3.8 
2005 94.7 5.3 97.4 2.6 94.7 5.3 97.0 3.0 
2006 94.3 5.7 97.2 2.8 94.3 5.7 96.7 3.3 
2007 94.0 6.0 96.9 3.1 94.0 6.0 96.4 3.6 
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 With normally retired Without normally retired 
 35-39 55-59 35-39 55-59 
Year No training Training No training Training No training Training No training Training 
2008 93.9 6.1 96.4 3.6 93.9 6.1 95.8 4.2 
2009 94.5 5.5 96.5 3.5 94.5 5.5 96.2 3.8 
2010 94.3 5.7 96.2 3.8 94.3 5.7 95.8 4.2 
2011 94.8 5.2 96.5 3.5 94.8 5.2 96.3 3.7 
2012 93.7 6.3 95.5 4.5 93.7 6.3 95.3 4.7 
2013 94.0 6.0 95.7 4.3 94.0 6.0 95.6 4.4 
2014 92.0 8.0 93.6 6.4 92.0 8.0 93.4 6.6 
2015 92.8 7.2 94.2 5.8 92.8 7.2 94.1 5.9 
2016 91.8 8.2 92.9 7.1 91.8 8.2 92.8 7.2 
 
 
Figure 20 — The distribution of the sample by those who had and did not have additional 
training in the last 4 weeks, 35-39 cohort by year, Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
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Figure 21 — The distribution of the sample by those who had and did not have additional 
training in the last 4 weeks, 55-59 cohort by year, Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
 
 
Figure 22 — The distribution of the sample by those who had and did not have additional 
training in the last 4 weeks, 35-39 cohort by year, Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
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Figure 23 — The distribution of the sample by those who had and did not have additional 
training in the last 4 weeks, Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
 
Table 23 — The distribution of the sample by macroregions by age cohorts and year, Model 1 
(with normally retired), %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
1992 24.1 21.3 18.3 26.0 10.3 25.5 21.4 19.9 24.1 9.1 
1993 23.7 21.1 19.3 25.5 10.4 25.6 21.3 20.3 24.2 8.6 
1994 23.8 21.9 19.0 24.9 10.5 26.2 21.5 20.1 24.0 8.2 
1995 25.0 22.3 19.0 23.6 10.0 27.3 20.7 21.1 22.7 8.2 
1996 25.4 22.0 19.3 23.4 9.9 27.1 21.8 21.1 22.0 8.0 
1997 24.9 22.4 19.1 23.9 9.7 27.8 21.9 20.8 21.9 7.6 
1998 24.4 22.3 19.2 24.3 9.8 28.2 22.2 20.6 20.7 8.2 
1999 25.9 22.5 18.8 23.1 9.7 28.0 21.8 20.7 21.5 8.0 
2000 25.6 22.2 19.3 23.3 9.6 27.0 22.0 20.4 21.8 8.8 
2001 26.2 22.0 18.5 23.1 10.2 26.6 20.4 20.6 22.9 9.4 
2002 26.2 22.6 18.4 22.5 10.3 25.9 21.8 19.7 23.5 9.0 
2003 26.7 22.2 18.4 22.7 10.0 25.5 21.4 19.7 24.1 9.2 
2004 27.8 23.9 14.9 23.4 10.1 27.2 20.9 17.0 25.4 9.5 
2005 28.6 23.2 14.7 23.2 10.3 27.6 20.5 16.5 25.1 10.3 
2006 27.9 22.9 15.3 23.4 10.6 27.4 21.2 16.2 24.9 10.3 
2007 27.8 22.6 15.7 23.3 10.6 27.5 20.7 16.7 24.9 10.2 
2008 28.1 22.4 16.1 22.7 10.6 27.5 20.4 16.7 24.9 10.% 
2009 28.3 22.2 17.1 22.0 10.4 28.0 20.7 16.8 23.5 11.0 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
2010 28.2 23.5 17.2 20.9 10.3 28.0 20.8 17.0 22.9 11.3 
2011 28.1 23.1 16.9 21.2 10.8 28.1 20.6 16.6 23.6 11.1 
2012 28.4 22.7 17.9 20.0 11.1 28.0 21.6 18.0 21.3 11.1 
2013 28.5 22.7 18.6 19.7 10.5 27.9 22.2 18.7 20.1 11.1 
2014 28.2 22.5 18.9 20.2 10.2 28.0 22.4 19.0 20.1 10.4 
2015 28.5 22.6 18.8 19.6 10.6 28.8 22.3 19.4 19.6 9.9 
2016 28.1 22.9 19.5 18.8 10.7 28.5 22.7 19.5 19.2 10.1 
 
 
Figure 24 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 35-39 age cohorts, by year, Model 1, 
%, 1992-2016 
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Figure 25 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 55-59 age cohorts, by year, Model 1, 
%, 1992-2016 
 
Figure 26 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 35-39 age cohorts, by year, Model 2, 
%, 1992-2016 
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Figure 27 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 55-59 age cohorts, by year, Model 2, 
%, 1992-2016 
Table 24 — The distribution of the sample by macroregions by age cohorts and year, Model 2 
(without normally retired), %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
1992 24.1 21.2 18.4 26.1 10.3 22.2 19.9 21.2 26.7 10.0 
1993 23.6 21.0 19.4 25.6 10.4 22.1 19.5 21.8 27.2 9.4 
1994 23.8 21.9 19.0 24.9 10.5 22.0 19.3 21.7 27.5 9.5 
1995 25.0 22.3 19.0 23.6 10.0 22.6 18.3 22.4 27.0 9.7 
1996 25.4 22.0 19.3 23.5 9.8 22.7 19.4 22.3 26.3 9.4 
1997 24.9 22.4 19.1 23.9 9.7 23.0 19.5 21.8 26.7 9.0 
1998 24.4 22.3 19.2 24.3 9.8 23.7 19.7 21.7 25.2 9.7 
1999 25.9 22.5 18.8 23.1 9.7 23.5 19.5 21.3 26.4 9.3 
2000 25.6 22.2 19.3 23.3 9.6 22.5 19.7 21.0 26.7 10.1 
2001 26.2 22.0 18.5 23.1 10.2 22.2 18.0 21.6 27.5 10.7 
2002 26.2 22.6 18.4 22.5 10.3 22.1 19.7 20.4 27.4 10.5 
2003 26.7 22.2 18.4 22.7 10.0 22.2 19.5 20.0 27.8 10.5 
2004 27.8 23.9 14.9 23.4 10.1 24.0 19.2 17.2 28.8 10.8 
2005 28.6 23.2 14.7 23.2 10.3 24.7 18.9 16.6 27.8 11.9 
2006 27.9 22.9 15.3 23.4 10.6 24.4 20.1 16.2 27.7 11.5 
2007 27.8 22.6 15.7 23.3 10.6 24.6 19.8 16.6 27.8 11.2 
2008 28.1 22.4 16.1 22.7 10.6 24.9 19.3 16.8 27.3 11.7 
2009 28.3 22.2 17.1 22.0 10.4 26.2 19.8 16.9 25.3 11.8 
2010 28.2 23.5 17.2 20.9 10.3 26.2 20.0 17.2 24.4 12.2 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
North-
West 
North-
East 
Center South Islands 
2011 28.1 23.1 16.9 21.2 10.8 26.7 19.9 16.7 25.0 11.8 
2012 28.4 22.7 17.9 20.0 11.1 27.0 21.2 18.1 22.1 11.5 
2013 28.5 22.7 18.6 19.7 10.5 27.1 21.7 18.9 20.8 11.5 
2014 28.2 22.5 18.9 20.2 10.2 27.4 22.0 19.2 20.6 10.7 
2015 28.5 22.6 18.8 19.6 10.6 28.3 22.1 19.6 19.9 10.1 
2016 28.1 22.9 19.5 18.8 10.7 28.1 22.3 19.8 19.6 10.3 
 
 
Figure 26 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 35-39 age cohorts, by year, Model 2, 
%, 1992-2016 
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Figure 27 — The distribution of the sample by macroregion, 55-59 age cohorts, by year, Model 2, 
%, 1992-2016 
Table 25 — The distribution of the sample by professions, current or last job, ISCO codes (1 
digit), 35-39 years old cohort, by years, %, Model 1, 1992-2016 
  35-39 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and 
shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft 
and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
1992 2.2 13.0 14.8 14.4 14.7 3.6 18.9 8.3 10.2 
1993 2.2 12.4 14.9 15.4 14.1 3.7 19.0 8.1 10.3 
1994 2.2 12.1 14.8 14.9 15.2 3.5 18.5 8.6 10.1 
1995 2.5 12.0 15.8 14.9 15.3 3.4 17.6 8.5 10.0 
1996 2.3 11.6 15.7 15.3 15.4 3.4 17.4 8.5 10.3 
1997 2.3 11.6 15.5 15.5 15.7 3.4 17.6 7.9 10.4 
1998 2.7 11.7 15.0 14.9 16.2 3.6 18.0 8.2 9.8 
1999 2.6 11.2 15.7 14.0 16.7 3.0 17.6 9.0 10.3 
2000 4.0 10.4 16.4 13.9 16.9 3.0 16.1 8.8 10.5 
2001 2.7 10.4 17.4 12.9 17.3 3.0 17.2 8.6 10.5 
2002 2.9 10.3 18.2 13.6 16.6 2.9 16.7 9.1 9.8 
2003 2.9 10.3 18.3 12.9 17.5 2.7 15.8 9.7 9.9 
2004 8.7 8.8 20.2 11.3 11.0 2.6 16.3 10.3 10.9 
2005 8.2 8.7 19.7 11.9 11.3 2.1 16.7 10.2 11.2 
2006 7.6 8.3 21.5 10.9 12.7 2.1 16.6 9.8 10.6 
2007 7.2 8.8 22.0 10.4 13.1 1.9 16.6 9.6 10.4 
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  35-39 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and 
shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft 
and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
2008 7.1 9.3 21.4 10.7 12.5 2.1 16.8 9.3 11.0 
2009 7.3 9.1 20.6 11.4 12.6 2.1 17.3 8.9 10.8 
2010 6.8 8.9 19.5 11.8 13.2 1.9 17.2 9.0 11.6 
2011 10.8 11.5 15.8 12.2 9.9 2.1 16.8 9.0 11.7 
2012 10.6 11.8 15.4 12.3 10.6 2.0 16.0 9.1 12.1 
2013 11.0 12.1 15.3 12.9 10.7 1.8 15.7 8.7 12.0 
2014 11.1 12.3 15.4 13.0 10.9 1.9 14.7 8.9 11.8 
2015 10.7 13.1 15.1 12.7 11.2 1.8 14.3 8.7 12.4 
2016 10.9 13.5 14.6 12.4 11.4 1.9 14.4 8.0 13.0 
 
 
 
Figure 28 — The distribution of the sample by professions (non-manual jobs), age cohort 35-39 
years old, Model 1 
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Figure 29 — The distribution of the sample by professions (manual jobs), age cohort 35-39 years 
old, Model 1 
Table 26 — The distribution of the sample by professions, current or last job, ISCO codes (1 
digit), absolute numbers, 55-59 years old cohort, by years, Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
 
55-59 
Year Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
1992 3.0 6.2 7.4 8.3 15.1 11.1 20.3 10.9 17.7 
1993 3.3 5.9 7.9 7.5 14.8 10.9 21.8 11.5 16.4 
1994 3.5 6.6 8.7 8.3 14.7 9.9 20.8 11.8 15.8 
1995 3.9 7.2 9.5 8.5 14.5 8.8 20.3 11.3 15.9 
1996 4.2 8.0 9.3 9.0 14.5 8.0 19.8 11.6 15.6 
1997 4.0 8.2 10.3 9.6 14.0 7.3 20.3 11.2 15.0 
1998 4.7 9.2 10.4 10.4 14.2 6.1 20.2 12.0 12.8 
1999 5.1 10.2 11.0 10.1 14.1 5.8 20.3 11.7 11.8 
2000 5.5 9.5 12.5 10.1 14.3 5.6 19.3 11.3 11.9 
2001 4.8 10.1 12.9 9.9 14.0 5.3 18.5 11.5 13.1 
2002 5.1 11.2 13.7 10.5 13.6 5.3 18.0 10.2 12.5 
2003 5.4 10.9 13.6 10.7 13.5 4.6 18.6 10.5 12.0 
2004 11.3 10.1 15.4 10.4 7.2 4.6 17.7 9.9 13.3 
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55-59 
Year Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
2005 11.2 10.9 15.6 10.6 6.7 4.3 17.5 10.4 12.5 
2006 10.9 11.1 17.8 10.2 7.1 3.7 16.9 10.1 12.2 
2007 10.5 11.4 18.9 9.5 7.3 3.4 16.8 10.0 12.3 
2008 9.7 11.4 18.9 10.5 7.5 3.7 16.6 9.4 12.3 
2009 9.2 11.7 18.2 11.7 7.4 3.9 16.5 9.1 12.3 
2010 8.9 11.8 17.7 12.5 7.5 3.6 15.8 8.6 13.5 
2011 9.5 15.6 13.8 12.9 7.5 3.6 15.2 8.7 13.3 
2012 9.4 14.6 13.4 13.3 8.3 3.6 15.2 8.5 13.8 
2013 9.6 14.7 13.5 13.5 8.9 3.4 14.3 8.6 13.5 
2014 10.1 14.2 14.2 13.9 8.8 3.2 14.0 8.3 13.2 
2015 9.7 13.8 14.4 14.1 9.7 3.0 13.7 8.3 13.3 
2016 9.5 13.8 14.6 14.2 10.4 3.0 13.0 8.1 13.4 
 
 
Figure 30 — The distribution of the sample by professions (non-manual jobs), age cohort 55-59 
years old, Model 1 
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Figure 31 — The distribution of the sample by professions (manual jobs), age cohort 55-59 years 
old, Model 1 
 
Table 27 — The distribution of the sample by professions, current or last job, ISCO codes (1 
digit), 35-39 years old cohort, by years, Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
1992 2.2 13.0 14.7 14.4 14.7 3.6 18.9 8.3 10.2 
1993 2.2 12.4 14.9 15.4 14.1 3.8 19.0 8.1 10.3 
1994 2.2 12.1 14.8 14.9 15.2 3.5 18.5 8.6 10.1 
1995 2.5 12.0 15.8 14.9 15.3 3.4 17.7 8.5 10.0 
1996 2.3 11.6 15.7 15.3 15.4 3.4 17.5 8.5 10.3 
1997 2.3 11.6 15.5 15.5 15.7 3.4 17.6 7.9 10.4 
1998 2.7 11.8 15.0 14.9 16.2 3.6 18.0 8.2 9.8 
1999 2.6 11.2 15.7 14.0 16.7 3.0 17.6 9.0 10.3 
2000 4.0 10.4 16.4 13.9 16.9 3.0 16.1 8.8 10.5 
2001 2.7 10.4 17.4 12.9 17.3 3.0 17.2 8.6 10.5 
2002 2.9 10.3 18.2 13.6 16.6 2.9 16.7 9.1 9.8 
2003 2.9 10.4 18.3 12.9 17.5 2.7 15.8 9.7 9.9 
2004 8.7 8.8 20.2 11.3 11.0 2.6 16.3 10.3 10.9 
2005 8.2 8.7 19.7 11.9 11.3 2.1 16.7 10.2 11.2 
2006 7.6 8.3 21.5 10.9 12.7 2.1 16.6 9.8 10.5 
2007 7.2 8.8 22.0 10.4 13.1 1.9 16.6 9.6 10.4 
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  35-39 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
2008 7.1 9.3 21.4 10.7 12.5 2.1 16.8 9.3 11.0 
2009 7.3 9.1 20.6 11.4 12.6 2.1 17.3 8.9 10.8 
2010 6.8 8.9 19.5 11.8 13.2 1.9 17.2 9.0 11.6 
2011 10.8 11.5 15.8 12.2 9.9 2.1 16.8 9.0 11.7 
2012 10.6 11.8 15.4 12.3 10.6 2.0 16.0 9.1 12.1 
2013 11.0 12.1 15.3 12.9 10.7 1.8 15.7 8.7 12.0 
2014 11.1 12.3 15.4 13.0 10.9 1.9 14.7 8.9 11.8 
2015 10.7 13.1 15.1 12.7 11.2 1.8 14.3 8.7 12.4 
2016 10.9 13.5 14.6 12.4 11.4 1.9 14.4 8.0 13.0 
 
 
Figure 32 — The distribution of the sample by professions (non-manual jobs), age cohort 35-39 
years old, Model 2 
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Figure 33 — The distribution of the sample by professions (manual jobs), age cohort 35-39 years 
old, Model 2 
Table 28 — The distribution of the sample by professions, current or last job, ISCO codes (1 
digit), absolute numbers, 55-59 years old cohort, by years, Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
 55-59 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
1992 3.4 6.6 7.7 7.8 16.5 12.3 20.1 9.5 16.1 
1993 3.8 6.4 8.3 7.4 16.0 12.1 20.9 10.0 14.9 
1994 4.2 7.4 9.1 7.1 16.4 11.1 20.5 10.2 14.0 
1995 4.8 7.9 9.9 8.0 16.4 9.8 19.3 9.2 14.7 
1996 5.1 8.9 9.6 8.3 16.6 8.8 18.9 9.0 14.9 
1997 4.8 9.2 11.0 8.8 16.2 8.4 18.7 8.3 14.6 
1998 5.7 10.1 11.0 9.8 16.4 7.1 18.1 8.6 13.2 
1999 6.1 11.1 11.2 8.7 16.4 6.7 18.4 8.4 12.9 
2000 6.0 10.4 12.6 9.3 16.3 6.4 17.3 8.5 13.2 
2001 5.3 11.2 12.7 8.9 16.1 6.1 17.3 8.5 13.8 
2002 5.5 12.1 13.7 9.1 15.8 6.0 16.9 7.3 13.5 
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 55-59 
Year 
Legislators, 
senior 
officials 
and 
managers 
Professionals 
Technicians 
and 
associate 
professionals 
Clerks 
Service 
workers 
and shop 
and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Skilled 
agricultural 
and fishery 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
2003 5.8 12.3 13.9 10.2 15.1 5.3 17.2 7.5 12.7 
2004 13.8 11.6 16.4 8.4 8.0 5.0 15.6 6.8 14.4 
2005 13.4 12.7 16.6 9.2 7.3 4.6 15.3 7.3 13.5 
2006 12.8 12.9 18.3 9.3 7.5 4.0 15.1 6.9 13.3 
2007 12.2 13.0 19.2 8.7 7.7 3.6 15.2 7.2 13.2 
2008 11.0 12.5 19.2 10.0 7.6 3.9 15.3 7.3 13.0 
2009 10.1 12.6 18.5 11.1 7.4 4.0 15.5 7.6 13.1 
2010 9.7 12.6 18.2 12.1 7.5 3.7 14.7 7.2 14.3 
2011 9.8 16.6 14.1 12.7 7.6 3.7 14.1 7.5 14.0 
2012 9.7 15.3 13.6 13.2 8.3 3.6 14.4 7.7 14.2 
2013 9.8 15.4 13.7 13.5 8.8 3.4 13.5 8.1 13.8 
2014 10.3 14.8 14.3 13.8 8.7 3.3 13.5 7.9 13.4 
2015 9.8 14.2 14.5 13.9 9.6 3.1 13.5 7.9 13.4 
2016 9.6 14.1 14.7 14.1 10.2 3.1 12.8 7.8 13.6 
 
 
Figure 34 — The distribution of the sample by professions (non-manual jobs), age cohort 55-59 
years old, Model 2 
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Figure 35 — The distribution of the sample by professions (manual jobs), age cohort 55-59 years 
old, Model 2 
Table 29 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of current or last job, by age cohorts and 
time, Model 1, %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
1992 6.7 30.7 62.6 17.3 33.5 49.2 
1993 6.4 30.1 63.5 16.4 35.1 48.5 
1994 6.5 30.0 63.4 15.6 33.9 50.4 
1995 6.6 29.9 63.6 14.0 34.7 51.3 
1996 6.6 30.0 63.5 13.0 34.3 52.7 
1997 6.1 29.5 64.5 12.0 34.0 54.0 
1998 6.4 30.1 63.5 10.1 34.0 55.9 
1999 6.1 30.2 63.7 8.8 34.5 56.7 
2000 6.0 29.4 64.6 8.4 32.9 58.7 
2001 6.0 30.1 64.0 9.0 32.7 58.3 
2002 5.5 30.6 63.9 9.0 32.1 58.8 
2003 5.6 31.5 62.9 8.2 32.6 59.2 
2004 5.4 32.3 62.3 9.0 32.2 58.8 
2005 5.1 32.4 62.5 8.5 31.6 59.9 
2006 5.1 31.2 63.7 8.0 30.4 61.6 
2007 4.9 31.1 64.0 7.8 29.8 62.4 
2008 4.7 31.7 63.6 7.3 28.9 63.8 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
2009 4.3 31.9 63.8 7.0 28.8 64.1 
2010 4.4 31.6 64.1 6.8 27.9 65.3 
2011 4.4 31.2 64.4 6.9 26.5 66.7 
2012 4.1 30.4 65.5 6.4 26.3 67.3 
2013 3.7 30.1 66.2 5.6 26.0 68.3 
2014 3.8 29.5 66.7 5.7 25.7 68.6 
2015 3.7 28.4 67.9 5.4 25.7 68.8 
2016 4.0 28.3 67.8 5.5 25.1 69.4 
 
 
Figure 36 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of the current or last job, 35-39 age cohort 
by year, Model 1, % 
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Figure 37 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of the current or last job, 55-59 age cohort 
by year, Model 1, % 
Table 30 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of current or last job, 35-39 cohorts and 
time, Model 2, %, 1992-2016 
  35-39 55-59 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
1992 6.8 30.7 62.5 17.5 31.8 50.7 
1993 6.5 30.1 63.4 16.7 32.4 51.0 
1994 6.5 30.1 63.4 15.5 31.2 53.2 
1995 6.6 29.9 63.6 14.4 31.3 54.3 
1996 6.6 30.0 63.4 13.6 30.5 56.0 
1997 6.1 29.5 64.5 13.0 28.6 58.4 
1998 6.4 30.1 63.5 11.3 28.8 59.9 
1999 6.1 30.2 63.7 10.2 29.5 60.3 
2000 6.0 29.4 64.6 9.8 28.1 62.0 
2001 6.0 30.1 64.0 10.4 28.6 61.1 
2002 5.5 30.6 63.9 10.1 27.9 62.0 
2003 5.6 31.5 62.9 9.1 28.3 62.6 
2004 5.4 32.3 62.3 10.2 26.3 63.5 
2005 5.1 32.4 62.5 9.2 26.0 64.8 
2006 5.1 31.2 63.7 8.7 24.9 66.4 
2007 4.9 31.1 64.0 8.3 25.0 66.7 
2008 4.7 31.7 63.6 7.8 25.5 66.7 
2009 4.3 31.9 63.8 7.3 26.3 66.3 
2010 4.4 31.6 64.1 7.1 25.6 67.3 
2011 4.4 31.2 64.4 7.1 24.4 68.5 
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  35-39 55-59 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
2012 4.1 30.4 65.5 6.5 24.9 68.6 
2013 3.7 30.1 66.2 5.7 24.8 69.5 
2014 3.8 29.5 66.7 5.8 24.8 69.4 
2015 3.7 28.4 67.9 5.5 25.2 69.3 
2016 4.0 28.3 67.8 5.6 24.6 69.9 
 
 
Figure 38 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of the current or last job, 35-39 age cohort 
by year, Model 2, % 
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Figure 39 — The distribution of the sample by sectors of the current or last job, 55-59 age cohort 
by year, Model 2, % 
 
 
Appendix 3 — Chapter 2. Parallel trend analysis 
 
Figure 40 — Employment rates of the treatment (55-59 years old) and control (35-39 years old) 
groups, %, Model 1 (with normally retired; before removal of missing variables) 
Table 31 — Logistic regression, analysis of the parallel trend, Model 1 
Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
Gender (base = female)     
Male 0.77 1% 
      
Level of education (base = elementary)     
upper sec 0.40 1% 
tertiary 0.76 1% 
      
Additional education or training in the las 4 
weeks (base = no education or training) 
0.27 1% 
      
Macroregion (North-West)     
North-East 0.10 1% 
Center 0.12 1% 
South -0.10 1% 
Islands -0.20 1% 
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Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
      
ISCO (base = elementary professions)     
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.66 1% 
Professionals 0.70 1% 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.54 1% 
Clerks 0.23 1% 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
0.15 1% 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 1.27 1% 
Craft and related trades workers 0.17 1% 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.00 n.s. 
      
Sector (base = agriculture)     
Industry 0.27 1% 
Services 0.70 1% 
      
Treated group of age 55-59 (base = aged 35-
39) 
-1.92 1% 
      
Year (base = 2003)     
1992 0.16 1% 
1993 0.16 1% 
1994 0.09 1% 
1995 0.01 n.s. 
1996 -0.08 10% 
1997 -0.10 1% 
1998 -0.26 1% 
1999 -0.25 1% 
2000 -0.15 1% 
2001 -0.15 1% 
2002 -0.04 n.s. 
2004 -0.54 1% 
2005 -0.56 1% 
2006 -0.51 1% 
2007 -0.52 1% 
2008 -0.55 1% 
2009 -0.68 1% 
2010 -0.72 1% 
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Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
2011 -0.74 1% 
2012 -0.94 1% 
2013 -1.02 1% 
2014 -1.10 1% 
2015 -1.09 1% 
2016 -0.99 1% 
      
Interaction year and treatment group (base == 
not treated and 2003) 
    
1 1992 0.03 n.s. 
1 1993 0.02 n.s. 
1 1994 -0.04 n.s. 
1 1995 -0.12 10% 
1 1996 -0.03 n.s. 
1 1997 -0.10 10% 
1 1998 -0.05 n.s. 
1 1999 -0.04 n.s. 
1 2000 -0.13 1% 
1 2001 -0.10 n.s. 
1 2002 -0.04 n.s. 
1 2004 0.40 1% 
1 2005 0.50 1% 
1 2006 0.50 1% 
1 2007 0.57 1% 
1 2008 0.65 1% 
1 2009 0.94 1% 
1 2010 1.10 1% 
1 2011 1.25 1% 
1 2012 1.52 1% 
1 2013 1.64 1% 
1 2014 1.80 1% 
1 2015 1.86 1% 
1 2016 1.84 1% 
      
Constant 0.93 1% 
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Figure 41 — Employment rates of the treatment (55-59 years old) and control (35-39 years old) 
groups, %, Model 2 (without normally retired; (before removal of missing variables) 
 
Table 32 — Logistic regression, analytical analysis of the parallel trend, Model 2 
Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
Gender (base = female)     
Male 1.05 1% 
      
Level of education (base = elementary)     
upper sec 0.33 1% 
tertiary 0.61 1% 
      
Additional education or training in the las 4 weeks 
(base = no education or training) 
0.16 1% 
      
Macroregion (North-West)     
North-East 0.07 1% 
Center -0.13 1% 
South -0.56 1% 
Islands -0.65 1% 
 154 
Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
      
ISCO (base = elementary professions)     
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.66 1% 
Professionals 1.03 1% 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.82 1% 
Clerks 0.54 1% 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
0.12 1% 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 1.24 1% 
Craft and related trades workers 0.25 1% 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.26 1% 
      
Sector (base = agriculture)     
Industry 0.27 1% 
Services 0.71 1% 
      
Treated group of age 55-59 (base = aged 35-39) -0.71 1% 
      
Year (base = 2003)     
1992 0.18 1% 
1993 0.17 1% 
1994 0.10 10% 
1995 0.01 n.s. 
1996 -0.08 n.s. 
1997 -0.11 1% 
1998 -0.27 1% 
1999 -0.25 1% 
2000 -0.15 1% 
2001 -0.16 1% 
2002 -0.04 n.s. 
2004 -0.55 1% 
2005 -0.56 1% 
2006 -0.51 1% 
2007 -0.52 1% 
2008 -0.55 1% 
2009 -0.68 1% 
2010 -0.72 1% 
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Employed (with normally retired in the base) Coefficients Significance level 
2011 -0.73 1% 
2012 -0.93 1% 
2013 -1.02 1% 
2014 -1.09 1% 
2015 -1.08 1% 
2016 -0.97 1% 
      
Interaction year and treatment group (base == not 
treated and 2003) 
    
1 1992 -0.39 1% 
1 1993 -0.33 1% 
1 1994 -0.22 1% 
1 1995 -0.30 1% 
1 1996 -0.18 5% 
1 1997 -0.10 n.s. 
1 1998 -0.14 10% 
1 1999 -0.13 10% 
1 2000 -0.18 5% 
1 2001 -0.13 5% 
1 2002 -0.04 n.s. 
1 2004 0.38 1% 
1 2005 0.40 1% 
1 2006 0.42 1% 
1 2007 0.46 1% 
1 2008 0.29 1% 
1 2009 0.43 1% 
1 2010 0.50 1% 
1 2011 0.58 1% 
1 2012 0.68 1% 
1 2013 0.72 1% 
1 2014 0.82 1% 
1 2015 0.87 1% 
1 2016 0.83 1% 
      
Constant 0.92 1% 
Appendix 4 — Chapter 2. DID analysis results (Model 1) 
Table 33 — Number of cases, Model 2, 1992-2016 
 Before After Total 
Control 137369 448177 585546 
Treated 94720 381295 476015 
Total 232089 829472 1061561 
 
Table 34 — DID analysis results, Model 1, 1992-2016 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 1) 
Standard error Significance level 
Before    
Control 0.740   
Treated 0.435   
Diff (T-C) - 0.305 0.002 1% 
    
After    
Control 0.665   
Treated 0.540   
Diff (T-C) - 0.125 0.001 1% 
    
DID 0.179 0.002 1% 
    
R-square 0.12   
 
Table 35 — Number of cases, Model 1, 1999-2007 
 Before After Total 
Control 60545 137881 198426 
Treated 38383 104788 143171 
 157 
 Before After Total 
Total 98928 242669 341597 
 
Table 36 — DID analysis results, Model 1, 1999-2007 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 1) 
Standard error Significance 
Before    
Control 0.765   
Treated 0.448   
Diff (T-C) - 0.317 0.003 1% 
    
After    
Control 0.723   
Treated 0.484   
Diff (T-C) - 0.239 0.003 1% 
    
DID 0.079 0.004 1% 
    
R-square 0.15   
 
Table 37 — Number of cases, Model 1, 2002-2004 
 Before After Total 
Control 24282 10865 35147 
Treated 15660 7473 23133 
Total 39942 18338 58280 
 
Table 38 — DID analysis results, Model 1, 2002-2004 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 1) 
Standard error Significance 
Before    
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Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 1) 
Standard error Significance 
Control 0.791   
Treated 0.499   
Diff (T-C) - 0.293 0.005 1% 
    
After    
Control 0.740   
Treated 0.478   
Diff (T-C) - 0.263 0.008 1% 
    
DID 0.030 0.009 1% 
    
R-square 0.15   
Appendix 5 — Chapter 2. DID analysis results (Model 2) 
Table 39 — Number of cases, Model 2, 1992-2016 
 Before After Total 
Control 137231 448158 585389 
Treated 69354 329483 389837 
Total 206585 777641 984226 
 
Table 40 — DID analysis results, Model 2, 1992-2016 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 2) 
Standard error Significance 
Before    
Control 0.812   
Treated 0.716   
Diff (T-C) - 0.097 0.002 1% 
    
After    
Control 0.741   
Treated 0.722   
Diff (T-C) - 0.019 0.001 1% 
    
DID 0.078 0.002 1% 
    
R-square 0.07   
 
Table 41 — Number of cases, Model 2, 1999-2007 
 Before After Total 
Control 60518 137872 198390 
Treated 69354 329483 107058 
Total 27680 79378 305448 
 
Table 42 — DID analysis results, Model 2, 1999-2007 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 2) 
Standard error Significance 
Before    
Control 0.827   
Treated 0.733   
Diff (T-C) - 0.094 0.003 1% 
    
After    
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Control 0.788   
Treated 0.749   
Diff (T-C) - 0.039 0.002 1% 
    
DID 0.055 0.004 1% 
    
R-square 0.08   
 
Table 43 — Number of cases, Model 2, 2002-2004 
 Before After Total 
Control 24271 10864 35135 
Treated 11571 5459 17030 
Total 35842 16323 51165 
 
Table 44 — DID analysis results, Model 2, 2002-2004 
Outcome variable 
Probability of being 
employed (Model 2) 
Standard error Significance 
Before    
Control 0.856   
Treated 0.779   
Diff (T-C) - 0.078 0.004 1% 
    
After    
Control 0.807   
Treated 0.761   
Diff (T-C) - 0.046 0.007 1% 
    
DID 0.031 0.008 1% 
    
R-square 0.08   
Appendix 6 — Chapter 3. Variables used in the 
experiment 
Table 45 — Electrician 
n VACANCY SEX AGE 
EDUCATION 
(specialized 
secondary 
education in 
the required 
field) 
 
CONSTANT 
UNDERGOING 
ADDITIONAL 
TRAINING 
YEARS OF 
RELEVANT 
EXPERIENCE 
CODE 
1 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
2 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF NO 10 B 
3 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
4 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF NO 25 C 
5 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
6 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF YES 25 D 
7 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
8 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF NO 10 F 
9 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
10 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF NO 25 G 
11 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
12 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF YES 25 H 
13 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
14 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF NO 10 F 
15 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
16 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF NO 25 G 
17 ELECTRICIAN M 35 SSE_RF NO 10 A 
18 ELECTRICIAN F 50 SSE_RF YES 25 H 
19 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
20 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF NO 10 B 
21 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
22 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF NO 25 C 
23 ELECTRICIAN F 35 SSE_RF NO 10 E 
24 ELECTRICIAN M 50 SSE_RF YES 25 D 
 
Table 46 — Managing Director 
n VACANCY SEX AGE 
EDUCATION 
(higher 
education in 
UNDERGOING 
ADDITIONAL 
TRAINING 
YEARS OF 
RELEVANT 
EXPERIENCE 
CODE 
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the required 
field) 
 
CONSTANT 
1 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 SSE_RF 
NO 
10 
A 
2 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 HE RF 
NO 
10 
B 
3 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
A 
4 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 
HE RF NO 
25 
C 
5 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
A 
6 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 
HE RF YES 
25 
D 
7 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
8 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF NO 
10 
F 
9 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
10 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF NO 
25 
G 
11 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
12 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF YES 
25 
H 
13 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
A 
14 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF NO 
10 
F 
15 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
A 
16 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF NO 
25 
G 
17 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
A 
18 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 53 
HE RF YES 
25 
H 
19 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
20 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 
HE RF NO 
10 
B 
21 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
22 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 
HE RF NO 
25 
C 
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23 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
F 38 
HE RF NO 
10 
E 
24 
MANAGINS 
DIRECTOR 
M 53 
HE RF YES 
25 
D 
 
 
Figure 42 — Comparisons that can be made between variables 
 
Appendix 7 — Chapter 3. Materials presented to the 
candidates 
Introduction 
Introduction — control group 
You will participate in an experiment that simulates job market situations.  
You will act as recruiters and will be presented with a variety of job vacancies and candidates 
for them.  
You will need to choose candidates for each vacancy presented who you will consider the best 
fit for it. 
When making your decisions please keep in mind the following information. The applicants 
have equal hiring costs for the employers, i.e. the wages, social security payments, etc. will be the same 
for all potential employees.  
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
Introduction — treatment group 
You will participate in an experiment that simulates job market situations.  
You will act as recruiters and will be presented with a variety of job vacancies and candidates 
for them.  
You will need to choose candidates for each vacancy presented who you will consider the best 
fit for it. 
When making your decisions please keep in mind the following information. The applicants 
have equal hiring costs for the employers, i.e. the wages, social security payments, etc. will be the same 
for all potential employees.  
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
This experiment has already taken place among other students. The amount of the payment you 
will receive will be calculated in the following way. For each response that will correspond to the 
majority of responses given by the previous group (i.e. more than 50%), you will receive 80 cents, for 
every response that will not correspond to the majority of responses you will lose 80 cents. In case you 
end in a loss, you will receive 5 euros participation fee. After the experiment you will need to feel in 
the questionnaire after which you will be able to know your winnings that will be communicated to you 
directly by the experimenter.  
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Resumes 
First vacancy. 
A position of an electrician in a construction company.  
Description: the successful candidate’s key responsibilities will include electrical installation, 
repairs and maintenance work which should be of high quality, ‘right first time’ and cost effective. 
Requirements: specialized secondary education; experience in a similar position of 3 years or 
more.  
 
First pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
Second pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988) and 25 years of relevant experience.  
Third pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988), proof of undergoing additional training in 2010 and 2016 and 25 years of 
relevant experience. 
Fourth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
Fifth pair of resumes: 
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1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988) and 25 years of relevant experience.  
Sixth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988), proof of undergoing additional training in 2010 and 2016 and 25 
years of relevant experience. 
Seventh pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
Eighth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988) and 25 years of relevant experience.  
Ninth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is female, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required 
field (graduated in 1988), proof of undergoing additional training in 2010 and 2016 and 25 
years of relevant experience. 
Tenth pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
Eleventh pair of resumes: 
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1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988) and 25 years of relevant experience.  
Twelfth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 35 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 2003) and 10 years of relevant experience.  
2. Second applicant is male, 50 years old, has specialized secondary education in the required field 
(graduated in 1988), proof of undergoing additional training in 2010 and 2016 and 25 years of 
relevant experience. 
Second vacancy 
A position of a Managing Director in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) in an advisory firm. 
Description: the successful candidate will be responsible for generation and execution of 
various M&A transactions (from the first discussions till the transactions’ closings); for the 
communication of the regulatory and financial information, as well as complex strategic issues in order 
to help the decision-makers in corporate finance transactions; for the development and enhancement of 
client networks, for the development and execution of sales and marketing strategies; for the 
mentorship of his / her subordinates.  
Requirements: Master’s degree in Economics, Accounting or Finance; at least 15 years of 
professional experience in M&A.  
First pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
Second pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 30 years ago.  
Third pair of resumes: 
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1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 30 years ago and has proof of undergoing additional training every 2-3 
years. 
Fourth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 
1989), started working in M&A 30 years ago.  
Fifth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting, started working in 
M&A 30 years ago.  
Sixth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in investment banking as an intern 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 
1989), started working in investment banking 30 years ago and has proof of undergoing 
additional training every 2-3 years. 
Seventh pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 
1989), started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
Eighth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 
1989), started working in M&A 30 years ago.  
Ninth pair of resumes: 
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1. First applicant is male, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is female, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 
1989), started working in M&A 30 years ago and has proof of undergoing additional training 
every 2-3 years. 
Tenth pair of resumes:  
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.   
Eleventh pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 30 years ago. 
Twelfth pair of resumes: 
1. First applicant is female, 38 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 2004), 
started working in M&A 15 years ago.  
2. Second applicant is male, 53 years old, has Master’s degree in Accounting (graduated in 1989), 
started working in M&A 30 years ago and has proof of undergoing additional training every 2-3 
Final questionnaire 
1. Age 
2. Gender 
3. Which of the following words would best describe your general attitude towards and 
relationship with people aged 50 or more (choose no more than 3 answers)? 
1. Distant 
2. Sympathetic 
3. Wary 
4. Friendly 
5. Uneasy 
6. Co-operative 
7. Respectful  
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8. Interested 
9. Indifferent 
10. None of the above 
4. Do you consider that most people over 50 are (choose no more than 3 answers)? 
1. Demanding 
2. Cheerful 
3. Helpful 
4. Difficult to please 
5. Easy to get on with 
6. Encouraging 
7. Very conservative 
8. Boring 
9. Flexible 
10. Interesting 
11. None on the above 
5. Who would you believe to have a higher proficiency level: workers older or younger than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
6. Who would you believe to be more dependable and responsible: workers older or younger than 
50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
7. Who would you believe to be better in group work: workers older or younger than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
8. Who would you believe to be more productive: workers older or younger than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
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2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
9. Who would you believe to be better in mastering new technologies and methods of work: 
workers older or younger than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
10. Who would you believe to be more prepared to work longer hours: workers older or younger 
than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
11. Who would you believe to be taking sick leaves more often: workers older or younger than 50? 
1. Younger than 50 
2. Older than 50 
3. The age does not matter 
4. Do not know 
12. Did you have any personal experience working with worker aged older than 50? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
13. If yes, in which circumstances? (open question) 
———————————————————————————————— 
14. If yes, would you consider it positive or negative? 
1. Positive 
2. Negative 
3. Do not know 
15. How old is your mother? 
________________________________________________________________ 
16. What is her occupation/What is his field of work? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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17. How old is your father? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
18. What is his profession/What is his field of work? 
________________________________________________________________ 
19. Are you familiar with the legislation against discrimination based on age in the labour market? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Appendix 8 — Chapter 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Figure 43 — Vacancy of electrician, both males, differ only in age 
 
Figure 44 — Vacancy of electrician, both males, differ in age and experience 
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Figure 45 — Vacancy of electrician, both males, differ in age, experience and additional 
training 
 
Figure 46 — Vacancy of electrician, both females, differ only in age 
 
 175 
 
Figure 47 — Vacancy of electrician, both females, differ in age and experience 
 
Figure 48 — Vacancy of electrician, both females, differ in age, experience and additional 
training 
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Figure 49 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger male and an older female, differ only in age 
 
Figure 50 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger male and an older female, differ in age and 
experience 
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Figure 51 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger male and an older female, differ in age, 
experience and training 
 
Figure 52 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger female and an older male, differ only in age 
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Figure 53 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger female and an older male, differ in age and 
experience 
 
 
Figure 54 — Vacancy of electrician, a younger female and an older male, differ in age, 
experience and training 
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Figure 55 — Vacancy of Managing director, both males, differ only in age 
 
Figure 56 — Vacancy of Managing director, both males, differ in age 
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Figure 57 — Vacancy of Managing director, both males, differ age, experience and training 
 
Figure 58 — Vacancy of Managing director, both females, differ only in age 
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Figure 59 — Vacancy of Managing director, both females, differ in age and experience 
 
 
Figure 60 — Vacancy of Managing director, both females, differ in age, experience and 
training 
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Figure 61 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger male, older female, differ only in age 
 
 
Figure 62 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger male, older female, differ in age and 
experience 
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Figure 63 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger male, older female, differ in age, 
experience and training 
 
Figure 64 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger female, older male, differ only in age 
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Figure 65 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger female, older male, differ in age and 
experience 
 
Figure 66 — Vacancy of Managing director, younger female, older male, differ in age, 
experience and training 
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Appendix 9 — Chapter 3. Results of the contingency 
tests 
Table 47 — Results of Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b tests to 
test Hypothesis 1 and 2 (control group) 
Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
(Electrician 
vs. 
Managing 
Director) 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Both males, 
same 
experience 
and training 
0.3726 0.542 0.0782 0.488 0.488 0.0782 0.5611 
Both males, 
same training, 
older 
candidate has 
more 
experience 
0.4553 0.500 0.0864 0.609 0.338 0.0864 0.5087 
Both males, 
older person 
has more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
6.0539 0.014 0.3150 0.032 0.032 0.3150 0.0153 
Both females, 
same 
experience 
and training 
0.3573 0.550 0.0765 0.481 0.481 0.0765 0.5693 
Both females, 
same training, 
older 
candidate has 
more 
experience 
0.7942 0.373 0.1141 0.446 0.263 0.1141 0.3813 
Both females, 
older person 
has more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
1.3202 0.251 0.1471 0.349 0.200 0.1471 0.2587 
Younger 
male, older 
female, same 
8.8651 0.003 0.3812 0.020 0.020 0.3812 0.0034 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
(Electrician 
vs. 
Managing 
Director) 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
experience 
and training 
Younger 
male, older 
female, same 
training, 
older 
candidate has 
more 
experience 
3.9937 0.046 0.2559 0.056 0.043 0.2559 0.0485 
Older male, 
younger 
female, older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.5604 0.454 0.0958 0.658 0.371 0.0958 0.4667 
Younger 
male, older 
female, same 
experience 
and training 
0.9099 0.340 0.1221 0.386 0.289 0.1221 0.3515 
Older male, 
younger 
female, same 
training, 
older 
candidate has 
more 
experience 
3.4574 0.063 0.2381 0.100 0.057 0.2381 0.0665 
Older male, 
younger 
female, older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.3963 0.529 0.0806 0.615 0.418 0.0806 0.5432 
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Table 48 — Results of Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b tests to 
test Hypothesis 1 and 2 (treatment group) 
Variables 
compared with 
treatment 
variable 
(Electrician vs. 
Managing 
Director) 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's V Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Both males, 
same 
experience and 
training 
6.3953 0.011 0.3265 0.036 0.036 0.3265 0.0129 
Both males, 
same training, 
older candidate 
has more 
experience 
0.6061 0.436 0.1005 0.604 0.302 0.1005 0.4452 
Both males, 
older person 
has more 
experience and 
recent training 
4.0994 0.043 0.2614 0.078 0.078 0.2614 0.0466 
Both females, 
same 
experience and 
training 
4.0678 0.044 0.2604 0.200 0.200 0.2604 0.0502 
Both females, 
same training, 
older candidate 
has more 
experience 
1.1871 0.276 0.1407 0.298 0.206 0.1407 0.2839 
Both females, 
older person has 
more experience 
and recent 
training 
1.2406 0.265 0.1438 0.384 0.205 0.1438 0.2736 
Younger male, 
older female, 
same experience 
and training 
No statistics possible to calculate as for Electrician everyone chose younger person 
Younger male, 
older female, 
same training, 
older candidate 
has more 
experience 
2.0332 0.154 0.1841 0.194 0.137 0.1841 0.1607 
Older male, 
younger female, 
older person has 
more experience 
and recent 
training 
0.5990 0.439 0.0999 0.583 0.424 0.0999 0.4546 
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Variables 
compared with 
treatment 
variable 
(Electrician vs. 
Managing 
Director) 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's V Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Younger male, 
older female, 
same 
experience and 
training 
4.6671 0.031 0.2789 0.054 0.040 0.2789 0.0332 
Older male, 
younger female, 
same training, 
older candidate 
has more 
experience 
1.4400 0.230 0.1549 0.250 0.207 0.1549 0.2393 
Older male, 
younger female, 
older person has 
more experience 
and recent 
training 
2.3151 0.128 0.1964 0.247 0.247 0.1964 0.1403 
 
 
 
Table 49 — Results of Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b tests to 
test Hypothesis 3 (control group) 
Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V 
Fisher exact 
test 
Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Electrician       
Males: Only 
Age; Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
62.0196 0.000 0.5870 0.000 0.5704 0.000 
Females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
52.5039 0.000 0.5401 0.000 0.4629 0.000 
Younger 48.4166 0.000 0.5186 0.000 0.4515 0.000 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V 
Fisher exact 
test 
Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
males; 
Older 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
Older 
males; 
younger 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
56.2116 0.000 0.5588 0.000 0.4573 0.000 
Managing 
Director 
      
Males: Only 
Age; Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
57.5084 0.000 0.5652 0.000 0.5302 0.000 
Females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
36.0623 0.000 0.5652 0.000 0.4685 0.000 
Younger 
males; 
Older 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
89.4171 0.000 0.7048 0.000 0.5805 0.000 
Older 
males; 
younger 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
84.7636 0.000 0.6862 0.000 0.5698 0.000 
 190 
Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V 
Fisher exact 
test 
Kendall's Tau-b 
    2-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
 
Table 50 — Results of Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b tests to 
test Hypothesis 3 (treatment group) 
Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V 
Fisher exact 
test 
Kendall's Tau-b 
     
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Electrician       
Males: Only 
Age; Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
68.8345 0.000 0.6133 0.000 0.5405 0.000 
Females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
47.0092 0.000 0.5068 0.000 0.4474 0.000 
Younger 
males; 
Older 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
42.4095 0.000 0.4814 0.000 0.4853 0.000 
Older 
males; 
younger 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
46.6471 0.000 0.5049 0.000 0.4926 0.000 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-value Cramer's V 
Fisher exact 
test 
Kendall's Tau-b 
     
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
+ Training 
Managing 
Director 
      
Males: Only 
Age; Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
58.9730 0.000 0.5677 0.000 0.5287 0.000 
Females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
45.2879 0.000 0.4975 0.000 0.3978 0.000 
Younger 
males; 
Older 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
70.4720 0.000 0.6206 0.000 0.6506 0.000 
Older 
males; 
younger 
females: 
Only Age; 
Age + 
Experience; 
Age + 
Experience 
+ Training 
67.7338 0.000 0.6084 0.000 0.6185 0.000 
 
Table 51 — Results of Chi-square, Cramer V, Fisher exact and Kendall’s Tau-b tests to 
test Hypothesis 4 
Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's 
V 
Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Electrician        
Both 
males, 
0.1697 0.680 0.0374 0.717 0.491 0.0374 0.6863 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's 
V 
Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
Both 
males, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
0.0786 0.779 0.0255 0.856 0.461 0.0255 0.7825 
Both 
males, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.0713 0.789 -0.0243 0.830 0.480 -0.0243 0.7930 
Both 
females, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
1.8263 0.177 -0.1229 0.365 0.187 -0.1229 0.1808 
Both 
females, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
0.6804 0.409 0.0750 0.468 0.260 0.0750 0.4131 
Both 
females, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.6729 0.412 -0.0746 0.457 0.263 -0.0746 0.4157 
Younger 
male, 
older 
female, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
5.1300 0.024 -0.2059 0.057 0.030 -0.2059 0.0246 
Younger 
male, older 
1.3977 0.237 -0.1075 0.303 0.165 -0.1075 0.2404 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's 
V 
Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
female, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
Younger 
male, older 
female, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
1.0020 0.317 -0.0910 0.357 0.207 -0.0910 0.3203 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
2.8053 0.094 0.1523 0.109 0.070 0.1523 0.0960 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
5.0064 0.025 0.2034 0.037 0.021 0.2034 0.0261 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
4.4587 0.035 0.1920 0.058 0.031 0.1920 0.0359 
Managing 
Director 
       
Both 
males, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
0.2403 0.624 0.0446 0.663 0.394 0.0446 0.6280 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's 
V 
Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
Both 
males, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
0.2036 0.652 0.0410 0.717 0.394 0.0410 0.6554 
Both 
males, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.3343 0.563 0.0526 0.762 0.393 0.0526 0.5682 
Both 
females, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
0.5803 0.446 0.0693 0.481 0.301 0.0693 0.4504 
Both 
females, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
2.4343 0.119 0.1418 0.145 0.084 0.1418 0.1210 
Both 
females, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.2179 0.641 -0.0424 0.684 0.397 -0.0424 0.6445 
Younger 
male, older 
female, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
0.2513 0.616 -0.0456 0.789 0.409 -0.0456 0.6208 
Younger 
male, 
older 
female, 
same 
training, 
older 
7.1199 0.008 0.2426 0.010 0.006 0.2426 0.0079 
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Variables 
compared 
with 
treatment 
variable 
Pearson 
chi2 
P-
value 
Cramer's 
V 
Fisher exact test Kendall's Tau-b 
2-sided 1-sided 
Statistics 
value 
P-value 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
Younger 
male, older 
female, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
1.0275 0.311 0.0922 0.491 0.254 0.0922 0.3155 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
same 
experience 
and 
training 
0.0014 0.970 0.0035 1.000 0.586 0.0035 0.9732 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
same 
training, 
older 
candidate 
has more 
experience 
3.4920 0.062 0.1699 0.082 0.047 0.1699 0.062 
Older 
male, 
younger 
female, 
older 
person has 
more 
experience 
and recent 
training 
0.8463 0.358 0.0836 0.529 0.274 0.0836 0.3623 
 
